China, the dark evil that decimates Xi Jinping's generals

In a normal country, if the last two defense ministers had been removed for corruption and treasondark coup-type scenarios would open up. In Chinese instead, the torpedoing of the leaders of thePeople's Army release became normal in 2017. Xinhua wrote: Since 2012, under the leadership of Comrade Xi, more than 100 senior officers were arrested: a number greater than the generals who died on the battlefields of the revolutionary wars. Since then, the list of people shot (metaphorically speaking) has grown.

Thursday June 27 Beijing Politburo announced that the generals Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were expelled from Communist Partydegraded, placed in the hands of military magistratesThus the careers of both ended in disgrace former ministers who had been at the head of Defense for six years. Which coincide with the maximum effort times Xi Jinping reform the armed forces and prepare them to fight a war and win it: his words, repeated obsessively.

Wei Fenghe70, was in office from 2018 to 2023, when he officially left the scene due to voluntary resignation. He had been promoted in his place Li Shangfu66, died in August 2023, after serving only seven months. No official statement, only speculation that he was involved in a major corruption investigation which has caused many heads to roll in the Chinese military hierarchy.

Now the declaration from the Communist Politburo chaired by Xi Jinping: the two generals were guilty of crimes of exceptional gravity which caused immense damage. Li Shangfthe accused of tRadiation principles on which the Party and its predecessor are founded Wei Fenghe for having lost confidence in the Party. Between the lines of the excommunication, it is clear that the betrayal was directed against Xi Jinping, who in addition to being the political commander of the People's Liberation Army (the Party commands the rifle as Mao had established), he had also personally promoted the two officers to the top of the MDepartment of Defense.

Xi has engaged in action cleaning of military rankswith the aim of reviving the capacities of fight of a numerically impressive but backward army, based until ten years ago on masses of infantry unprepared for the rapid and coordinated operations that serve to project a force worthy of a superpower abroad. Xi, with a 2015 reform, streamlined the infantry divisions and diverted spending to due unit, aeronautics and the navy.

But the first enemy to defeat inside: the endemic corruption. According to the Politburo indictment, this amounts to a certain condemnation at least for allperpetuityThe two former ministers asked for and obtained huge sums of money both in the field of military supplies and in the provisions relating to personnel management. This second accusation highlights the dark evil: in the Chinese army, you can make a career by bribing your superiors. get promotions. The system is said to be so ingrained and widespread that the common soldier pays to become a sergeant and so on up the chain of command, up to the colonel who wants the rank of general.

Of Bill Bishoprespected newsletter author Sinocism: Li Shangfu paid Wei Fenghe to advance his career? After all the work done against corruption, promotions are still bought and sold in the Chinese military. You need money to buy a rank and the salary is not enough for the bribe, so after paying the appointment, you have to find a way to recoup the expense. There chain of corruption.
Before becoming Minister of Defense, General Wei Fenghe had commanded the missile force The Chinese, the spearhead of all modern armies. And on the soldiers who hold them in their hands nuclear weapons and conventionals of the Chinese superpower the scythe of the anti-corruption investigation continues to fall: in August 2023 the generals were torpedoed Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbincommander and deputy of the missile divisions. It is particularly troubling (not only for Xi but for international security) that men with such great responsibilities make decisions for their personal gain.

In all, based solely on the news published by Beijing Press, Last year, nine generals and three top leaders of the military-industrial complex fell under the Party's scythe. The fact that Li Shangfu's head also fell after this purge shows that Xi and his Politburo cannot be sure of anyone, with corruption endemic.
Before briefly becoming a minister, General Li Shangfu (aerospace engineer) had managed a satellite launch base then from 2017 to early 2023 he was head of the Department of Procurement and Equipment Development of the People's Liberation Army: a position which controls a turnover and colossal money.

Li Shangfu seriously polluted the equipment acquisition sector and related industries, the indictment says.
Xi should not have had suspicions about the officer if he had promoted him to the top of the power. Department of Defenseat the height of the recovery campaign. But in July 2023, his former ministry, in a rare statement reported by the Beijing press, announced that it had committed to cleaning up the allocation procedure. supply and had invited anyone with information about irregularities dating back to 2017 to come forward to investigators. In August, Li stopped appearing in public. No official explanation for months.

Scientists from western Beijing imagined that lynching it was also a revenge ofmilitary establishment, a boycott of Xi's moralizing action: if even Li was not pure, if everyone first paid and then imposed bribes to advance their careers, it was better to accept the situation and move on that last December, after five months of inconceivable emptiness for one. superpower who must maintain political contacts at the highest level with the UNITED STATESThe new Minister of Defense is appointed: Admiral Dong Jun (Xi has invested heavily in the Navy, which he plans to gain supremacy in the South China Sea.)
Another worry for Xi peace disease: decades without combat experience, unlike the American adversaries engaged by Somalia allIraq allAfghanistan (even if they did not come out of these asymmetrical conflicts well).

The People's Liberation Army has fought only once in the past fifty years, a quick clash with Vietnam in 1979. On the disputed Himalayan border withIndia Skirmishes are fought with pikes, trench picks and nailed clubs, because a bilateral agreement prohibits Weapons on the front line to avoid any escalation. This did not prevent dozens of men from dying during clashes in June 2020.

Certainly, among the plans formulated by Xi's generals, there is one aimed at solving the problem. Taiwanese question: reunification by force if political persuasion (threat) is not enough. But how formidable is the Chinese military? The figures are impressive, whether it concerns personnel in permanent service (2 million), planes (3,700 including 500 bombers and 1,800 fighters), ships (370), missiles (500 with nuclear warheads). But behind the bullets and steel, there is the human factor to take into account.

They must be suppressed fake combat capabilitiessaid the general in March He Weidong, one of the two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, of which Xi is naturally number 1. The “People's Liberation Army Daily” cited the case of night exercises carried out at sunset, when visibility is best to be able to write in the reports that the operation was fully successful.
On June 19, the agency Xinhua reported the key sentence the president uttered at a meeting with the military: Leaders, especially high-level ones, must have the courage to put aside their personal prestige and admit their weaknesses. Military cadres must reflect deeply and rectify their behavior and thoughts. And significantly, to deliver his speech, Xi traveled to Yanan, the historic stronghold where theMaoist army is attested at the end of the Long walk.

Among the accusations that emerged in the investigation of the two former ministers, there is also the disloyalty and betrayal towards the Party. Another phrase uttered by Xi during the last major indoctrination session of the high-ranking officers in Yanan: the rifle must always be held by men loyal to the Party and politically reliable. Revisiting Mao's slogan. And this circumstance hides a serious underlying problem that, according to analysts, weighs on the real combat capacity of the Chinese armed forces. Their politicization implies that the first mission is the protection of communist power, promotions to high command positions often depend on real or perceived loyalty to the Party, and not on technical, tactical and strategic abilities. Over the past fifty years, the bloodiest battle for the soldiers of thePeople's Army a state with its own people: the Tiananmen massacre in 1989.