What to expect during Xi Jinping's visit to Central Asia?

Editor's note: political scientist and orientalist Parviz Mullojanov (Tajikistan).

The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Central Asia comes at a rather ambiguous and complex moment in the history of the region, as well as the entire post-Soviet area. This period sees the peak of the confrontation between Russia and the West, which has a negative impact on the economy of the region closely linked to Russia. Relations between China and the West are also strained, while Beijing is becoming more active on the international stage, trying to assume the role of another leading geopolitical player. In this situation, the countries of the region are trying to balance their relations between different geopolitical centers, trying to distance themselves from global conflicts and maintain political and economic stability.

Xi Jinping’s official visit to two Central Asian countries has attracted considerable attention from the press and experts. Most reports on the visit are more informative, discussing its goals in general terms, without analysis, and merely citing official statements. The brevity of commentary on the visit can be partly explained by the lack of reliable information about its real goals. Most of the discussions and agenda will take place behind closed doors, and the list of topics is so long that it is currently difficult to determine which ones will be the focus of the discussions. In other words, it is difficult to say whether Xi Jinping’s visit will be extraordinary or even significant in its results, or whether it will be just another official trip to the region during which a few routine topics and issues will be discussed.

Officially, Xi Jinping will arrive in Astana to attend the 24th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on July 4. He will also pay state visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan at the invitation of the presidents of these two countries. Thus, Xi Jinping's visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are scheduled outside the SCO meeting, which shows the special importance that the Chinese side attaches to this part of the official protocol. Alternatively, Xi Jinping could simply meet with the two presidents on the sidelines of the summit, as usually happens at such international meetings.

It is possible that during the summit and the visit, Xi Jinping plans to discuss China's cooperation plans for the coming years. It is known that after the Astana summit, China will chair the SCO from 2024 to 2025 in turn. Thus, after seven years, China will again assume the SCO chairmanship, to which the Chinese side clearly attaches great importance. China's global plans for this summit and the next two years are also indicated by the fact that UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the heads of several international organizations have been invited to the SCO meeting in Astana.

It is difficult to say exactly what China's SCO development plan is for the next two years under its chairmanship. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke of “ambitious plans to further deepen multifaceted relations with China” in five main areas. These include deepening investment cooperation, especially in agriculture, new energy, and automotive; increasing the volume of trade between our countries, including by diversifying trade structures and expanding the range of products; further promoting the global Belt and Road Initiative; strengthening cultural and humanitarian interactions, simplifying visa practices, opening mutual cultural centers, Luban workshops, university branches, and working tirelessly to increase flights.

Of course, many of the directions listed by Tokayev reflect, first of all, the interests of China, which plays a leading role in relations with the region as a key investor and external actor. The Belt and Road Initiative is of particular importance for China and for Xi Jinping personally. At the same time, in the context of the impending crisis of the Russian and post-Soviet economies, the countries of Central Asia need more than ever additional support and external investment, including from China.

Another important aspect that will probably be discussed in Astana and Dushanbe is the issue of regional security. This includes internal threats resulting from the deepening economic crisis and growing social tensions, as well as external challenges, such as radicalism and religious extremism. Xi Jinping may also discuss relations with the Taliban, whose representatives are increasingly appearing on international platforms created by Russia and China. These negotiations may concern, first of all, the Tajik side, which is traditionally wary of the Taliban and the prospects for peaceful coexistence with them in the near future.

Overall, it seems that China and Russia intend to continue the expansion of the SCO in the coming years, presenting it as a possible geopolitical alternative to pro-Western integration models. It is possible that new plans for the expansion of the SCO will also be discussed at the summit and on its sidelines. However, it is difficult to say to what extent the SCO will expand in the coming years – there are already increasing claims that the SCO is losing its effectiveness with each new enlargement and is turning into a “talking club”.

In any case, Xi Jinping's visit to the region is of considerable, even symbolic, importance. It is no coincidence that President Tokayev recently said in an interview with Xinhua that Kazakhstan and China are on the verge of another “golden 30 years” of bilateral relations. At the same time, despite such thunderous statements, it is unlikely that any decisive agreements or treaties will be signed between the countries of the region and China in the near future.

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