Under Prabowo, the military-security apparatus will have more of a say in foreign policy

As Jakarta prepared for the 79th anniversary of the Indonesian Armed Forces on October 5, there seemed to be an extra chill in the air. Amid the martial scene of massive military hardware in central Jakarta and in the run-up to Prabowo Subianto's inauguration on October 20, it felt like Indonesia was on the cusp of something new but also familiar.

Key ministerial appointments and government change mechanisms so far suggest that Prabowo's approach to governance is reminiscent of the Suharto era, characterized by greater political centrality and political influence of the military apparatus. -safe. This includes foreign policy.

Prabowo served in the armed forces from 1970 to 1998, when the power of Indonesia's military-security apparatus was at its peak. This system, known as defenseembodied a series of defense, intelligence, and security functions focused primarily on suppressing internal dissent and separatist insurgencies.

The ancient power of defense The apparatus was anchored in the dual socio-political role of the army, dual function. This doctrine legitimized the major role of the armed forces in Indonesian society and at all levels of government.

It is worrying to note a return towards a dual functionSuch a paradigm has been observed in the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia, particularly during the last five years of Joko Widodos' presidency. It appeared in the proposal revisions to a law governing the armed forces, for example. Researchers have noted a trend of democratic regression during Widodo's second term.

The exact connection between politics, the military's growing political influence, and the loyalty and motivations of military officers may not be immediately clear. However, changes in the balance of Indonesian civil-military relations have historically had broader implications for good governance and policy implementation.

Prabowo appointed the Sugionoa lawmaker, Kopassus' top lieutenant and former official of the new president's Gerindra Party, as foreign minister, replacing noted career diplomat Retno Marsudi. This could end a 26-year reform journey for the Foreign Office.

This journey began with Indonesia's democratic political transition in 1998. Radical legislative and policy reforms ended the Suharto-era practice of reserving top foreign affairs positions and priority ambassadorships for military officers. Democratic consolidation in the early 2000s strengthened the power of civilian foreign policy actors and democratic norms were internalized in Indonesian foreign policy.

To be fair, Sugiono is no longer an active military officer, but he clearly remained a loyal adjutant to Prabowo thanks to his previous military service in Kopassus and Prabowos. patronage of him in the Gerindra party. In fact, the appointment of Sugionos even departs from the diplomatic traditions of the Suharto era. Suharto, himself a former general and one of Asia's most cunning and enduring political leaders, preferred career diplomats to military personnel as foreign ministers.

Prabowos ministerial appointments are clearly motivated by the need to grant political rewards. But his portfolios of foreign affairs, defense and political security respectively choose Sugiono, former Kopassus officer Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Budi Gunawan, who respectively reflect the importance of loyalty and personalized chains of command.

While the Prabowo-Sugiono team is unlikely to make radical changes to Indonesia's foreign policy principle of non-alignment, expect more creative reinterpretations of the principle. In Prabowos, Indonesia, non-alignment now includes biennial exercises with the Russian Navy in Indonesian waters and recovery military exercises with the People's Liberation Army.

Sugionos' first days as foreign minister already signal a break with the Foreign Office's cautious instincts. Her announcement The fact that Indonesia is reportedly seeking full membership in the BRICs, despite the ministry's previous reluctance, reveals that it has been tasked with implementing Prabowo's bolder foreign policy agenda, probably beyond doubt.

This policy agenda aims to expand Indonesia's diplomatic influence on the global stage while strengthening the country's hard power. Defense spending is expected to increase by 0.7 to 1.5 percent of GDP.

The political changes currently taking place in Indonesia are strongly reminiscent of the Suharto era. Prabowo's electoral victory and major ministerial choices continue a trajectory in civil-military relations that strengthened during Widodos' second term. Although much remains uncertain about the balance of Indonesian foreign policy interests, the resurgence of defense The device suggests that the locus of foreign policy influence in Indonesia has now changed.