Xi's purges reduce PLA's political influence

After last year's dismissal of the defense minister, at least nine generals and several top military industry executives, the People's Liberation Army, once the kingmaker of Chinese politics, is being purged again .

President Xi Jinping pledged to enrich the toolbox to punish new types of corruption and hidden corruption and strengthen supervision of senior officials.

In a speech reported by Chinese state television on June 19, Xi said: Cadres at all levels, especially senior cadres, must show unity and have the courage to put aside their prestige and expose their shortcomings. They must reflect deeply on themselves. They must “make serious corrections and resolve the problems underlying their thinking.

In 2015, shortly after coming to power, Xi launched a major reform that restructured the PLA to strengthen its combat capability. The command system was flattened and reorganized, giving more control to the party.

The number of military regions (dividing the PLA's China command) was reduced from seven to five theater commands with joint control of ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This change was intended to shift the concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented defense to mobile and coordinated movements, thereby strengthening air and naval offensive capabilities.

Units were dismantled and reassembled, with soldiers and NCOs and officers dispersed to break the bonds of loyalty in the chain of command and reinforce the PLA's dependence on its top leaders.

However, it seems that this restructuring has not worked in an ideal way. Rumor has it that an investigation launched last year after a scuffle with observation balloons found that much of the strategic rocket equipment was not working well, if at all.

In early 2023, a Chinese spy balloon was observed hovering over a US military base, sparking massive concern in the US about the possibility of a surprise Chinese attack. Due to the incident, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken canceled a planned visit to Beijing. Initially underestimating the alarm, China later launched an investigation, which could lead to the dismissal of Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Defense Minister Li Shangfu.

The three-day conference that ended on June 19 was the first of its kind since 2014, when Xi held a military-political working conference in Gutian on the anniversary of the December 1929 meeting that consolidated Mao's control over the Red Army, the precursor to the PLA. .

Mao's power over the Red Army gave him control of the Party for the next decade. Unlike its Soviet counterpart, the Chinese Communist Party was primarily a spin-off of the military. The Soviets seized power in Moscow and had to build an army to fight the Tsar's loyalists. The Chinese party failed in its urban insurrection and had to fight its way to power from the countryside.

The 2014 conference provided the first framework for the 2015 military reform. Here, there are similarities and differences between the party's past ties with the PLA.

During the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was mainly protected from Mao's political upheavals. While most civilian officials were purged and punished, the military was not. For decades, he remained the kingmaker of Chinese politics. Army chief Marshal Ye Jianying staged the coup to stop the radical Group Four in 1976 after Mao's death. This paved the way for Deng Xiaoping's return to power.

A failed reform?

The 2015 restructuring of the PLA was aligned with the plans of some reform-minded generals. The military relinquished its former political power in exchange for a transformative change to a modern, combat-ready apparatus. This was also intended to change relations between the party and the military.

Xi Jinping is chairman of the PLA Central Commission, and his first public job was as an assistant to Geng Biao, the head of military intelligence and a close friend of his father, Xi Zhongxun, then defense minister.

The recent purge shows that the reform has not worked as intended. Yet last year's dismissals and this conference demonstrate Xi's influence over the military. Both events took place without any public outcry.

This could indicate that Xi succeeded in becoming the first leader in the history of the People's Republic of China to give his party control of the military, reversing the historical dynamic.

Despite this, the PLA still has political responsibilities. Military responsibilities also cover the entire Chinese territory, divided into five zones that do not coincide with the geography of the existing provinces, thus providing an additional level of political cohesion alongside the civil administration.

Moreover, Xi Jinping is the only one who sits at the head of the military commission, the party and the civilian government. This allows him, in theory, to play army against party or party against army if necessary.

Therefore, a new power structure seems to be emerging, in which Xi is the sole pillar holding the entire architecture together.

It is also significant that the meeting took place just days before the July opening of a long-delayed party plenum. The plenum is rumored to focus on economic reforms, but it may have greater significance in light of the military conference.

The prolonged and brutal war in Ukraine, along with growing regional tensions and those with the United States, may have been a wake-up call to China that conflict may not be far away and that Beijing should prepare for it.

A conflict could fully or partially disrupt Chinese exports to G7 countries, which now account for a large part of China's surpluses, and thus impact its sprawling middle class. The fighting in Ukraine also showed the new importance of hybrid warfare, in which propaganda, espionage and cannon fire are all part of the same plan.

The PLA has not fought in a war in 45 years since the end of the Vietnam conflict. The new Defense Minister, Dong Jun, comes from the Navy which is, due to its global missions and patrol duties in the South China Sea, the only branch of the PLA with extensive active experience.

Francesco Sisci, a political analyst and commentator with over 30 years of experience in Asia, is the director of the Appia Institute, which originally published This item. It is republished with permission.