From the library: American political speeches on China

In his new book, Yan Chang Bennett explores the United States' historical view of China. They range from evangelical promises of redemption to intransigent capitalism exploiting vast opportunities. Bennett says these perspectives have shaped U.S. foreign policy for centuries and often form the basis of new administrations' China policy.

Drawing on an examination of recently declassified foreign policy documents, Bennett guides readers through three centuries of U.S.-China relations, focusing on three pivotal moments: President Richard Nixon's rapprochement with China ; Jimmy Carter normalizes relations between the United States and China and Bill Clinton advocates for China's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Before Nixon's presidency, China was considered a communist enemy in the United States. The administration reshaped its policies and, in doing so, drew on American views and sentiments of the 19th and early 20th centuries. These included a mixture of missionary impulse and the idea of ​​China as an untapped economic opportunity. Nixon promoted the idea that China, if left isolated, would be an aggrieved giant threatening world peace, while its reintegration into the world community would bring benefits to the United States and also to China.

Building on Nixon's policy of rapprochement and consistent with earlier notions that helping China was a special U.S. enterprise, the Carter administration viewed the country as a candidate for democratization as well as a vast market for American products. He believed that if China normalized its relations with the United States, its economy could move toward a free market and its system of government could more closely resemble those of Western Europe and the United States. Bennett's historical analysis shows that Carter could not have been more naive about these prospects for reform when dealing with then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.

It was at this time that the United States recognized the Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China, stating however that the United States would maintain cultural, commercial relations and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan and continue to be interested in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The United States opened formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979.

The Clinton presidency, in turn, built on the policy actions taken by Nixon and Carter in championing China's membership in the WTO. He too was convinced that this would lead to liberalization and democratization. Bennett argues that this enduring belief reflects 19th-century American attitudes. They were fake. Along with the implementation of these US policies, the Chinese government had its own astute and pragmatic outlook on its relationship with the United States, mindful of its interests and historical context.

U.S. activities to facilitate China's entry into the WTO, which Clinton claimed would allow almost unlimited access to the Chinese market, were misguided on several levels. Systematic misinterpretations stemmed from American perceptions of China that were not grounded in reality.

China has not opted for fundamental economic liberalization, and Bennett says Clinton's Chinese hands should not have expected such a thing from China's authoritarian government. For example, Beijing established tighter controls on its giant state-owned enterprises and pegged its currency to the dollar at artificially low levels, thereby conferring significant competitive advantages to Chinese exporters.

As Bennett says, it is now clear that WTO membership has allowed China to enter the global economy, fueling its staggering economic growth. But what has also been clear from the start is that China acted in its own economic self-interest, exploiting Clinton's vocal support. Not once during the eight years of the Clinton administration starting in 1993 did China declare that it would become a democracy like the United States or that it would undertake economic reforms that would lead to a political liberalization.

As China rejects Western ideologies, Bennett advocates a pragmatic reassessment of American policy. She argues that one should avoid emotional narratives and idealized frames, such as the belief in liberalization and democratization that motivated support for China's accession to the WTO, even though evidence of such hope was low.

Bennett sees an enduring character in American perceptions of China in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and their repetition in current American policy. Current narratives continue to emphasize China as being buried deep in the past. They extend to Chinese leader Xi Jinping, presented in the media as a timeless Confucian emperor. In fact, since his birth after the establishment of the People's Republic, his entire education has been imbued with Marxist-Leninist principles of governance.

Using historical data, Bennett's book offers insight into the new administration of Donald Trump. His analysis is important in a world where China is charting an independent course under Xi Jinping and Trump's agenda to make America great again aims to counter perceptions of U.S. decline.

Since Trump's 2024 victory, Bennett has offered separately six ways the United States can counter China: modernize American military capabilities; prioritize the Indo-Pacific; strengthen economic leverage; share the burden of global leadership; invest in technology and innovation; and strengthening energy independence and resilience.