Beyond geopolitical arguments, Taiwan is personal for Xi and will remain a red line for China – Defense News

By Oorja Tapan

The spheres of influence argument continues to reflect old undercurrents of power – whether Ukraine for Russia or Taiwan for China. The personal history of Xi Jinping's ties to Taiwan adds to the geostrategic aspects of the conflict over Taiwan. Given China's ambivalence and disregard for Indian sovereignty claims as well as the geo-economic advantages of Taiwanese techno-industrialism, India can no longer remain indifferent on the Taiwan issue.

The end of the Cold War led to the belief that, with the United States as the sole superpower, the idea of ​​strong nations imposing their will on weaker ones (known as spheres of influence) was no longer valid. news. However, in 2020, Graham Allison pointed out that new spheres of influence still reflect old power dynamics and that the United States should share its global influence with other powers. In the 21st century, Russia and China have emerged as other powers with aggressive domestic policies and assertive foreign postures. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, in their authoritarian governments, pursue past national goals while seeking to maintain regime stability at home.

As evidenced by the actions of Putin in Ukraine and Xi in the Great South China Sea (which includes Taiwan) to preserve their respective spheres of influence, past preoccupations with prestige, manipulation, and coercion (borrowing the book's title by Joseph Torigian) may well snowball into higher-order security implications. Revisionist powers, as China experts like Hal Brands and others have pointed out, exhibit peak power syndrome. Russia and China are no longer ascendant powers that would demonstrate optimism, that is to say, peaceful rise. Both are under considerable pressure due to the erosion of their national legitimacy due to the economic and social difficulties induced by the pandemic. Fast-growing countries like China respond to economic recessions with reckless expansionist tendencies to fuel their domestic rhetoric with face-saving prestige games, coercion, and information warfare. Anxiety and aspirations are a dangerous recipe for explosion and balance of power theorists and policy makers should always remember that the seething frustration within the revisionist powers just needs a spark or a excuse to project and protect their regional hegemony and aspiring to superpower status.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to publish its list of banned Taiwanese imports. Military exercises crossing Taiwan's median line continue as do some distributed denial of service (DDoS)/cyberattacks, aside from recent analyzes of China's quarantine strategies for Taiwan. China also released a list of new measures against the United States – shutting down exchanges on a diverse set of issues, as well as new claims of re-educating Taiwan. We do not want to engage in hawkish rhetoric by making statements too early to declare the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis, but the United States and its allies are concerned about Taiwan being under Chinese influence given its geostrategic importance .

Chinese actions and concerns over Taiwan are also an excuse to rekindle another past obsession with Xi Jinping's family history. For Xi Jinping, Taiwan is not only a central issue to give a strong image as the general public's favorite supreme leader, but also for its national legitimacy. After mass protests against stifling lockdowns due to China's absurd zero-Covid policy, the Evergrande real estate crisis and the slowing economy, the Taiwan question for Xi is also personal and deeply emotional. Given his father Xi Zhongxun's deep involvement in the work of the United Front for Taiwan over several decades, the unification of Taiwan is for Xi a family and national duty. The Kuomintang (KMT) was the Chinese political party ruling mainland China from 1927 to 1949 before its exile on the island of Formosa (aka Taiwan or Republic of China). Xi Zhongxun was deeply engaged in secret negotiations with Taipei at the end of the Mao era and the failure of unification left a festering wound before his death. As a child, Xi had watched his father meet with KMT officials for United Front work, and as a result, Taiwan continues to simmer as a personal and geostrategic goal for both Xi and China. Strongman Chinese leader Xi Jinping has always placed the stability of the PRC regime above all else, but he has consistently reiterated that he will not let slip any part of the territory his ancestors left to the Chinese people.

Delhi has monitored Taiwan more closely in recent years than at any time before and in its concern over issues in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is close to India as both are major players in the Indo-Pacific construction alongside geo-economic interests and hence it will not be easy for India to remain on the fence in the years to come on the Sino-Taiwanese conflict. Taiwan, through its New Southward Policy (launched in 2016), has always encouraged a more concrete relationship with India. Law East New Delhi and Indo-Pacific outreach efforts also recognize Taipei for its deeper economic relationships; particularly in semiconductor and electronics manufacturing.

India's own sphere of influence, besides South Asia, also figures in the broader Indo-Pacific order for its foreign policy ambitions. China continues to show little respect for Indian red lines regarding Indian territorial sovereignty as well as in the neighborhood and South Asia. Direct Chinese military pressure in the Himalayas and oceans is forcing Delhi not to remain neutral here, even in Indo-Pacific affairs. There are serious concerns in New Delhi about possible Chinese hegemony in Asia. Maintaining an elusive position on Taiwan will not help Delhi in the long run. If tensions escalate, neutrality and remaining on the bench will bring it, reluctantly, into China's sphere of influence. And this would constitute a dangerous and slippery slope for Indian foreign policy. China has shown little concern about Indian red lines and India can begin to reciprocate – for pragmatic reasons.

The author is a doctoral student at the Diplomacy and Disarmament Division, Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi.

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