Fear of Soviet-style collapse keeps Xi Jinping up at night

IN LATE SEPTEMBER, workers erected a structure in Tiananmen Square. It is 18 meters high and looks like a basket of fruits and flowers. Exhibitions have flourished in Beijing to celebrate the 75th anniversary, on October 1, of the founding of Communist China. It is full of giant peaches and squash, symbols of long life. But China's leader, Xi Jinping, is concerned about the length of his party's rule.

Amid the festivities, state media avoided mentioning another milestone. Communists had been in power for 74 years in Moscow at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Chinese Communist Party has now overtaken its big brother, as it once called the Soviet Union. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the bloody repression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 was only a recent memory. With ruthless determination, the Chinese party crushed the opposition and shielded itself from the shockwaves emanating from Moscow.

In his speeches today, Mr. Xi worries about how the authorities' vigilance has been weakened by years of prosperity, increasing the dangers of Soviet-style decadence. Even after a dozen years in power, during which he purged potential rivals in the party's top ranks and waged relentless ideological campaigns to ensure the absolute loyalty of its nearly 100 million members , Mr. Xi seems far from satisfied.

The last few years have been difficult. First there was the chaotic abandonment in 2022 of Mr Xi's zero covid policy. Since then, there has been an anemic economic recovery, which last week gave rise to a desperate attempt to revive growth with bold stimulus measures. Amidst the sadness, reminders of the collapse of the Soviet Union keep recurring in speeches, media reports and party meetings. The aim was to warn officials to be on guard against long-term, persistent dangers.

Say no to nihilism

In late 2021, on the 30th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, party officials began convening internal meetings across the country to air a five-part documentary about it. The series rebels against historical nihilism, the party language to criticize the horrors of Stalinism and Maoism. He accused Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev of starting the trend with his 1956 secret speech denouncing Stalin's personality cult. This lit the fire of nihilism, the narrator intoned. From that point on, the documentary suggested that the Soviet party was living on borrowed time. Screenings continued for weeks in government offices, public enterprises and campuses.

In October 2022, at a five-yearly party congress, Mr. Xi hinted at the anxiety that the collapse of the Soviet Union still provokes among China's elite. We must always remain vigilant, he told the assembly, and determined to meet the particular challenges that a large party like ours faces in order to maintain the support of the people and consolidate our position as a party of long-term government.

The phrase special challenges of a major party has since become a leitmotif of party propaganda, largely referring to the experience of the Soviet party, the only other major party of real interest to China. Since the party congress, many books have been published with these words on the cover, including at least three this year. Academics have published articles on the subject. In July, state television aired a two-part documentary on how to avoid collapse, with the first part focusing on the particular challenges. Once again, local officials organized tours for party members.

Mr. Xi also continued to use the term special challenges. This was the subject of a classified speech he delivered in January 2023 to the party's Central Committee. Part of it was published in March this year. As the party grows, some may form small cliques or factions or engage in behavior that undermines the party's unity and fighting strength, he said. A fortress is more easily breached from the inside. The only ones who can defeat us are ourselves. Most analysts agree that there are no obvious divisions within the party today, but their possible re-emergence clearly worries him.

In August, Mr. Xi brought up Soviet history again. The occasion was the 120th anniversary of the birth of Deng Xiaoping, who launched China's reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s. He praised Deng for his resolute opposition to China's unrest in 1989, against the backdrop of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. He quoted Deng as saying: No one can crush us.

In the vast body of literature produced by China since the 1990s on the collapse of the Soviet Union, a shift in focus has occurred under Mr. Xi. Deng's supporters used the fate of the Soviet Union to push back against party ideologues who viewed his economic reforms as a betrayal of Marxism. Similar dogmatism, they argued, had destroyed the Soviet economy, fueling the public discontent that precipitated the country's downfall. This was essentially the message of Deng's southern tour in early 1992 that revived his reform agenda.

Mr. Xi seems more obsessed with the Soviet party's loss of ideological and organizational discipline. This is evident in the enormous efforts he has made to rebuild the party from the grassroots, to strengthen its presence in private businesses and to impose total obedience to his orders among party members. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng and his immediate successors abandoned any talk of political reform, but still tolerated limited experiments, such as allowing small NGOs to help victims of injustice. Mr. Xi has crushed civil society. Chinese academics make it clear why, saying that Western-backed NGOs played a role in pushing the Soviet party over the edge.

Mr Xi's propagandists prefer not to dwell on a problem common to autocracies: how to ensure a smooth transfer of power when a leader resigns or dies. In 2010, two years before Mr. Xi's arrival, a book published in China, The Truth About the Soviet Union: 101 Important Questions, included an analysis of his succession disputes. Under communist rule in Moscow, he says, the choice of leaders was determined by brutal internal power struggles, decided by a handful of elders behind the scenes or even resolved by intra-party coups.

Mr. Xi does not appear to have learned any lessons. He has shown no interest in grooming a successor and has changed the unwritten rules to allow himself to rule for as long as he wants. The possible transition to a post-Xi China could once again evoke memories of the turbulent history of the Soviet Union.

2024, The Economist Newspaper Ltd. All rights reserved.

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