Russia joins the Chinese dream late

To begin with, Xi Jinping didn't like Russia. His priorities were elsewhere.

Since coming to power, Xi has had three priorities: ensuring that the color of the red flag does not fade, that China catches up with the United States economically and militarily, and finally achieving the so-called unification of the homeland (by which he means the reincorporation of Taiwan). This is what we call his Chinese dream.

In order to catch up with the United States, Xi Jinping's reference has never been Russia or even Europe. Moreover, Xi must follow in the footsteps of his predecessors, believing that China can continue to freely benefit from the United States, particularly in terms of technological development. (Intelligence partners group Five Eyes calls this open theft of Western secrets brazen, with Australia saying last year it was the most sustained, extensive and sophisticated theft of intellectual property and expertise. in the history of humanity“).

For this purpose he sent positive signals to the Obama administration through various channels during its first two or three years in office to establish a new type of great power relationship with Washington. President Obama was dismissive and only then did Xi's attention turn to Putin. Russia, although technologically far inferior to the United States, has always been considered a military power by Beijing. Obtaining military technology and resources from there could also go some way to helping Xi realize his Chinese dream.

Over the past 14 years, Xi and Putin have met more than 40 times. The two men clearly got along. They all call themselves old friends and wish each other Happy birthday every year. Of course, Xi's favorable opinion of Putin reflects his great sympathy for the Communist Soviet Union. Although Putin is not a communist, his desire build a Russian (essentially colonialist) world through wars of aggression is also understood by Xi as an effort to save the lost Soviet Union.

As for Putin's admiration and need for China, this shows that he already had the feeling, before the war in Ukraine, that Russia would be forced to turn to the East. The all-out war, in turn, significantly strengthened its search for an alternative to the West in China.

Whether or not Putin personally told Xi Jinping during his stay in Beijing in February 2022 that he had decided to launch a war against Ukraine, Beijing also smelled the inevitability of war. Moreover, China seemed confident that Russia would resolve the problem quickly. Beijing itself promised that Sino-Russian cooperation has no upper limit, which naturally encouraged Putin to attack his neighbor on a large scale.

China's superstitious belief in Russia's military competence was reflected in the behavior of the Chinese embassy in Ukraine at the start of the war. He apparently estimated that the Russian army would take kyiv on the third day of the war and asked Chinese students studying in Ukraine to hang chinese flags on their cars as they retreated from Ukraine, so that the occupying forces (i.e. the Russians) would instantly recognize them as coming from a friendly country and allow them safe passage.

Baffled by Russia's military failure, China was surprised and, initially at least, unusually humble in its explanations. Thus, in April 2023, Fu Cong, China's plenipotentiary to the European Union (EU), hastily refused the seriousness of the promise of unlimited Russian-Chinese cooperation in order to dispel Western fears of a Sino-Russian axis.

Uncertain of Russian success and undoubtedly fearing the consequences of its defeat, Beijing decided to play the role of mediator and neutral. He even broke with his previous pro-Russian practice and sent a special envoy to the Ukrainian front. report on the courage and determination of the Ukrainian resistance against the invading forces. All this, apparently, greatly upset Putin.

According to reports in major Western media, Putin was in possession of evidence that China's new foreign minister was secretly communicating with the United States and sent this information to Xi Jinping through its own channels. Xi was subsequently imprisoned Gang Qinand Putin's information significantly strengthened Xi's confidence in his old Russian friend.

Although the details of these reports remain unverified, Beijing's decision to loyally side with Putin has been clearly visible since then. All issues related to the war in Ukraine were coordinated with Moscow. The principle is clear: do not harm Russia's interests.

In order to build a new common world order challenging Western preeminence, Xi has been actively involved in expanding the BRICS organization, and in order to better coordinate militarily with Putin, he last year appointed Dong Jun, a Russian-speaking Who qualified at the Moscow Military Academy, as Minister of Defense. More importantly, Chinese intelligence has contributed to the growing network of links between the Russian military seeking to war related material Chinese companies. Not to mention other aid to the Russian army, such as the provision of satellite information.

The war in Ukraine has brought many benefits to China. Not only was China able to buy Russian oil and gas at a greatly discounted price, but the Russian market, which was not open to China, is now completely open. And it turns out that Russia has compensated for Western sanctions in various areas, including financial ones, with the help and cooperation of China. The volume of trade in 2023 far exceeds the trade targets set by both parties, which amount to $240 billion.

With the prolongation of the war, Russian demand for Chinese military products increased rapidly. It is true that China remains vulnerable to any threat to its trade; As a result, Xi claimed, at least on the surface, that he was not shipping weapons to Russia. Furthermore, China and Russia agreed that they would never openly call themselves allies.

But it has also stepped up efforts to supply dual-use products as well as critical manufacturing equipment and chips to the military industry. Most notably, Russia, reversing its distrust of Chinese development in the Far East, has allowed China to develop the Far East with Russia since last year, while China has agreed to invest directly in Russia's key industrial sectors, for a total of 79 major projects, with investments totaling more than $160 billion. The majority of investments will be made this year.

The development of the Far East makes the Russian military industry, taking into account the introduction of Chinese technology and equipment, more capable of waging a protracted war.

Ukraine and even other so-called hostile countries. This is the complete opposite of what some Western observers thought.

Of course, it is worth noting that the Sino-Russian axis presents its own vulnerabilities and unpredictabilities.

First, neither side will help the other at the expense of its own core interests, and this is especially true in the case of China. Take Putin's dream of a 2,600 km (over 1,600 miles) Siberian Power 2 gas pipeline projectFor example.

Russia desperately needs China to reach out and entirely replace Europe's pre-war purchases of natural gas. But Xi Jinping does not want to impose China's overreliance on Russia and excessive spending on pipeline construction, especially when other suppliers are available, this author learned in private discussions.

Moreover, while Xi does not want to see Putin fall in the wake of his defeat, he would not necessarily hold his hand if Western weaponry were to tip the scales in Ukraine's favor.

For China, the key issue is not Vladimir Putin's neck, but the survival of the Communist Party regime. This comes before everything else.

Dr. Junhua Zhang is a Senior Associate at the European Institute of Asian Studies (EIAS)

Edge of Europe is CEPA's online journal covering critical foreign policy topics in Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or of the Center for European Policy Analysis.