The CHP, Turkey's main opponent, is in cahoots with President Erdogan and his allies.

Abdallah Bozkurt/Stockholm

Turkey's main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) has realigned itself closely with the ruling Islamist party led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his far-right nationalist allies, reinforcing the widely held belief that the Political opposition in Turkey has been co-opted by the authoritarian regime.

The CHP's co-optation became more evident following a change in leadership, when zgr zel, a pharmacist turned politician, took over from Kemal Kldarolu, who had been leader for 13 years before being ousted from a party . congress in November 2023.

zel, whose origins are rooted in anti-Western neo-nationalist groups that have maintained a decade-long partnership with the Erdogan regime, brought the CHP closer to Erdogan's government on numerous issues during the year elapsed.

His main motivation for forging a secret alliance with Erdogan appears to stem from a deep sense of insecurity in his new role as he faces challenges from the popular mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, both leading contenders for office. inauguration of the party in the next presidential election.

This gives Erdogan greater latitude to co-opt and control the main opposition, dilute genuine dissent to maintain the illusion of pluralist democracy, reduce internal and external pressures on his authoritarian rule, and strengthen his claims to legitimacy.

Months after assuming the CHP presidency, zel rushed to Erdogan at the headquarters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for a private meeting in May, breaking the long-standing boycott that his predecessor had maintained to protest against Erdogan's authoritarian policies.

The seating arrangement was carefully choreographed to emphasize Erdogan's dominance, although both are party leaders who should be equal in terms of protocol. Erdogan sat centrally on a prominent chair, flanked by two side chairs, only one of which was occupied by Zel, sending a clear message that Zel is subordinate to Erdogan.

This did not bother Zel at all, who continued to appear alongside Erdogan at public events. At the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Turkish armed forces' operation in northern Cyprus in July, zel sat in the front row near Erdogan, with the speaker of parliament between them. Footage from the event shows Zel leaning from a lower vantage point to chat with Erdogan, while Erdogan, appearing impassive, looked on without much engagement throughout the celebration, further highlighting the power dynamic between them .

On October 1, when a new session of Parliament was opened with a speech by the president, zel ended the CHP's long protest of sitting during Erdogan's speeches. He was the first to show his respect and respect for Erdogan, followed by other CHP deputies.

zel significantly moved the CHP to align with Erdogan on many domestic and foreign policies, endorsing the government's repressive measures against opposition and dissident groups, particularly against Kurds and members of the Glen movement. These groups have been the most affected by the Erdogan regime's repression, which constitutes a blatant violation of Turkey's commitment to respect constitutional provisions and international human rights conventions.

The CHP has adopted an increasingly ultranationalist stance on several foreign policy issues, aligning itself with the Erdogan government's positions on Greece and Cyprus, while adopting an anti-Western orientation.

One of Zel's first acts after becoming party leader was to reinstate people who had been expelled from the CHP due to political differences. A good example is that of Bolu Mayor Tanju Zcan, a far-right nationalist and fascist politician known for cutting off aid to refugees in his town, raising transport fares specifically for migrants and even renting bus to transport them to the border area with Greece. refoulement towards Europe. zcan was welcomed back to the CHP by zel.

As mayor of the revitalized CHP, zcan continued his ultranationalist acts, even erecting a statue in honor of Melih Demiral, who had been fined by UEFA for making the ultranationalist and racist gesture of the Gray Wolves during of a match against Austria.

Whenever Erdogan found himself in troubled waters, the CHP leader was there to lend him a lifeline. For example, it was Zel who rushed to defend the Erdogan government when Turkish officials were implicated in a corruption scandal involving connections to the mayor of New York and influence peddling aimed at accelerating the opening in 2021 of the Turkish House (Trkevi), a 36-story building. which houses the Turkish consulate general as well as several Turkish diplomatic missions.

Speaking in New York on the day an indictment was unsealed against New York City Mayor Eric Adams, Zel said Turkey was not a country that would need to pay bribes. wine to obtain the opening of a skyscraper, thus whitewashing the crimes committed by Erdogan's government. .

