Fear of Soviet-style collapse keeps Xi Jinping up at night

In late September, workers erected a structure on the Tiananmen Square. It is 18 meters high and looks like a basket of fruits and flowers. Exhibitions have emerged in Beijing to celebrate the 75th anniversary, October 1, of the founding of Communist China. It is full of peaches and giant pumpkins, symbols of long life. But the Chinese leader, Xi Jinpingis worried about the longevity of his party's government.

Amid the festivities, state media avoided mentioning another milestone. Communists had been in power in Moscow for 74 years when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Chinese Communist Party has now overtaken Big Brotheras he once called the Soviet Union. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the bloody repression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 was only a recent memory. With ruthless determination, the Chinese party crushed the opposition and remained shielded from the shockwaves emanating from Moscow.

In his speeches, Xi worries about officials' weakening vigilance after years of prosperity, which increases the the dangers of a Soviet-style decline. Even after a dozen years in power, during which he carried out purges of potential rivals in the party's upper echelons and waged relentless ideological campaigns to ensure the absolute loyalty of its nearly 100 million members , Xi seems far from satisfied.

The last few years have been difficult. First there was the chaotic abandonment in 2022 of the zero covid of Xi. Since then, there has been a vibrant economic recovery that last week sparked a desperate attempt to revive growth with bold stimulus measures. Amid the pessimism, reminders of the collapse of the Soviet Union continued to appear in speeches, media and party meetings. The aim was to warn officials to be wary of long-term lingering dangers.

In late 2021, on the 30th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, party officials began convening internal meetings across the country to air a five-part documentary on the subject. The series criticized historical nihilismthe way the party refers to criticism of the horrors of Stalinism and Maoism. He accused the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, to create a trend with his 1956 secret speech denouncing Stalin's cult of personality. This I lit the fire of nihilismthe narrator intoned. From that point on, the documentary suggested that the Soviet party was living on borrowed time. Screenings continued for weeks in government offices, public enterprises and campuses.

In October 2022, during a five-yearly party congress, Xi alluded to the anxiety that the collapse of the Soviet Union still provokes among China's elite. We must always remain vigilant, he told the audience, and determined to meet the particular challenges facing a large party like ours to maintain the support of the people and consolidate our position as the ruling party in the long term. .

The expression special challenges of a big match has since become a leitmotif party propaganda, largely referring to the experience of the Soviet party, the other major party that really cares about China. Since the party congress, many books have been published with these words on the cover, including at least three this year. Academics have published articles on the subject. In July, state television aired a two-part documentary on how to avoid collapse, with the first part focusing on the particular challenges. Once again, local officials organized screenings for party members.

Xi also continued to use the term special challenges. It was the subject of a classified speech that he delivered in January 2023 before the Central Committee of the party. Part of it was published in March this year. As the party grows, some may form small cliques or factions or engage in behavior that undermines the party's unity and fighting strength, he said. A fortress is more easily breached from the inside. The only ones who can defeat us are ourselves. Most analysts agree that there are no obvious divisions within the party today, but its possible resurgence clearly worries them.

In August, Xi brought up Soviet history again. The occasion was the 120th anniversary of the birth of Deng Xiaopingwho launched China's reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, praised Deng for his resolute opposition to the upheavals in China in 1989, against the backdrop of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and dramatic changes in Europe from the East. He quoted Deng as saying: No one can crush us.

In the vast literature produced by China since the 1990s on the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a shift in emphasis under Xi. Deng's supporters used the fate of the Soviet Union as a means of counterattacking party ideologues who viewed its economic reforms as a betrayal of Marxism. Similar dogmatism, they argued, had ruined the Soviet economy, fueling the public discontent that precipitated the country's downfall. In essence, this was the message of Deng's southern tour in early 1992, which revived his reform agenda.

Xi seems more obsessed with the Soviet party's loss of ideological and organizational discipline. This is evident in the enormous efforts he has made to rebuild the party from the ground up, strengthen its presence in private businesses and enforce total obedience to his orders among party members. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng and his immediate successors abandoned discussions of political reforms, but still tolerated limited experiments, such as allowing small NGOs to help victims of injustice. Xi has crushed civil society. Chinese scholars make it clear why, arguing that Western-backed NGOs played a role in pushing the Soviet party into the abyss.

Xi's propagandists prefer not to dwell on a problem common to autocracies: How to ensure a smooth transfer of power when a leader resigns or dies. In 2010, two years before Xi came to power, a book was published in China The Truth About the Soviet Union: 101 Important Questions included an analysis of his struggle for succession. Under Moscow's communist regime, he says, the election of leaders was determined by brutal internal power struggles, decided by a handful of elders behind the scenes or even resolved by intra-party coups.

Xi does not seem to have learned his lesson. He showed no interest in grooming a successor. and changed the unwritten rules so he could rule as long as he wanted. The possible transition to a post-Xi China could once again evoke memories of the turbulent history of the Soviet Union.

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