Is the United States losing ground to China in Southeast Asia?

Historically, Southeast Asian countries, with rare exceptions like the Philippines today, have done their best not to clearly side with either of the two regional giants, China or the United States. But there are growing warning signs that the United States is losing influence to China in the region. These signs do not mean that Southeast Asian states would necessarily side with China in the event of a military conflict in the South China Sea or determine how they would act in the event of a war over Taiwan. Nor does it mean that most Southeast Asian states are undisturbed by China's growing militarization of the South China Sea, by claims over disputed areas likely to contain significant deposits oil and gas, or by Beijing's significantly more aggressive and dangerous tactics towards ships from the Philippines and Vietnam. , and other countries in waters that China claims as its own.

However, although the change is subtle, there are growing signs that China is gaining the upper hand in various ways in most Southeast Asian states, with the exception of the Philippines. Laos and Cambodia are already essentially Chinese satellite states as they have become dependent on China for aid, investment, diplomatic protection and defense cooperation. Myanmar falls into this category to some extent, although the growing success of the anti-junta opposition leaves China's future relationship with Myanmar uncertain.

Even in the richest and most powerful Southeast Asian states, there are signs that China is making significant progress. As The economist recently notedSoutheast Asian leaders are unhappy that, for the second year in a row, US President Joe Biden is skipping the East Asia Summit, the first Asian summit and a venue where many Asian states have benefited opportunity to interact with the US President to present agendas for him. There are also other concerns in Southeast Asia: despite Vice President Kamala Harris' multiple visits to the region, her top advisers (including my former CFR colleague Philip Gordon) are Atlanticists who may be inclined to focus primarily on transatlantic relations. .

To be fair, the problem of senior U.S. leaders consistently failing to show up at major Asian summits and events, which Southeast Asian leaders view as essential to respecting the region and contrasting with senior Chinese officials who attend almost every event, is not unique to Biden. administration. The Trump administration has often failed to attend these high-level summits, and the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have received some of the same criticism.

Additionally, many Southeast Asian states, already massively dependent on China for trade (and sometimes aid and investment), have become frustrated with the lack of a coherent U.S. trade policy toward Asia. over the past four years. As the region embarks on a rapid series of trade agreements, some of which support and complement each other, the United States is not participating and has offered modest economic incentives through its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The IPEF is far from being a real trade agreement and has not been popular with most Southeast Asian states. Of course, trade deals of any kind are currently unpopular with the American public, especially right before a presidential election. Yet Southeast Asian states remain disappointed by U.S. trade abdication in the region.

As THE Economist also note, The war in Gaza has added to American unpopularity in Muslim-majority states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, where Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who has long-standing ties to the United States, has harshly criticized his role in the war. At the same time, Anwar has assiduously cultivated China, even to the point of doing seemingly little to defend Kuala Lumpur's claims to the South China Sea that overlap with Beijing's. Until there is a change in the war in Gaza or the regional conflict in the Middle East, it will be difficult for an American leader to regain public support in Malaysia and Indonesia, where l American opinion has collapsed.

This growing discontent among Southeast Asians with the United States is reflected in the annual survey conducted earlier this year by the Singapore-based think tank Iseas Yusof-Ishak. Each year, the think tank offers an invaluable study on the state of Southeast Asia's views on a wide range of topics, including their views on major regional external powers. (The survey is primarily limited to Southeast Asian elites, but it nonetheless captures widespread trends in the region.) This year's survey, for the first time, reveals that China continues to be considered the most influential economic (59.5%) and political-strategic (43.9%) power in the region, edging out the United States by significant margins in both areas. He also revealed, notablythat China has overtaken the United States to become the predominant choice (50.5%) if the region were forced to align with the ongoing US-China rivalry. The United States fell from the first choice of 61.1 percent of respondents the previous year to 49.5 percent of respondents this year. Nearly half of respondents (46.8%) believe the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should strengthen its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers. The results of this year's survey are not promising for the United States in Southeast Asia.