According to the indictment filed by Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the mayor faces charges of bribery, wire fraud, conspiracy and soliciting campaign contributions from foreign nationals, including at least one Turkish government official.

In addition to accusations of accepting free plane tickets and upgrades, lavish hotel stays and illegal campaign donations from Turkey, Adams is also accused of pressuring the state's fire department. City of New York (FDNY) to facilitate the opening of the Turkish house without a fire inspection, following a request from a Turkish official, in time for a high-profile visit by Erdogan.

The CHP leader said the Turkish House was a source of pride for all of us, adding that his party would now hold all its events in New York at the Turkish House. He also dismissed criticism of the building's high cost, which stands at $291.2 million.

It is clear that the CHP, under Zel's leadership, has pledged allegiance to the new regime established by President Erdogan, which maintains full control over the armed forces and the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.

By getting closer to President Erdogan, ZEL believes he can maintain his leadership position within the CHP and avoid any challenge within his own party, by relying on Erdogan's crucial support, whether in the form of resources. financial, access to government jobs or legal assistance. .

Erdogan used the same strategy to co-opt the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) when its leader, Devlet Baheli, faced a serious mutiny within his own ranks and was on the verge of losing the presidency at the party's 2016 congress . Erdogan helped to crush it. intra-party opposition within the MHP by using loyalist judges to rule against the initiatives of MHP dissidents, who had obtained enough delegate votes to call for an extraordinary party congress.

President Erdogan appears to have mastered the political strategy of co-opting opposition parties one by one and attracting powerful politicians to his side. Although opposition parties are allowed to exist, participate in elections, and express criticism, their actions are limited within certain limits, allowing Erdogan to maintain an appearance of legitimacy without giving up real power.

The CHP is prepared to share power with the AKP in local governments that oversee provinces and cities. Both CHP and AKP members benefit from personal and political gains through this cooperation in city councils, operating under a policy of “scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours” at the expense of voters. .

Zoning changes that benefit wealthy and influential figures, as well as the awarding of local government contracts to cronies, are often facilitated by close cooperation between CHP and AKP politicians at the local level. In return, the Erdogan government is putting pressure on the judiciary and law enforcement to ignore corrupt acts committed by opposition politicians.

This insidious collaboration exacts a heavy toll on Turkey, wasting taxpayers' money, corrupting institutions, encouraging influence peddling and enabling abuses of power with impunity. Moreover, this results in a fragmented opposition as some party members accept co-optation to enrich themselves, while others resist such policies.

Furthermore, the pretense of a political opposition in Türkiye stifles the emergence of a real opposition, thus allowing the Erdogan regime to feel safe.

Erdogan's government is now seeking to play a similar game with the pro-Kurdish People's Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party by offering some form of legitimacy and recognition as part of a new push in in favor of peace talks with the Kurds, in particular with the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party. (PKK).

Erdogan has launched similar initiatives in the past, only to derail them when they became inconvenient for his pursuit of the peace and reconciliation process. On numerous occasions, he has made secret deals with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Calan, who appears more concerned about his own release than the rights of the Kurdish people. Co-opted by the regime, Calan even wrote a letter of support to Erdogan during the previous elections, which helped weaken the main Kurdish political party and isolate imprisoned Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirta.

It is clear that Erdogan has succeeded in controlling the political opposition in Turkey, regulating channels of dissent according to his preferences and misleading the Turkish population with the appearance of an opposition that responds to the grievances of ordinary citizens. This strategy allows Erdogan to play it safe on his own turf by creating a safety valve to prevent popular frustration from turning into mass protests.

Under Zel's leadership, the CHP risks losing credibility and voter support as it is increasingly seen as complicit in the brutal authoritarianism of Erdogan's regime.

Furthermore, Turkish voters may eventually lose confidence in the political system's ability to bring about meaningful change in government. If this trend persists for much longer, the Erdogan government and the controlled and co-opted opposition could be delegitimized, not only in the eyes of the Turkish people but also within the international community.