Beyond the border on the India-China table

In the economic domain, the argument that excessive restrictions on engagement would impact our growth trajectory is valid. Likewise, engagement must be regulated to protect national security and long-term economic interests.

Even with the various restrictions imposed on Chinese investments and the encouragement of import substitution, China remains the largest source of India's imports, which continue to rise inexorably. Almost all of our imports from China are industrial products. The growing influx of Chinese companies into India, which will source most of their needs from China, is increasing imports. Increases in American customs duties on Chinese products encourage their dumping in India.

Opening trade with China should not slow our domestic efforts to reduce our dependence on China for essential industrial products. Traders who oppose antidumping duties on below-cost Chinese exports are actually delaying our import substitution efforts. There must be a calibrated trade-off between short-term gains and long-term priorities. The rapprochement between India and China must also be seen in the context of current global geopolitical change.

As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict drags on, many policymakers in the United States and Europe are preparing for a negotiated resolution soon after a new administration takes office in Washington, regardless of who wins the presidential elections. . There are extraordinarily complex interests at stake and a multiplicity of stakeholders. Efforts to reach a win-win settlement for key stakeholders could prove tortuous and have unpredictable consequences for Eurasian security.

In West Asia too, an outcome must emerge after the US elections to put an end to the ongoing carnage. The guiding hand of the United States will be either a Democratic administration, which has so far failed to curb its ally's military campaign, or a Republican administration, which stands firmly behind Israel. U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan remain petrified by the prospect of a broader conflagration. It is difficult to imagine a solution that is not complicated.

These concerns moved a diverse group of countries from across continents, regions and political systems gathered in Russia at the BRICS summit. They ignored the Western narrative that BRICS is a Sino-Russian construct aimed at challenging the Western-led world order, or the myth of Russia's international isolation which should remain intact. Some planned to hedge their political bets in the short term; others sought longer-term insurance against threats emanating from the global financial architecture.

The probable return of Donald Trump to the White House has naturally animated conversations about its impact on these international upheavals. The most significant change in US behavior may concern China. It was Trump who decisively shifted American strategic attention to China during his first term. He now promises to do more, and harder.

The Trump program has no patience for mixing cooperation and competition. He advocates total strategic decoupling with Chinaamong otherszero dependence on Chinese supply chains, the extension of tariffs to all Chinese products, the denial of visas to Chinese students and researchers, and the withdrawal of accreditation from American universities receiving grants from China.

To add insult to injury, a Congressional investigation could investigate the hypothesis that the coronavirus originated in a Wuhan lab and, if proven, impose billions of dollars in damages on China. Even if only some of these measures were implemented, China should have its hands full against its main adversary. Global governance structures will also be shaken. India and China will have much more to think about than their rivalry.

PS Raghavan

Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation and former diplomat