What Xi Jinping tells his military about Taiwan

Earlier this year, the New York Times published a article claiming that Chinese military strategists are seeking to use China's nuclear weapons in new and more aggressive ways. The article's primary source was a 2012 speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to China's Second Artillery (now the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force), responsible for China's conventional and nuclear missiles.

The UCS published that speech accompanied by a translation and analysis showing that it contains no evidence to suggest that Xi thinks about nuclear weapons differently than his predecessors.

We have also obtained a collection of Xi's speeches on Chinese military affairs from 2017 to 2019, intended for internal distribution, and we will publish a series of blogs analyzing what Xi has to say on various military topics. The first of these blogs analyzes his language in Taiwan in speeches delivered on November 3, 2017 And December 22, 2017.

The status of the United States-China-Taiwan triangle

As China's military modernization advances toward the goal of building a a world-class army by 2049, U.S. officials increasingly believe that Chinese President Xi Jinping has set a timetable for a military operation. However, analysis of Xi's speeches to his military shows no concrete timetable for an invasion, only exhortations for combat readiness and warnings about outside interference in the cross-Strait status quo.

May 20^th, the Republic of China inaugurated its new President Lai Ching-te, ushering in the third consecutive presidential term of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Storm clouds had been brewing over the Taiwan Strait well before the January elections. After then-Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, China conducted a series of military exercises around the island.

Although the DPP does not explicitly call Taiwan an independent country distinct from mainland China, it rejects 1992 consensus. The Consensus is an agreement between the Kuomintang (KMT), the sole ruling party of Taiwan from 1945 to 1996, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), according to which China and Taiwan belong to a single country, the point of contention being whether whether that country is the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China.

Lai has a history of making statements that lean more strongly in favor of independence than his predecessor Tsai Ying-wen. With this in mind, there was significant speculation on the tone that the Laïs administration will give to relations between the two shores and on the reaction of Beijing. May 23^rd saw the resumption of military exercises that have become more regular since Pelosi's visit.

After the United States transferred its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, the cross-Strait status quo remained shrouded in uncertainty. In a recent phone call to President Biden, the Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated that the Taiwan question is the first red line that must not be crossed in American-Chinese relations.

It's hard to say exactly where that red line lies, but official Chinese government sources offer the best clues. UCS obtained a collection of speeches and comments made by Xi Jinping on Chinese military strategy, objectives and issues between April 2017 and May 2019. The collection is classified as an internal publication intended for use by senior officials at above regimental level.

Although the collection focuses primarily on strategies for military reform, anti-corruption and technological development, these priorities help contextualize Xi's comments on Taiwan by painting a broader picture of Beijing's military concerns. Overall, Xi expresses his desire for greater technological self-sufficiency and concerns over personnel reliability and combat readiness, while maintaining confidence in China's advantage in cross-strait relations of the strait. Xi does not express timetable for reunificationbut the speeches express significant concerns about external influences on the situation across the Strait, both from Taiwan and third parties.

How does Xi see the dynamic between the two sides of the Strait?

Speaking at his inauguration, President Lai used language that deviated in some ways from that of his predecessor Tsai, although he had pledged in the past to maintain his cross-Strait policies. Lai was more cavalier when it came to proclaiming the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and his reference to Taiwan's position in the first island chain echoes U.S. strategies in the region. This is a major concern for Beijing, which often accuses the United States of use Taiwan to contain China.

China also reacted angrily to Lai's inauguration; May 21^st, the Party's main newspaper, the People's Daily, devoted an entire page to various comments and articles denouncing, among other things, Lai's comments, Taiwan separatists and foreign countries for sending delegations to the inauguration. According to Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, the instability across the Strait stems from the DPP's refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus. The most vicious repudiation came from a editorial on the same page, which called Lai the ultimate scoundrel destroying stability in the Taiwan Strait by advocating the use of force to achieve the goal of peace.

Beijing then launched another series of military exercises around the island, but as some have pointed this outthe reaction of the Chinese media was likely to be aggressive, whatever the content of his speech.

Nonetheless, People's Daily media coverage implies anger over perceived moves to move away from the status quo, and Xi's comments on Taiwan in military speeches reflect a perception of stability across the Strait. Achieve the reunification of the motherland, Xi told a meeting of the Central Military Commission in December 2017is one of the three great historical missions of our Party (Speak clearly by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, the other two accelerate the modernization of socialism, oppose hegemony and support world peace.) Xi said China has a degree of control over cross-strait relations that is incomparable with the past; Furthermore, China must make every effort to achieve peaceful reunification, but never abandon the possible use of force, and always firmly contain and deter Taiwan's pro-independence separatist activities.

This language is similar to Chinese leaders' public statements on Taiwan, although the emphasis on efforts to achieve peaceful unification is clear. This can be interpreted as a desire to avoid the use of force or, possibly, as a commitment to finding non-military means, coercive or not, of promoting unification.

Xi urges military preparedness throughout the book, warning that some Western countries seek to coerce China and oppose its development. The comments were taken from a speech delivered to the Joint Command Operations Center of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in November 2017. In this speech, Xi asserts that an increased risk of conflict between a growing power and an established power is a rule of history. This recalls the Thucydides Trap, a historical trend of conflict between rising and established powers

Xi's recognition of the high-risk nature of this situation is positive, although he makes it clear that to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, we will not spare war, i.e. say that China will not abandon the possible use of force. However, in urging the military to prepare for war, he emphasizes that “we cannot say when we will fight.” Again, this can be interpreted in two ways. Xi tells his army to be ready to go at a moment's notice, which is not abnormal language from a commander in chief towards his troops, but it also suggests that Beijing is not working to a strict timetable for conflict across the strait. .

Taiwan in the context of PLA modernization

Xi's comments about Taiwan and potential conflicts when he addresses his troops express a desire for preparedness in the face of possible outside influences. Xi says when a war might break out is uncertain; thus, it seems that China's mentality is to be ready to respond to possible external shocks that could modify the status quo in Taiwan. And while Xi expresses confidence in the military's ability to improve, he also highlights various gaps and areas for improvement.

Perhaps the main problem is corruption. 2016 and 2017 saw several spectacular corruption investigations into high-ranking officials, and Xi's speeches are peppered with references to them. For example, speaking at the party-building meeting of the central military commissions in August 2018, Xi called for daring to turn the blade inward in a bid to completely eradicate their toxic influence. Xi constantly expresses concerns about maintaining the Party's absolute leadership over the military; Speaking to the CMC in December 2017, he mentioned the need to resolve the weakening of absolute Party leadership within the PLA over the previous five years.

Combating corruption and improving the reliability of soldiers and officers are an important part of China's military modernization goals. Beijing aimwhat Xi emphasizes in these speeches is achieving a fundamentally modernized force by 2035 and a world-class military by 2049.

Beijing appears to take a patient, long-term approach to military modernization, and constant calls for combat readiness, reliability, and loyalty suggest a perception of material military shortcomings.

However, everyone with an interest in cross-Strait relations should keep in mind that there are red lines. Xi makes clear throughout his speeches that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be protected. Even though China has doubts about its current capabilities and estimates that it will take twenty-five years to have a world-class military, Beijing will certainly take action if it finds itself in a perceived position of extreme vulnerability or of weakness.

Xi's words on Taiwan demonstrate both determination and patience; he believes China has a unique level of control over cross-Strait relations and should strive for peaceful reunification, while warning that the precise timing of war is still uncertain. Above all, when it comes to Taiwan, Beijing does not want its hand forced.