Winter is coming for Indonesian civil society forces

Photo by Adrian Mulya

If what happened in 2024 is any indication of what will happen, we can safely say that 2025 will not be a democratic spring for Indonesia.

In 2014, Indonesians welcomed the election of Joko Jokowi Widodo, then considered a reformist representing the interests of the people in a political system dominated by oligarchs. He was seen as a symbol of hope for those who believed in democracy. The expectation may have been unrealistic, but the hope for change was there.

Fast forward to 2024, Indonesians find themselves at a crossroads once again. This time, the public mood is much less optimistic. Former President Jokowi is no longer seen as a reform outsider but as a member of the oligarchy. He is accused of breaking numerous rules to allow his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run as a vice-presidential candidate in February's presidential election.

This political gamble proved decisive for the election this year of Jokowi's former rival and now ally, former army general Prabowo Subianto. This clearly showed that the political climate, already cold for democracy supporters, is likely to worsen even more quickly.

Indonesian democracy still under siege

It is a truism that Indonesia suffers from a democratic decline. The problem now is that this downward trend is expected to accelerate under Prabowo's presidency.

In his latest remark targeting democratic institutions, Prabowo once again floated the idea of ​​abolishing direct regional elections under the pretext of saving state money. In this scenario, regional legislators would have the power to elect governors, mayors and regents (regent), a return to the authoritarian regime of Soeharto, Prabowo's former father-in-law. “We feel the democracy we have… there are things we need to fix,” he said. according to Reuters. “How many billions spent in one or two days?

Prabowo's suggestion drew widespread condemnation from pro-democracy activists. While admitting that local elections are expensive, they believe that it is a necessary investment.

Prabowo's position on the regional elections is characteristic of his apparent aversion to the democratic reforms implemented after the fall of Soeharto. In fact, Prabowo has long expressed his intention to revive the original draft of the 1945 Constitution.. As Simon Butt argued shortly after Prabowo floated this idea during the 2014 elections, this proposal means removing the constitutional amendments from 1999 to 2002, on which Indonesian democracy is now constitutionally built. This could allow the new president to end direct presidential elections, remove presidential term limits, dissolve the Constitutional Court and further weaken the rule of law.

Prabowos tries to present himself as a strong leadereven after months of a massive digital campaign to rebrand it cuddly grandfatheris worrying. The growing presence of military officials in Prabowos' administration is another cause for concern. This reflects his security-focused policies, which favor a stronger military and possibly significantly increased control of public life.

Civil society prepares for repression and co-optation

There is no doubt that Indonesia's civil society forces face even greater threats of repression and co-optation under the new president. Prabowo's security-first approach to governance means it is likely that the state apparatus will be more inclined to use existing draconian laws to silence critics.

This tactic was widely used and relatively effective under former President Jokowi.. It is not impossible that Prabowo is using the same playbook, given that the draconian laws used by Jokowi are the Penal Code, the Electronic Information and Transactions (EIT) Law, the Pornography Law and the Law on mass organizations still in force.

However, a bigger threat facing Indonesian progressives may be the regime's strategy of co-opting different elements of civil society. Prabowo has already been able to consolidate his influence among a wide range of different social groups, ranging from paramilitary groups such as Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and the now banned Islam Defenders Front (FPI) (useful for street mobilization ) to intellectual groups linked to traditional Islamic organizations (useful in gaining public consent for unpopular elite-led policies).

After his inauguration, Prabowo inducted non-elite figures, including activists and victims of political violence during Soeharto's final daysin his office to strengthen his legitimacy. However, it is unrealistic to expect them to constrain the president. Past experience has shown that former activists who tried to fight for change within the State House often ended up facilitating authoritarian policies.

Many civil society organizations, primarily the Muslim groups NU and Muhammadiyah, are expected to seek to maintain their independence under Prabowo. Yet Jokowi's years in power have shown us that supposedly progressive social and religious organizations can easily be used as political tools to safeguard elite interests at the expense of public rights.

With a greater military role in civilian affairs and a deeper encroachment of state interests on civil society, Indonesian progressives now find themselves with much smaller political space to advance their democratic aspirations. The recent attack by unidentified attackers on local residents opposed to the Rempang Eco-City megaproject is a clear example of how non-state actors can be mobilized to suppress public protests.

Last defense of democracy

Prabowo's rise on the back of Jokowis caw-caw (interference) calls for the creation of a sustainable pro-democracy movement with a broader and stronger social base, capable of countering retrograde forces at the elite and grassroots levels.

This strategy, however, is easier said than done, given the fragmentation of Indonesian civil society. Furthermore, there is a clear risk that the Prabowo government will mobilize co-opted civil society groups on the streets and in cyberspace to disrupt opposition forces.

There is no doubt that Indonesia's civil society forces are in for a long winter as the elite continues to work to dismantle democratic institutions. Ultimately, the last defender of Indonesian democracy is the Indonesian people themselves. The question is: will they set a limit on how much democracy they are willing to lose?

In the new Indonesia that Prabowo is creating, the challenge for civil society forces is to engage the public sufficiently to increase the political cost of destroying democracy.