Beijing May Be Shifting Gears, But It's Not Just About Trump

Donald Trump's second inauguration as president of the United States this week is expected to make global headlines. But anyone observing China's recent policy moves should be wary of seeing everything through Trump's prism.

Take for example the recent round of export controls between Washington and Beijing. After the US government imposed additional measures export restrictions to China of hardware and software used to manufacture semiconductors in early December, Chinese authorities responded within 24 hours in ban exports in the United States of a range of minerals, including gallium, germanium, antimony and ultra-hard materials essential to a range of industries, including electronics manufacturing.

The speed of Beijing's response was remarkable. Two years earlier, it took the Chinese government more than six months to adopt a new targeted export licensing regime for gallium and germanium, following the United States' introduction of export controls on advanced semiconductors in October 2022.

Some commentators have drawn both direct and indirect links between China's increased assertiveness in its use of export controls and other measures in preparation for Trump's return to the White House. Certainly, China is preparing for the next American presidency, but its actions are not limited to that.

China's assertiveness in December was likely driven by three alternative factors. First, Beijing views these actions as part of ongoing tensions with the United States, regardless of who occupies the White House. Second, the new export controls were adopted primarily in direct response to similar U.S. measures implemented by the Biden administration, rather than to the new Trump-led administration.

Third, in recent years, China has pursued policies that largely mirror those of the United States. The December announcements illustrate that China continues to learn from the American model and masters the adoption of policies as instruments of governance, an approach also called “lawfare”.

Another set of recent moves illustrates how Chinese tactics are evolving. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced in January its intention to impose new export controls on technologies used in battery components and raw mineral processing, two sectors in which China maintains a leading distinct advantage in global supply chains. China processes more than 90 percent of some critical minerals, has more than 80 percent of battery cell production and manufactures more than 90 percent of the world's anodes and cathodes.

In the past, China has generally chosen to restrict areas of its economy where the costs to itself were low. However, battery manufacturing and critical mineral processing are important parts of China's economy run by Chinese companies, meaning these restrictions could result in higher costs for China itself, a risk that she had previously avoided by imposing costs on others.

The decisions of recent weeks reflect an approach based on the belief that, regardless of changes in the U.S. administration, China feels like it is locked in a strategic struggle with the world's preeminent power.

However, we should not be too quick to reassess China's appetite for self-inflicted costs. A quick look at the list The number of items covered by the proposed new export controls shows that Beijing is targeting narrowly selected items that already face increased surveillance and restrictions from third countries. With proposed new export controls, China could seek to regain control of a dynamic that currently sees the country falling victim to restrictive measures. The EU and the United States have imposed restrictions on imports of electric vehicles to varying degrees.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that the new export controls have not yet been adopted and are currently open for public consultation. China may still be assessing the costs to its own businesses. Finally, as in the past, if new licenses were adopted, this does not mean that exports would be immediately restricted or prohibited but that China is multiplying the levers at its disposal, ready to be used if necessary.

Overall, signaling still plays a central role in how China uses restrictions. For example, the new restrictions announced on January 2, 2025 against American companies appear to target companies with little commercial presence or engagement with China.

Another recent development cited as evidence of China's preparation for a new US administration is the economic recovery packages announced until the fall. But rather than being a response to Trump's return and the possible imposition of 60% tariffs on imports from China, the stimulus appears to be a follow-up to Beijing's fiscal and monetary measures in 2023. .

THE Central Economic Work Conference in December 2024, highlighted the importance of domestic demand as a driver of economic growth. This emphasis on consumption and measures to boost it are a combination of concerns about the hostile external environment that Trump may be contributing to, but which has long been a fixed point in China's perception and internal performance. 'economy.

Boosting demand and revitalizing the domestic economy have always been a high priority for China since the Covid pandemic, especially after 2022. In other words, the importance of the domestic market in strengthening China's economic resilience and for his recovery efforts predates the likelihood of a second Trump presidency. It is not clear whether the next change of administration will increase the urgency on the part of Beijing.

Indeed, Trump or no Trump, China has long been assessing and trying to minimize its vulnerabilities, particularly in relation to the United States, while exploiting those of its competitors. During the four years of the Biden administration, China has adopted a growing number of policies that reflect the US policy framework. Interpreting China's current actions as a gear shift aimed specifically at the upcoming Trump presidency ignores how China's policymaking and implementation has evolved over the past several years. The decisions of recent weeks reflect an approach based on the belief that, regardless of changes in the U.S. administration, China feels like it is locked in a strategic struggle with the world's preeminent power.

Although these same policies may serve as bargaining chips in possible future negotiations, interpreting them solely as tactical measures to prepare for a second Trump presidency risks leading to political and strategic miscalculations. Not everything China does will concern Trump: most of it will concern China first and foremost.

Francesca Ghiretti is a research manager at RAND Europe, working primarily in defense and security and leading work on economic security. She is also an expert on economic security, China's foreign policy, and Europe-China relations and an adjunct research fellow at the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technology, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).