Data shows Chinese government less popular than state media suggests – Analysis – Eurasia Review

By Erin Baggott Carter, Brett Carter and Stephen Schick

The White Paper protests, which spread across China in November 2022, were sparked by the deaths of ten people in a fire in a quarantined building in Urumqi. The protests reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the Chinese government's COVID-19 policy, forcing observers of Chinese politics to question whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actually enjoys broad support. popular.

Unlike the majority of protests in China motivated by discontent with local governments, the White Paper protests have been critical of the central government and CCP power in general. The legitimacy of the CCP rests on the party's achievements in development of the Chinese economy and reducing poverty, maintaining social stability through censorship and repression, and, increasingly, promoting a nationalist vision of China's future depend to a large extent on the regime's perception by the public.

Popular political attitudes in China have shaped the regime's domestic stability, the reception of its policies, and constrained its foreign policy decisions. These pillars of the CCP's legitimacy appear to be shifting beneath the regime's monolithic façade, as the White Paper protests demonstrated. Whether due to China's economic slowdown, the concentration of power under Xi Jinping, or the harshness of the country's response to COVID-19, researchers and policymakers must carefully analyze these changes in popular attitudes , otherwise they risk misunderstanding the state-society dynamic.

For scholars of Chinese politics, the most commonly used tool for gauging public opinion is a direct survey, in which respondents are asked about their attitudes toward the Chinese government via in-person pollsters or online forms.

A important studypublished by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance at Harvard University, has tracked popular attitudes toward the Chinese government since 2003. Their surveys place support for the regime above 90 percent, suggesting that favorable views towards the Chinese government are as pervasive as the party's propaganda might suggest. . These results were covered by China Central Television, Xinhua, China Global Television Network, China Daily and other CCP propaganda outlets, part of the state's efforts to justify its legitimacy both domestically and than abroad.

But does the CCP really enjoy such support? Or are those interviewed hiding their opposition to the regime because of the threat of repression? And if so, what proportion of Chinese citizens actually support the CCP? To answer these questions, we used a survey technique known as a list experiment. In a list experiment, respondents are given a short list of non-sensitive statements, such as I consider myself a sports fan, and are asked to count the number of statements with which they agree.

Respondents were randomly assigned to either a control or treatment group, with treated respondents receiving an additional sensitive statement, such as “I support Comrade Xi Jinping” or “The CCP government works for the people.” .

The results, which were published In THE China Quarterlyreveal widespread preference falsification. Using direct questions, individuals reported support for Xi, the CCP, and the Chinese government at rates similar to those found in prior direct surveys, reaching over 90% support for the regime. With the list experiments, support for the regime fell to between 50 and 70 percent.

Given that list experiments may not completely dispel respondents' concerns about online surveillance, this is more likely an upper bound on support for the regime. Respondents were more willing to express opposition to the governing system than to Xi or the CCP directly.

Across questions and survey waves, support for the regime varied consistently along three characteristics. Ethnic Han respondents support Xi about 20 percentage points more than minority respondents. Respondents with a college education were 1,020 percentage points more supportive of the CCP than those with a high school education. This may be because the CCP's efforts to shape educational programs have been successful, or because college-educated Han perform much better in this area. the job market. CCP members support the regime by about 10 percentage points more. This is logical since they chose to join the Party and benefit from its benefits.

The difference between support for the regime under direct questioning and support for the regime under list experiments is known as the preference falsification rate. Survey experiments reveal a preference falsification rate in Xis China of around 25 percentage points. A recent meta-analysis examined all known list experiments in autocratic contexts and found an average preference falsification rate of about 14 percentage points. This makes Xi's China a clear exception and demonstrates that its citizens are far more afraid to express their opposition to the regime.

These results suggest that observers should be skeptical of public opinion surveys in China that rely on direct questions. The CCP's sprawling domestic security apparatus forces citizens to self-censor on a massive scale, at a rate nearly three times higher than in Vladamir Putin's Russia. The pervasiveness of self-censorship has led observers to overestimate the legitimacy enjoyed by the CCP. This legitimacy, according to conventional wisdom, is born of its history of economic growth and an apparatus of propaganda and censorship that persuades citizens of the merits of the regime.

The results, taken together, suggest that the CCP is facing widespread frustration. Its recent policies, including intensifying repression and saber-rattling against Taiwan, should be seen as an effort to contain this frustration.

About the authors:

• Erin Baggott Carter is an assistant professor at the University of Southern California and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University.
• Brett L Carter is an assistant professor at the University of Southern California and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University.
• Stephen Schick is a doctoral student in political science and international relations at the University of Southern California.

Source: This article was published at East Asia Forum