Stephen M. Young on Taiwan: Ukraine's Importance to the Strait

The unity of the free world in its fight against the unjustified attack on Ukraine by self-proclaimed strongman Vladimir Putin offers lessons for Taiwan. The heroic government of Volodymyr Zelenskiy has exceeded most analysts’ expectations, but the war has come at a heavy cost to the Ukrainian people. Putin shows no sign of changing his bid to subjugate and partition Ukraine. Yet the West has admirably supported the Kiev government, sending vital munitions and funds. Despite clear limits on what the United States and its allies are willing to provide Ukraine with in terms of advanced weaponry, kyiv has so far managed to limit Russian advances in the country’s eastern and southern reaches.

Putin has found himself diplomatically isolated, with NATO and the EU firmly opposed to this war of aggression. Xi Jinping’s China (1) has not given open support to Putin’s war, although China (and to a lesser extent India) are buying large quantities of cheap Russian oil, diluting the impact of Western sanctions. These sanctions against Russia have nevertheless clearly done some harm, although more could be done to hamper Russian oil and gas sales to anxious customers around the world. Even small countries in the Baltic and Caucasus regions, once semi-colonies of the late and unregretted USSR, have stepped up their moral and material support for Ukraine. Most surprisingly for Russia, its northern neighbors Finland and Sweden have responded to this war of aggression by applying to join NATO. I seriously doubt that Putin expected this when he rashly chose to invade Ukraine.

There are interesting parallels in the current political climate between the two authoritarian neighbors, Putin and Xi. After 23 years in power, Putin seems determined to remain the strongman for life, provided those around him accept his outsized ambitions. After more than a decade in power, Xi also harbors similar aspirations.

After Xi Jinping’s success in securing a historic third term as China’s leader, I bet he will manage to convince his comrades to grant him the lifetime mandate he clearly wants. But nothing is certain. After all, he is seeking to continue to oppose Deng Xiaoping’s earlier decision (1968) to limit the supreme leader’s term to two five-year terms, after the disastrous end of the autocratic rule of strongman Mao Zedong (1968).

Moreover, the other senior party officials are also ambitious men, and I am sure that some of them quietly aspire to replace Xi Jinping as party leader. That said, the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are opaque, so many outcomes are possible. It is quite striking that the two Eurasian authoritarian behemoths, Moscow and Beijing, end up with leaders who are never willing to give up power voluntarily.

It should be remembered that these two countries have not always been the best of friends. During the Maoist era, Moscow and Beijing were engaged in ideological conflicts and armed clashes over territory along their vast common border. These historical problems, although now hushed up, have not entirely disappeared.

Russia’s financial situation, faced with sweeping boycotts and sanctions, is not entirely stable. Moscow is trying to find other markets for its oil and gas, and may be succeeding for now. But the determination of NATO, the EU, and much of the rest of the world to demonstrate strong opposition to Putin’s tyranny shows no sign of abating.

Xi Jinping’s situation may not be as dire as Putin’s, but his economy is also slowing. He faces opposition from a strong alliance of more open economies in East Asia. Japan in particular has been building up its military power. ASEAN and our friends Australia and New Zealand to the south are as concerned about China’s hegemonic ambitions as Washington. Vietnam is no friend of China. At the same time, despite its dependence on Russian exports, especially arms sales, democratic India cannot be happy about Moscow’s authoritarian turn. Delhi and Beijing have also clashed over their disputed border in the high Himalayas.

More recently, another incident has highlighted tensions between Beijing and its neighbors. Chinese warships clashed in the South China Sea with Philippine vessels over a remote island in that region. It is worth noting that the Permanent Court of Arbitration has ruled that the island belongs to Manila, although Beijing has so far tried to defy that ruling.

None of these factors suggest that any attempt by Beijing to escalate tensions with Taipei would be well received in East Asia. Closer economic and military ties between Australia, Japan, and the United States make Xi Jinping’s adventurism problematic. Tokyo has moved significantly closer to its former southern colony, abandoning decades of distrust of Taiwan.

As I have explained in these pages before, Tokyo has long had close economic and cultural ties with Taipei. More recently, this collaboration has extended to political and defense matters. The fact that China is making similarly unfounded claims to several Japanese islands north of Taiwan plays a role in this.

The United States’ commitment to its East Asian neighbors remains unwavering. The fraternity between former President Trump and Xi Jinping is over. President Biden’s tough policy toward its East Asian friends, including Taiwan, enjoys broad bipartisan support at home. President Biden, his administration, and Congress have made stronger statements and actions, including on Washington’s commitment to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an unprovoked attack on the island state. Biden has been more outspoken about U.S. support for Taiwan than his predecessors, though his advisers sometimes seek to tone down his blunt statements about U.S. commitment.

President Biden has now abandoned his ambition to run for another term, and his running mate, Kamala Harris, appears to be the favorite to replace him in the US elections next November. It is true that former President Donald Trump is running for another term in the White House. But his star seems to be fading since Biden withdrew from the race. Kamala Harris has surged in early polls, and the US elections are in two months.

Xi Jinping must understand that any attempt by the PRC to attack or threaten Taiwan, such as Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, will be met with strong and united opposition from the United States and its vast network of friends and allies. Xi Jinping would be wise to proceed with caution if he hopes to avoid serious new challenges if he were to actually engage in open hostility with Taiwan. America’s determination to counter Beijing’s illegal and unpopular territorial ambitions has served primarily to reinforce the United States’ longstanding commitment to peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific.

If Harris is elected president of the United States in November’s election, she appears determined to stand firmly behind allies and friends across East Asia. This support is longstanding, given the fear that some kind of Pax Sinica will be imposed on the free and democratic states that now dominate East Asia. Early polls suggest that Harris has an advantage over former President Trump, who faces both criminal and electoral challenges that only seem to grow with time.

In short, China’s dream of creating an Asia under Xi Jinping appears to be fading, as the rest of the region rallies behind American power to stabilize an open and essentially democratic framework. Much depends on the US elections in November. But as we saw with Ukraine, I am confident that Washington’s long-standing commitment to the region will continue, allowing it to extend its streak of liberal governance and its determination not to succumb to Beijing’s intimidation. This future would bode well for Taiwan, which continues to expand its economic and political influence in this tumultuous region.

Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.) lived in Kaohsiung as a child more than 50 years ago and served at AIT on four occasions: as a junior consular officer (1981–82), as a language student (1989–90), as deputy director (1998–2001), and as director (2006–09). He travels to Taiwan frequently and writes regularly on Taiwan issues. Young also served as U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and Consul General to Hong Kong during his 33-year career as a foreign service officer. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Wesleyan University and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.