Iranian who helped transport sanctioned materials for Tehran's nuclear program still active in Turkey

Abdallah Bozkurt/Stockholm

An Iranian agent accused of transporting banned materials for Iran's nuclear enrichment program remains active in Turkey after avoiding criminal prosecution with the help of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's pro-Iran government.

Maghsoud Ghaffariyeh, who adopted the Turkish name Mesut Atasoy after acquiring Turkish citizenship in December 2010, continues to operate despite serious accusations of transporting banned materials for Iran's nuclear program, in violation of Turkish laws.

According to Commercial Registry records, two out of three companies operated by Ghaffariyeh are still listed as active businesses in Turkey. One of these companies, Baha Group Danimanlik Di Ticaret Limited irketi (Baha), an Istanbul-based foreign trade and consulting company, was implicated in 2012 following an investigation by German federal prosecutors into the Ghaffariyeh's associate, Hossein Tanideh. Tanideh, an Iranian, was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2012.

The German investigation revealed that Iranian front companies based in Istanbul transported 941 items with nuclear applications via Turkey, with the end user being the Iranian company Modern Industries Technique Company (Mitec).

Mitec is subject to sanctions from the United Nations, the United States and the European Union for purchasing materials used in the heavy water reactor in the Iranian city of Arak. It is owned or controlled by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Informed by their German counterparts, Turkish police arrested Tanideh and Ghaffariyeh in January 2013, executing search and seizure warrants at their residences and affiliated companies. The Turkish investigation corroborated German suspicions, revealing that the two men had sent materials with nuclear applications obtained from Germany and India to Mitec, falsely declaring them to be plumbing parts and accessories.

Turkish police found that 91 items with nuclear applications were sent seven times from Germany to Iran via Turkey, while 856 nuclear items were sent four times from India to Iran via Turkey. Turkey.

Fearing arrest in Germany, Tanideh fled Turkey in June 2012 and kept a low profile to avoid detection. He was staying at one of the properties owned by Ghaffariyeh.

According to official documents, Baha was founded in August 2001 by Ghaffariyeh and another Iranian named Ebrahim Jafarimotlagh. In March 2003, Ghaffariyeh recruited a relative, Mohammad Reza Ghaffariyeh, as a partner in the firm. Ghaffariyeh owns or rents 12 properties in Istanbul alone. The most recent address of Baha's office is My Office 212, a prestigious commercial property near Atatürk Airport in Istanbul.

Another company owned by Ghaffariyeh is Zenith Group naat Danmanlk Sanayi Ve D Ticaret Limited irketi, which operates in the foreign trade and construction sectors. He started the company in June 2012 with Gulnara Nerziyeva, a Turkmen national. Ghaffariyeh became the sole owner after Nerziyeva left and sold her shares to her. The company remains active and is registered in the commercial register.

In July 2019, Ghaffariyeh and two other Iranian nationals, Bayanollah Ramezani and Masoud Karimkhani, established a trading company called Red Travel ve D Ticaret Limited irketi. The company was dissolved in May 2022. Its rapid liquidation suggests that it was created as a shell company for a specific purpose and subsequently abandoned once that purpose was achieved.

Although Tanideh and Ghaffariyeh were under criminal investigation in Turkey by the Istanbul Police's anti-smuggling and organized crime unit, they were released and the investigation was dropped following the interference from Erdogan's government. Turkey also rejected Germany's extradition request for Tanideh, who later returned to Iran. Ghaffariyeh remained in Türkiye and continued to operate his business without facing any legal consequences.

Their case coincided with two major investigations into Iran's clandestine activities in Turkey, which targeted Iranian smugglers, spies and terrorist networks. However, both investigations were suppressed by the Erdogan government, which openly intervened in these matters.

The Erdogan government, influenced by many pro-Iranian Islamists in key positions, has tolerated covert Iranian activities disguised as legitimate business ventures. In some cases, he actively facilitated these activities, motivated by substantial financial gains that enriched those involved, including members of Erdogan's own family, to the tune of millions of dollars.

In February 2014, the Erdogan government disrupted Turkey’s largest counterterrorism investigation into the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Qods Force network. The investigation, conducted between 2011 and 2014, had incriminated senior government officials for aiding Iran’s covert operations.

A pivotal moment highlighting this collusion came in December 2013, when Erdogan, then prime minister, and several members of his cabinet were implicated in wide-ranging corruption investigations. These investigations revealed their role in laundering Iranian state funds through the Turkish banking and financial systems, revealing a network of illicit financial activities with far-reaching implications.

The investigation revealed a convoluted network of corruption, with Turkish-Iranian national Reza Zarrab at the heart. Zarrab bribed senior government officials, including ministers, and developed personal relationships with Erdogan and his wife, Emine.

Document from the commercial register which shows the establishment of Baha in Turkey by Iranian national Maghsoud Ghaffariyeh and his associate:

Baha_establishment_Aug_17_2001

Following his involvement in the investigation, Erdogan intervened to derail the prosecution by orchestrating the dismissal of key prosecutors and investigators involved in the case. All suspects, including Zarrab, were later released with the help of judges newly appointed by the Erdogan government to oversee the proceedings.

The saga took a dramatic turn when Zarrab was arrested by the FBI in Miami in 2016. He was facing charges filed by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, accusing him of orchestrating transactions worth hundreds millions of dollars on behalf of Iran. government. He was also accused of money laundering and bank fraud.

Zarrab reached a plea deal with prosecutors and cooperated in a landmark US federal case, providing insight into President Erdogan's involvement. According to Zarrab's testimony, Erdogan asked Turkey's state-owned banks to participate in the multibillion-dollar project in exchange for bribes.

Iranians have increasingly become leaders in establishing foreign businesses in Turkey, despite the modest volume of trade between the two countries. Many of these companies, run by Iranians, are involved in the acquisition of banned or restricted materials for Iran. They also facilitate the distribution of funds and provide logistical support to Iran-aligned terrorist entities and proxy factions globally.

The Erdogan government has openly declared its refusal to participate in Western sanctions against Iran, refused to extradite suspects wanted in the United States and Europe on criminal charges, and granted economic and trade concessions to support the Iranian regime .