President Prabowos' accommodation policy could mean a short honeymoon

As a presidential candidate and even after winning the presidency, new Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto often promised the electorate that he would implement a business firm (i.e. choosing the right person for the right job based on professionalism and technocratic competence). However, his new and a cabinet of 48 ministers that smacks of political horse-trading. There are 48 ministries up from 34, five state agencies and other new agencies to support the Cabinet. With 109 ministers (including deputy ministers), Prabowos is the the biggest wardrobe since the Sukarno era.

This is a missed opportunity, as Prabowo has significant political resources and public support. He did not have to welcome as many political actors into his new government.

First, Prabowo remains president and in full control of his Gerindra party, which leads the Indonesian Forward Coalition (Advanced Indonesian Coalition). The KIM includes four parties with significant shares in Parliament.

Furthermore, in February, Prabowo won the presidential elections by direct vote (PE) with the the largest margin in history. On the eve of his inauguration, popular confidence in Prabowo was strong. The authors' investigative agency, Indikator, found in recent nationwide surveys great public confidence under the presidency of Prabowos. When asked: How confident are you that Prabowo is capable of leading Indonesia to a better future?, the public trust level was 83.4 percent, significantly higher than public trust towards Joko Widodo (Jokowi) at the start of his second term in 2020. , or 68.3 percent (Figure 1). In fact, Jokowi won the presidency in 2014 and 2019 with a lower level of public trust than Prabowo.

Such public confidence reflects the resounding support Prabowo has enjoyed, especially after he chose Solo Mayor Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's eldest son, as his running mate last year. This strategic move allowed Prabowo to effectively get rid of the political polarization in Indonesian politics during the 2014 and 2019 EPs, when supporters of Jokowis and Prabowos clashed. A post-inauguration investigation by another survey company indicates that Prabowo's popularity is now just over 90 percent, higher than that of Jokowis after leaving office.

Interestingly, a Kompas investigation found that trust in the new president and Prabowos (84.1 percent) is significantly higher than that of his vice president Gibrans (71 percent). This discrepancy and Gibran's lower rating are likely due to the heavy criticism directed at Jokowi towards the end of his presidency and the controversy surrounding his family. alleged gratification and abuse of power.

Figure 1. Comparison of trust in Widodo and Prabowo (%)

Respondents were asked How sure are you that [presidents name] is he capable of leading Indonesia towards a better future? April 2019 and January 2020 (Widodo); July and September 2024 (Prabowo)

Such a level of public trust early in a presidency can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, for Prabowo, this can constitute significant political capital when combined with the qualified majority he has accumulated in Parliament (DPR). On the other hand, public optimism may be short-lived if it cannot meet public expectations and its coalition and new government fail to implement their policy agenda in the first year.

Many democracy activists and observers have warned against accommodation policy by Prabowo courting all major Indonesian political parties into his grand coalition. Only the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the National Democrats (NasDem) are not represented in the Cabinet. While a supermajority coalition ensures the smooth passage of priority bills and approval of new government programs in the DPR, Prabowo will ultimately face an inevitable trade-off between political stability and government efficiency.

Such a level of public trust early in a presidency can be a double-edged sword.

Looking at past administrations, high levels of public trust and approval ratings typically fall when a new administration takes difficult but necessary policy actions, such as reducing fuel subsidies. For Prabowo, a potential compromise could be reducing these subsidies to fund essential social assistance programs, including its free nutritious meals. promisewhich will be one of the flagship policies of his administration. He already has warned his ministers that they must support this program or resign.

The eternal problem of sectoral ego between state ministries in Indonesia's bureaucracy can also hinder effective governance. Former President Jokowi often complained about bureaucratic cumbersomeness when it came to coordination between ministries and agencies, even under his cabinet which oversaw 34 ministries. We can only imagine how compounded this challenge would be given that Prabowos had 48 ministers and ministries.

Furthermore, the policy of accommodation means that Prabowo may have overlooked the questionable integrity of some of Jokowis' ministers, seeking political buy-in. Seventeen of Prabowos, 48 ​​ministers and 56 deputy ministers are holdovers from the Jokowis era. Many are well respected, such as Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati. A few however have been involved or mentioned in connection with corruption casesas the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartartoformer Golkar youth leader and minister of youth and sports Here Ariotedjoand Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights Eddy Hiariej.

With his high approval ratings, Prabowo could have established a more efficient system business rather than a potentially heavy-handed and clearly politically motivated cabinet aimed at appeasing its supporters. Ironically, this policy of accommodation could contribute to a briefer honeymoon period for the new president.

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