Brothers in ideology have a sea to share Firstpost

New Vietnamese President To Lam arrived in China on Sunday for his first state visit since being appointed general secretary of the ruling Communist Party. The Vietnamese president arrived in southern China's Guangzhou province for a three-day visit, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, underscoring the close ties between the two communist neighbors.

Despite the South China Sea dilemma and the conflicts of interest arising from it, the history of the Vietnam War and the shared communist ideology cement the ties between the two countries, which maintain significant economic and trade ties. The two countries have signed bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Even the Middle Kingdom's nine-dash line in the South China Sea, often cited as an example of Chinese expansionism, was an eleven-dash line, but in 1952 China gave up its claims to the Gulf of Tonkin during the era of cordial relations between Mao Zedong and Vietnam.

China may well understand the implication of the new general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam's first overseas trip and rightly said last week that Lam's tour fully reflects the great importance he attaches to developing ties between the two parties and the two countries.

China has always regarded Vietnam as a priority in its neighborhood diplomacy and supports Vietnam in adhering to the Party's leadership, taking a socialist approach suited to its national conditions, and deepening the cause of socialist reform and modernization, Xi said during his meeting with Lam. Lam also said ties with Beijing are a top priority for Hanoi and the visit is a confirmation of the importance the Vietnamese Party and government attach to their relations with China.

This assertion was quite necessary, as Vietnam recently concluded a historic joint coast guard exercise with the Philippines. In addition, according to recent reports, Vietnam has accelerated the expansion of its outposts in the Spratly Islands, which strengthens its position vis-à-vis China, but does not pose a threat to the other main contender in the region, the Philippines.

In addition, Hanoi elevated its relations with Washington to the highest level in September 2023, while agreeing to build a community of shared destiny with Beijing in early December.

At the same time, despite the Philippines’ shared claims to the features of the Spratly chain, Hanoi and Manila have strengthened their ties and collectively challenged Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. While the Philippines has joined a new Indo-Pacific security group called Squad, with the US, Australia and Japan as other members, and as such has seemingly allied itself with the West, which has been enough to raise eyebrows in Beijing, the impact of which is visible in the growing tensions between the two nations in the South China Sea, Vietnam is still able to maintain a delicate balance.

All this shows that Hanoi seems to have managed to maintain a certain balance, with its economy continuing to perform well. Press reports show that Vietnam is enjoying a strong increase in exports and industrial production. In July, exports were reported to have increased by 19% compared to the previous year, while the industrial production index increased by 11.2%.

Vietnam appears to have close ties with China, has improved relations with the United States, holds joint exercises with the Philippines in the South China Sea, and remains a beneficiary of Western initiatives to de-risk or delink China in order to diversify its supply chains.

Clearly, the economic and strategic planning of this Southeast Asian communist nation deserves praise, until someone understands how China operates diplomatically and strategically.

Beijing, at least in its rhetoric, separates economic and territorial issues; moreover, China's technique of slicing and its ability to reinterpret or change the terms and tone of diplomatic negotiations is quite clever and can sometimes surprise the other side. Recall that when India celebrated the rhetoric ofHindi-Chinese Bhai Bhai,Border tensions were escalating, which eventually led to the Himalayan debacle of 1962. Even after the Galwan incident of May 2020, when relations between New Delhi and Beijing are at their lowest, China is advising India to separate territorial disputes from economic cooperation.

If Vietnam can be an exception to this Chinese model, it will be an achievement for which Hanoi will deserve to be applauded. But what if this model continues? Can territorial issues, which are otherwise very sensitive for the identity and pride of a nation, be a subject of reflection for Hanoi? In any case, the future of the ties between these two theoretical ideological partners will be worth observing in international relations.

The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of Firstpost.