Xi has brought down powerful military rivals. Now he's going after his own men

Hong Kong
CNN
—

During the early years of Xi Jinping's war on corruption, the Chinese leader consolidated his control over the world's largest military by eliminating powerful generals from rival factions and replacing them with allies and protégés of his own. faithful.

A decade later, after carrying out a structural overhaul of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and integrating his own ranks into its senior ranks, the supreme leader is still immersed in his seemingly endless fight against corruption and disloyalty .

And, like many strong leaders in history, he increasingly turns against his own hand-picked loyalists.

Late last month, Xi purged one of his closest military protégés, a decades-long associate responsible for instilling political loyalty within the PLA and controlling high-level promotions.

Admiral Miao Hua, who serves on the Central Military Commission (CMC), the top command body chaired by Xi, has been suspended and is being investigated for serious discipline violations, the ministry said of Defense, using a common euphemism for corruption and disloyalty.

As head of the CMC's political work department, which oversees political indoctrination and personnel appointments, Miao is the highest-ranking officer in Xi's latest military purge. Since last summer, more than a dozen senior figures in China's defense establishment have been ousted, including the last two defense ministers promoted to the CMC by Xi.

But none of them boast the kind of long-standing relationship Miao shared with the top leader, dating back decades to the start of Xi's political career in the coastal province of Fujian.

The investigation into Miao opens a new front in a growing purge that has raised questions about Xi's ability to end systematic corruption in the military and improve its combat readiness at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.

Over the past decade, Xi has overseen an ambitious transformation of the PLA into a world-class fighting force capable of rivaling the U.S. military. A key goal of this modernization drive is to ensure that China is prepared to fight and win a war against Taiwan, the democratic, self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own.

But Miao's fall renews questions raised during last summer's purges about how much confidence Xi has in his top generals who would be tasked with waging a war, said Joel Wuthnow, a senior fellow at the National Defense University , funded by the Pentagon.

If he is concerned that he has brought in people who are not unquestionably loyal to him or who are not loyal to his agenda, that would pose a huge problem.

Experts say Xi's purge of longtime acolyte reveals a dilemma familiar to autocrats, including his predecessor Mao Zedong: After eliminating his political rivals, the supreme leader keeps seeking new threats to his rule absolute control over power, including from those around him.

Miao's history with Xi dates back three decades. The Fujian native served as a political officer in the former 31st Army Group from the 1980s to the early 2000s, when Xi was rising through the ranks as a local official to become governor of Fujian province.

According to credible sources, Xi regularly visited the 31st Army Group at the time and is known to have had personal contact with Miao, said James Char, a longtime PLA observer and researcher at the School. of international studies S. Rajaratnam in Singapore.

Miao's military career took off soon after Xi came to power. In 2014, he received a major promotion to become political commissar of the PLA Navy, making an unusual move after a career in the ground force. Three years later, he was promoted again to the CMC, the pinnacle of military power.

We can't find a more apodictic Xi ​​acolyte than Miao, Char said. If Miao is ultimately charged with corruption, it is clear that Xi himself did not anticipate the obscene scale of corruption that exists among the PLA elites.

Over the past 18 months, Xi's cleansing has largely targeted officials linked to arms procurement and the Rocket Force, which oversees China's nuclear and conventional missiles. But Miao's fall signals a widening of that crackdown to new sectors, such as political work that Xi has described as the lifeline of the army and navy.

Wherever they look, I'm sure they will find problems and cases. It's just a matter of which sector they choose, Char said.

The Defense Ministry did not provide any details about the allegations against Miao.

As the PLA's chief political commissar, Miao is responsible for ensuring its loyalty to the ruling Communist Party. He oversees promotions in the military, vetting key candidates for political loyalty, a role he also held in the Navy.

In the past, these roles have been a breeding ground for corruption, including bribery for promotions. Miao's predecessor, General Zhang Yang, committed suicide while under disciplinary investigation for corruption.

As the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China intensifies, the PLA Navy has also seen a drastic increase in its purchases of warships and other weapons, providing ample opportunities for corruption, said Victor Shih, professor of political science at the University of San. Diego.

But there could be another potential reason for Miao's downfall, Shih said, because he was too obvious in his attempt to favor one faction in the military.

Xi has repeatedly warned against the formation of factions within the party and military. Of course, the only person allowed to do this is Xi himself, Shih added.

Miao is believed by some analysts to have recommended several Navy associates for promotions to key positions, including Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin and Defense Minister Dong Jun.

The announcement of Miao's investigation came a day after the Financial Times reported that Dong had been investigated for corruption, citing current and former U.S. officials. The Defense Ministry dismissed the report as a complete fabrication, and days later Dong made a public appearance at a security forum.

Wuthnow, the National Defense University expert, said what led to Miao's downfall was a loss of confidence, but the reasons for this remained elusive.

In one scenario, Wuthnow said, Xi could have seen Miao as becoming too powerful and independent, and wanted to uproot what he saw as a bastion of influence that he could not fully control.

I don't think this is how leaders who are confident in their own power and ability to control bureaucracy behave. In fact, it seems to me to be a sign of weakness, even paranoia, that he feels the need to constantly upset the apple cart, he said.

It happens again and again

Miao's fall comes less than a year after former Defense Minister Li Shangfu withdrew from the CMC.

The powerful body had six members, all considered Xi loyalists, serving under the top leader when he began his unprecedented third term two years ago. If Miao were also removed, that would leave two seats vacant.

Shih, the expert on Chinese elite politics, said many dictators, from former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to Mao, eventually turned on their own protégés.

Once all his real competitors are gone, a dictator can never again think: Well, all the threats are gone. I can just relax. Because they always think that new threats could emerge, including from people who were once very close to them. It happens again and again, he said.

As a result, the dictator is always looking for increasingly subtle signs that someone is plotting against him, said Shih, the author of Coalitions of the Weak, which examines Mao's grip on power in the late of his life.

During Mao's final years, he turned on Lin Biao, his longtime protégé, former defense minister and heir apparent, accusing him of plotting a coup.

This type of dynamic will become increasingly serious as Xi Jinping ages, as his health is no longer as robust as it once was. His sensitivity to signs of potential challenges to his power will also become more acute with time, Shih said.

For now, the top leader appears determined to continue his crusade against corruption and disloyalty.

Earlier this month, Xi inspected the PLA's Information Support Force with his remaining four loyalists in the CMC.

We must ensure that the troops remain absolutely loyal, absolutely pure and absolutely reliable, Xi told an audience of note-taking officers.