Modi's foreign policy remains the same after third term

India has just concluded its six-week general election, in which more than 640 million people cast their ballots. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were re-elected for a third term, but for the first time in his career, Modi failed to secure victory. He and his party must now rely on coalition partners, including two regional parties: the Telugu Desam Party and the Janata Dal (United).

India has just concluded its six-week general election, in which more than 640 million people cast their ballots. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a third term, but for the first time in his career, Modi failed to secure victory. He and his party must now rely on coalition partners, including two regional parties: the Telugu Desam Party and the Janata Dal (United).

The reality of a coalition government will undoubtedly limit Modi’s domestic agenda, but it is unlikely to change India’s approach to foreign policy. The BJP’s partners have little interest in foreign policy issues, giving Modi and his team a free hand to pursue their agenda internationally. As a result, India-US relations are unlikely to change significantly, certainly not before the US elections in November.

As in many other countries, elections in India tend to prioritize domestic issues over foreign affairs. For the average Indian voter, economic and identity issues tend to overshadow foreign policy. This election cycle was no exception: to the extent that foreign policy issues were integrated into the electoral discourse, Modi and the BJP sought to use international engagement to convey nationalist messages about India’s growing place in the world.

India has used its tenure as chair and host of the G20 in 2023 to showcase Modi’s influence with other world leaders. Similarly, when Western government spokespeople have expressed concern about the erosion of India’s tradition of liberal democracy in the run-up to the elections, including the arrest of key opposition leaders and the freezing of rival parties, Bank accountsIndian officials answered confidentlyessentially claiming that the criticism reflected foreign resentment at India's inexorable rise to power.

Such offensive responses were commonplace well before these elections, and India’s foreign policymakers are likely to maintain this proud posture. New Delhi has the advantage of adopting a tough tone with the West: its domestic audience responds well to such rhetoric, while Western powers, with the notable exception of Canada, seem willing to turn a blind eye to India’s excesses. As India’s economy, diaspora, and strategic capabilities grow, Western countries are unlikely to find themselves caught in a battle of rhetorical posturing.

The election result should also ease some concerns about India's democratic decline, a source of tension between India and some of its Western partners. India's main opposition parties seem to agree that the Election Commission of India is more or less effective in managing the electoral process, particularly voter security and vote counting. For some foreign critics, the exercise seems to be sufficient proof of the strength of India's democracy.

Of course, democracy requires deeper commitments. It remains troubling that Arvind Kejriwal, a prominent opposition leader from the Aam Aadmi Party, was arrested on corruption charges in the midst of an election campaign. India’s Supreme Court questioned the timing of Kejriwal’s arrest and ultimately decided to prosecute him. granted him bail during the election period. Today, Kejriwal finds himself in judicial custody again.

Beyond the rhetoric, the election has not significantly altered India's foreign policy. Key portfolios will continue to be headed by the same ministersModi’s alter ego, Amit Shah, has retained the home ministry. S. Jaishankar has returned to his post as external affairs minister. Rajnath Singh will continue to head the defence ministry, while Ajit Doval, who has been national security adviser since 2014, has also returned to his post. This continuity suggests that Modi’s foreign policy priorities will remain intact.

This returning team is likely to keep a close eye on China, which has taken aggressive steps on its disputed border with India since 2020. If Russia and China continue to deepen their relations in the years ahead, New Delhi may have to reassess its long-standing partnership with Moscow. India will continue to pursue its interests in the rest of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia without much change. Its willingness to partner with Western countries, particularly the United States, will also continue, although India has signaled a reluctance to make concessions in exchange for Western support.

From Washington’s perspective, a change in policy toward New Delhi is equally unlikely. There is little difference between how U.S. President Joe Biden and former U.S. President Donald Trump would approach India in a second term. Both would continue to court India as a strategic bulwark against China; neither would resonate much with the country on the Taiwan issue. Both Biden and Trump would continue to encourage India to develop alternative supply chains. The coalition government could even make India a more attractive market for U.S. investment.

In addition, India-US defence ties will continue to deepen. For example, the US and India last year concluded a major defence production agreement for the co-production of Stryker armored vehicles in India. Such partnerships can only continue as India seeks to build its own defense capabilities and the United States seeks to free itself from its dependence on Russia.

However, Biden and Trump appear to have different personal relationships with Modi, which could affect the tenor of India-US relations. Although Biden has officially courted Modi, Trump and Modi seem to be to found from one to the other, holding several joint gatherings in each other's countries. Of course, Trump's thunderous personality adds an element of unpredictability to the partnership, which has colored a the mini fare was between countries towards the end of the Trump administration.

Another possible difference between a Biden and Trump administration is India’s human rights record, but even here there may be more similarities than differences. Moreover, the BJP’s electoral setback means Modi must depend on potentially shifting coalition partners, a scenario that should help keep his Hindu nationalist agenda in check. And after being caught almost red-handed for alleged involvement in assassination plots In Canada and the United States, India will likely avoid any further attempts at transnational repression.

Still, if these sensitive issues were to resurface, a second Biden administration would likely send mixed signals to India. It is no secret that the current White House is divided on the issue of India. Many officials want to deepen ties, but some progressive voices remain critical of Modi and the BJP. In contrast, a second Trump administration would likely remain silent on human rights issues, as long as they are limited to India or the broader region.

These differences aside, the Indian elections bode well for US-India relations. However, the coalition dynamics risk compromising Modi’s ability to implement at least two domestic policy changes that will have implications for the country’s foreign affairs.

First, the issue of labor law reform will be postponed. Labor laws in India vary widely, but are generally considered unfriendly to business, especially foreign companies. General Motors And Ford left the Indian market.) Many domestic and foreign observers hoped With a clear majority in parliament, Modi may finally be able to change the laws. But with considerable organized opposition and underemployment a key election issue, a weakened BJP-led government is unlikely to enter the fray. As a result, foreign companies will have to weigh the pros and cons of relying on Indian labor.

Second, the possibility that India will change its nuclear liability law That now seems less likely. The legislation was passed after the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal and essentially runs counter to that deal, imposing responsibilities on foreign companies seeking to supply nuclear infrastructure for civilian energy purposes, with some exceptions and workarounds for Russian state-owned suppliers. Foreign nuclear companies have largely stayed away from India. Biden And Asset Administrations have called for a review of the law, but Modi is unlikely to spend much political capital on the issue.

These two obstacles, while frustrating for foreign investors, should be seen as the price of doing business with an emerging power that has only recently restored some of its democratic credentials. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. administrations have built meaningful relationships with India on a variety of fronts and learned in the process that New Delhi is not an easy country to invest in. negotiating partnerWhile US-India relations will undoubtedly see their share of ebbs and flows, they will remain on a relatively stable trajectory overall under Modi's coalition government.

Therefore, failure to make progress on specific issues will not undermine a burgeoning and multifaceted strategic partnership. Despite India’s many idiosyncratic features, the United States and other Western powers are more eager than ever to partner with the country. It is too big a market, too crucial to break supply chain bottlenecks, and too important a player in what is perhaps the world’s most strategically charged neighborhood.