Trkiye's political change amid the terrorist attack on TUSA

Last week a series of events occurred in Trkiye. First, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Baheli, one of the main partners of the People's Alliance, made a surprise statement to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, demanding that PKK founder Abdullah Calan , who has been imprisoned in a high-security prison since 1999, are calling on the PKK to lay down their arms and end terrorism. More interestingly, Baheli suggested that Calan come to Parliament and make this call from the platform of the People's Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). This development has led to interpretations that a new process may have begun.

Immediately after Bahelis' statement, President Recep Tayyip Erdoan made a more cautious comment, calling for the continuation of the détente/normalization process he had initiated earlier, in a manner that would be inclusive of all parties. Erdoan has been highlighting regional developments in the Middle East for some time, emphasizing the need to maintain a strong domestic front.

While Baheli and Erdoan's statements were supported by the DEM party, the leader of the main opposition party met with Selahattin Demirta, a prominent figure in Kurdish politics, in prison and expressed support for maintaining this new political climate.

However, on October 23, a terrorist attack took place in Ankara, targeting TUSA, one of the main companies in the Trkiyes defense industry.

Nothing is a coincidence

What do we know so far about the TUSA attack in Trkiye?

The two terrorists involved in the attack are confirmed members of the PKK and were recruited in Trkiye. One of the attackers, a female terrorist, was previously chairwoman of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) (now DEM) in the central Hakkari district before being recruited by the PKK.

Security sources believe the attackers had recently entered Trkiye. It is suspected that they crossed Trkiye from Syria, probably using paramotors to facilitate the crossing. The two attackers are said to have undergone specialized training in Syria.

Reconnaissance and surveillance of the attack were likely carried out using digital intelligence methods. It is also suspected that they received specific intelligence about the location of the attack, although other individuals may have been involved in this aspect.

Targeting TUSA suggests that critical defense projects may have been the focus.

The timing of the attack is seen as a response by the PKK to recent calls for the group to disarm. Trkiyes airstrikes are currently targeting YPG military installations and infrastructure in Syria, and operations are expected to continue.

Although the DEM party condemned the attack, signaling its support for an internal peace process, it believes maintaining this stance could prove difficult for the party.

By focusing on the points highlighted above, we can analyze several issues. The first question is whether MHP leader Bahelis' call was planned or not.

President Erdoan's statements following Bahelis' remarks indicate that the government has not decided to begin a new process. This reinforces the belief that Baheli acted independently.

Erdoans calls for maintaining a strong domestic front in order to foster a new era of political and social détente by reducing the deep polarization between political actors in Turkish politics. However, Israeli aggression against Gaza and Lebanon, as well as the potential impact of an Israeli-Iranian conflict on Syria, worries Trkiye.

Rather than adapting to the scenarios likely to emerge from these developments, Ankara seems to have positioned itself to directly control the situation. The government has not reduced the priority of the fight against terrorism; on the contrary, after the TUSA attack, it seems engaged in a more intensive and more comprehensive anti-terrorism policy.

Is a new peace process possible?

The solution/peace process (2013-2015) aimed for the PKK to finally abandon its armed struggle and lay down its arms. This process aimed to put an end to the armed activities of the PKK and find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. Abdullah Calan, the PKK's founding leader, called for a ceasefire from prison in 2013, and the PKK began withdrawing from Turkish territory. The government has initiated discussions with Kurdish political representatives and civil society organizations. The most critical part of the process was the direct negotiation with the PKK.

However, in 2015 the process collapsed due to both domestic political developments and the impact of the Syrian conflict. Following a terrorist attack against two Turkish police officers, the government launched large-scale military operations against the PKK and the conflict resumed.

There are many reasons why the resolution process fails. Among the most important are: the absence of a comprehensive roadmap for a final solution, public opposition to negotiations with the PKK, lack of support from opposition parties, failure to take action timely constitutional amendments, the PKK's views on the 2011 uprisings in Syria. as an opportunity for the PYD and the YPG to gain influence; the maximalist demands of the PKK; the PKK's policy of arming itself, radicalizing civilians, and creating alternative power structures against the state and security forces through youth organizations in many towns in southeastern Trkiye, despite the ceasefire; and the failure to involve the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the peace process.

Given the lessons learned from the peace process between 2013 and 2015, it seems unlikely that a new process will be similar. One of the most important reasons is that the government does not define the events of recent weeks as a new process. However, it is also clear that a strategic roadmap aimed at simultaneously addressing constitutional and legal conditions, social and political conditions, intelligence mechanisms, security and military conditions and, most importantly, the dynamics created by regional and international actors has not yet been developed.

Another reason is the position of the PKK. The terrorist attack on TUSA shows that the PKK has no intention of laying down its arms and putting an end to terrorism. Even though Abdullah Calan calls for disarmament, disagreements within the organization could prevent a new process from continuing. In terms of Kurdish politics, the autonomy of the DEM party from the PKK is also seriously limited. The failure of the DEM party to sign the parliamentary condemnation of the TUSA attacks illustrates these limits.

On the other hand, the PKK's continued presence in Syria appears to be one of the most significant obstacles to a new peace process. For example, even if the PKK disarms in northern Iraq, it is not clear how PKK elements within the YPG could be separated.

The main weakness of any new process could be social support. Gaining social support for a new process could prove difficult for all political parties.

Given the above, there are serious obstacles to launching a new process, and these obstacles are unlikely to be overcome in the short term.

The Sabah Daily News Bulletin

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