It's early to talk about peace process, but something is developing, says DEM party MP Andar

Ceren Bayar / DUVAR

On October 13, Cengiz Çandar, an MP from Turkey's opposition People's Equality and Democracy (DEM) party, veteran journalist and politician, gave an interview to Duvar regarding a possible new peace process amid recent developments.

In a surprising gesture, on October 1, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the government ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), shook hands with DEM party deputies during the opening session of Parliament.

He then “invited” the DEM party to “become a party of Turkey”, proposing conditional reconciliation. Previously, he had repeatedly called for the DEM party to be shut down, accusing it of collaborating with the banned PKK.

On October 12, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan supported Bahçeli and emphasized the preparation of a new constitution for a possible new peace process with the Kurds. “We are always ready to resolve problems through non-terrorist methods,” Erdoğan said.

Additionally, Al-Monitor's Amberin Zaman reported that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan spoke with other PKK leaders in Qandil and declared that “the time has come to negotiate the laying down of arms.”

Commenting on these developments, Çandar said it was still early to consider the government's attempts as a new peace process, “but something is developing.”

Below is the full translation of Çandar's interview with Duvar:

How do you assess the recent change in attitude and discourse from Devlet Bahçeli and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the claims that a new peace process is in the works?

Let's remember the “Oslo Process”, which dates back to 2006, started in 2008, and collapsed during the 2011 elections, and the “Peace Process”, which we all remember, started at the end of 2012, built on [PKK leader] Abdullah Öcalan and in which HDP deputies also played a role. From the context of these two periods to current signs and declarations, can we qualify this recent peace process? I'm not very sure. So far, there does not seem to be any mechanism similar to the peace processes in Türkiye and around the world.

If you say, “Is anything developing?” ”, yes, but it is too early to speak of a “peace process”. It seems that we are at the very beginning of the period of “exploratory talks”, as they are commonly called in Türkiye.

Would it be correct to say that we are in the period which opens the way for the process?

According to Al Monitor journalist Amberin Zaman, there's a little more to it than that.

Amberin is a very valuable colleague. I have never seen her write for manipulative purposes. By reading the reports very carefully, I could more or less guess who the sources were. Therefore, I have no doubt about the validity of the information provided by Amberin Zaman in her report.

But there is another debate: do the people who spoke in this report want to have an early birth? Or do they really want to create a preliminary preparation? It is not possible to know at this stage.

There are two emphases in this report. A; Öcalan is in talks with the state. Two; there is communication between Öcalan and Qandil. Of course, this is also ensured by the state.

When all this is combined with the words chosen by Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, in his speech at the group meeting, and the words chosen by President Erdoğan in his speech at the group meeting of his own party, we can see and feel that something is developing.

I think it is premature to use the term “peace process” [at this time].

Some say that the change in rhetoric and attitude of Erdoğan and Bahçeli has a more pragmatic goal and is linked to the 2028 elections. How would you assess it?

Ankara has a style of journalism very suited to daily controversies. Information is produced with perceptions and reactions adapted to the agenda of this day, this week.

However, it is important to pay attention to the words chosen by Devlet Bahçeli in his speech at the MHP group meeting, the words chosen by President Erdoğan in his speech at the AKP group meeting a day later and the words that he said at the MHP group meeting. the plane returning from Serbia. To think that these statements are only an investment for the elections, or that President Erdoğan is calculating in this way to be re-elected president, seems to me to construct a very narrow political equation.

If constitutional work begins and progresses, we can view it as a byproduct of the process we are talking about, or we can view it as a natural outcome. But it's a very important thing. To consider an approach to the Kurdish question in Türkiye within the framework of current debates would be an excessive simplification.

In his group speech, Erdoğan made a distinction between politicians arrested in the Kobanê affair and those who were not. Can Erdoğan's statements be interpreted as a sign that if there is to be a process, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ will be excluded from this process?

His words can be read as such. Indeed, there have been comments along these lines. However, no approach that criminalizes the HDP over Kobanê and keeps Selahattin Demirtaş in prison despite the rulings of the ECHR can lead Turkey in a positive direction. Let us hope that Erdoğan realizes this reality.

What pushed the People's Alliance and the government to such a change in policy and discourse?

Turkey has become a country closed to the world and the region with its obsession with localism and nationalism. On the other hand, we do not see any attitude that logically analyzes who is doing what in the Middle East, why and where the region is going. On the one hand, Israel militarily weakens its adversaries, notably Iran, through an extremely aggressive policy. But on the other hand, Israel itself does not know where and how to stop. All of this is pushing the region toward enormous confusion and uncertainty. Perceptions of Turkey are inevitably affected by this uncertainty.

Turkey's most important problem, the Kurdish question, has actors outside Turkish borders. There are actors in Syria, Iraq and Iran. The government therefore now feels that developments in the Middle East will have repercussions on Turkey. Therefore, efforts are being made to take precautions in the general context of the region and in the face of the uncertainty of the future.

But they've handled this problem so poorly so far, and pushed it so far toward insolvency and confusion, that they don't really know how to get out of it. This is why exploratory measures are being taken.

It seems that we are looking for answers to questions such as “What can be done with İmralı and Kandil?” What attitude should we develop against the DEM party, which reflects the same sociological structure in Parliament? How can Turkey's security be positively affected?

For all these reasons, this question is of great importance beyond the constitutional debate.

The lack of transparency and the absence of a legal basis in previous peace processes were seen as shortcomings. What should we consider if these “exploratory” discussions take shape today?

The way this has been handled so far, it continues to have the drawbacks you point out in this question.

Secondly, there is a mind game based on a slogan such as “the DEM party should be the party of Turkey”. There is no party in Türkiye that is more Turkish than the DEM party. The DEM party is a more Turkish party than the MHP. MHP is almost non-existent in the southeast and east. The DEM party is present in all regions of Türkiye.

Now there is a circle that says “draw a clear line between you and terrorism”, “free yourself from the PKK” and puts this forward as if it were a prerequisite.

If you want the DEM party to curse the PKK all day long, know that this will not happen and will not yield any results.

Considering its links to terrorism, the DEM party is a party that has built its existence from the beginning on resolving problems through negotiation. It is a determined party which has put forward the resolution of the Kurdish question through negotiation as an existential aspect and which has never taken up arms. In this regard, setting these conditions amounts to aggravating the situation.

Consider Amberin Zaman’s reporting. It is not the DEM party but the state itself which is in contact with the PKK. Does the state perceive the PKK as a terrorist organization or as “the identity card of the Kurdish rebellion”, as Süleyman Demirel puts it? If it is the first case, it must be resolved by police measures, there is no other way. If it's the latter, you need to find a way to negotiate. In this case, the DEM party must be used today, just as the HDP was used during the previous peace process.

The previous peace process was almost a process where members of the media went to Qandil. But it was a completely “local and national” process, open, without third parties or observers. It ended in July 2015 and after its end, Turkey went through a nightmare period. In other words, a peace process without a third party is likely to be blocked. The third party is not very popular. If it is to be bipartisan, the political representatives of the Kurds, AKP and MHP representing the state, must be clear in their speech.

It must be a transparent process in which civil society can be involved.

Nobody emphasizes it, but the Republican People's Party (CHP), the founding party of the Republic, must be associated with the process.

Of course, these are all elements that will be valid if there is a new peace process. As I said, it is too early to talk about a peace process. We must wait and see developments more clearly.

(English version by Alperen Şen)