The story of what really happened when Chinese troops withdrew from the Galwan Post 58 years later

How the title was born

Annexation of China to Tibet, construction of a road network in Aksai Chin, and the governments of Jawaharlal Nehru for the Territory of India led to a war in October 1962.

But months before that, Operation Galwan by an Army platoon remains a story of great courage and determination despite the terrain and severe weather.

In accordance with the Forward Policy, the platoon managed to reach the Galwan Valley in the early summer of 1962 and set up a post on 5 July. The soldiers were from the 1/8 Gorkha Regiment who were brought to the Ladakh sector.

Four battalions were deployed in Ladakh but the numbers were insufficient to defend the front, covering nearly 480km from Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in the north to Demchok in the south.

So nearly 36 posts were created with a force of only 10-20 soldiers each in the advancement locations. These posts were created to show presence and prevent the Chinese from coming further.

However, the Galwan Post played two roles. As it established the Indian presence in the Valley, it also cut the line of communication with a Chinese post further.

Unlike the way soldiers have now been flown in by helicopter or expelled downstream of the Shyok and Galwan rivers, soldiers in 1962 had to walk long distances on rough terrain and poor clothing to establish the post.

Speaking to ThePrint, former Northern Army Commander Lieutenant General HS Panag (Retd) said there are two roads from the Hot Springs area and the Gogra Post. One goes east to Kongka La, which is almost on the eastern edge of Aksai Chin. There is another road that runs from Hot Spring in the north to the source of the Galvan River.

What people do not realize is that in 1962 when we founded the Galvan Post, it was 80 km upstream. And the route we took was from Hot Springs, he said.

So from Hot Springs we approached the source of the Galwan River. We actually went and set up the post in 1962 after the Chinese. Direct access to Aksai Chin is from DBO and Galwan and so the Chinese are very sensitive, he added.

On July 6, 1962, the Chinese spotted Gorkhas and reported this to their headquarters.

Four days later, about 350 Chinese troops advanced into the Indian post, led by about 30 soldiers. They locked themselves in about 45 m away from the post and surrounded him. Records show that on the night of July 12, the Chinese came within 15 m of the post.

Despite being numbered, the Gorkhas remained on their land under Naik Subedar Jung Bahadur Gurung. They did not open fire as the instructions were open fire only when shot.

The Chinese later moved from the Indian post by about 200 m to what was seen as their attempt to allow Indian soldiers to return.

This resulted in the title, Chinese Troops Withdrawn from Galwan Post.

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Happened something happened in the Galvan post later

Since the Indian Post in Galwan had limited supplies, an attempt was made in the following days to supply helicopters with food and supplies for the 30 soldiers.

Shiv Kunal Verma, a military historian, wrote in his book, 1962: The war that was not, as of October 4, 5 Jats Alpha companies under Major SS Hasabnis were launched into the post by Indian Air Force (IAF) helicopters.

Gorkhas, having lived on the site by the jowl with the Chinese for more than two months, relocated returning Mi-4 helicopters over the next few days, Verma wrote.

Hasabnis spoke NDTV in 2012 about the incident, saying When we got into that post we knew we were walking into a death trap. “

He added, But the 60s made no sense because more than 2,000 Chinese were around us in fenced conditions and not only that, they had a very large ring around us from trenchers, morchas, communication weapons and they used to show their guns and jawans once said, saab yeh to haath baandh ke bhi ayenge to hum inko kahi nahi le jaa sakte (Even if they come with their hands tied, we can not take them anywhere). Even our jawans were making a joke out of it.

Hasabnis’s post was exceeded by an hour on October 20, the first day of the 1962 war. He was imprisoned and had been in a PoW prison for seven months.

His son, Lt. General SS Hasabnis, is now Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, Planning and Systems.

Why was politics created before?

Writing for governments Nehru Forward Policy, renowned lawyer and political commentator AG Noorani said in 1970: Few episodes in Sino-Indian relations have sparked greater controversy than the ‘forward policy’ adopted by India in the vicinity of 1961. has been quoted differently in explaining, mitigating or justifying China’s military attack in October 1962.

In his review of three books written about the 1962 war Himalayan mixture Brigadier JP Dalvi, Untold story by Lt Gen BM Kaul, Guilty men of 1962 by DR Mankekar Noorani wrote that politics has been criticized within India itself as a typical case of allowing domestic political considerations to transcend those of national security.

With regard to patrolling, Noorani noted, Nehru approved Armys’ proposal to send regular patrols to the border claimed by the Chinese according to their 1952 map. The instructions were issued in December 1960, but were not implemented for some time. due to lack of resources.

However, the Chinese remained active and spread well beyond the 1956 demand line in Ladakh and established new posts and built roads connecting them to the rear bases.

This progress and India’s apparent helplessness added to the growing domestic criticism of Nehru’s entire policy toward China. The Progress Policy was designed in response to progress and criticism, Noorani wrote.

Kaul, in his book that Noorani described as a grueling attempt at self-harassment, said Nehru stressed in the fall of 1961 that anyone who managed to create even a symbolic post would create a claim in that territory.

The whole basis of the Progress Policy was the assumption that China was unlikely to wage war with India. When Mr. Nehru thought of war, he always thought of a total war and not of a limited war, Kaul wrote.

In his book, Mankekar said the Army Headquarters directed its Western and Eastern Command to patrol as much as possible at the international border to place additional posts to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate each post. Chinese already established in Indian territory.

The recordings show that the message also said, This policy forward will be carried out without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese unless it becomes necessary in self-defense.

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