Past Lessons and Future Actions: Policies for a Successful Free and Open Indo-Pacific

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Executive Summary

This article is the second in a two-part series on the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The first study, The rise of a free and open Indo-Pacific and the challenge of deterrenceexamined the genesis of the FOIP as well as its rise to strategic centrality for the nations of the Indo-Pacific, North America, and Europe.

FOIP has made immense contributions to the connectivity, prosperity, peace and security of the Indo-Pacific. However, as our first study explores through a Hudson Institute simulation exercise, FOIP has distinct limitations as a strategic doctrine. As a concept, it cannot bring friendly or less friendly members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to help Taiwan if the small island nation faces what could be the challenge most important strategic strategy in the region: a Chinese invasion or blockade.

However, FOIP remains essential to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. Therein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: it has the capacity to expand the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security, which in turn will strengthen that security while reducing the burden of the security of the United States by extending it to other countries willing to do so. defend themselves and their allies. Yet, for now, because the FOIP is unable to prevent a Taiwan contingency, the ability to expand the FOIP and expand America's network of allies rests on the foundations of American deterrence.

In response to this situation, policymakers must follow two simultaneous paths: building institutions that promote FOIP and integrating the countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania into the economic geography of the United States, Japan and Europe. Through these parallel developments, America would learn to listen to the needs of ASEAN and Pacific Island countries while bringing them into a form of economic dependence on the United States, Japan and the Europe that would parallel their growing dependence and vulnerability on the People's Republic. from China.

That is why, in this report, our policy recommendations focus on what we consider to be key strategic sectors: energy, semiconductors, and overseas economic development and investment. These are sectors where Indo-Pacific countries have consistently called for greater collaboration and where the United States and its allies have the greatest competitive advantage over China.

To support these efforts and advance support for FOIP in the future, this report makes several recommendations as a necessary conceptual approach when engaging with the Indo-Pacific.

First, for FOIP to be effective, it must be adaptable. Much of this involves careful design of the types of structures needed to meet regional demands. Given the high growth rate and socio-political changes in the region, it is inevitable that structures, needs and partners will change over time. Yet if countries supporting FOIP continue to coordinate and collaborate in specific functional areas, they will be able to continue their efforts regardless of changes in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Likewise, it is beneficial to design structures such as non-governmental, which allows them to engage agnostically with a wide range of stakeholders from potential partner countries across government, industry and society. civil society to achieve results.

Along the same lines, FOIP initiatives should also respond quickly to changing circumstances. Southeast Asian countries are reluctant to support FOIP, in part because they want to avoid what they see as superpower competition. As a result, outreach efforts by the United States and its allies are unlikely to bear fruit consistently. However, examples such as the Philippines working enthusiastically with the United States, Japan and other partners in the wake of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea mean that partners supporting the FOIP should develop a model to respond quickly to new potential partners when opportunities arise. . The speed with which Tokyo and Washington respond to Manila's security needs through radar installations and reciprocal access agreements, as well as its economic needs through the Luzon Corridor and collaboration in the semiconductor sector, is a model for how to achieve these changes in the future.

Third, to truly succeed, FOIP initiatives must mobilize all disparate stakeholders across the Indo-Pacific region to utilize the potential available from governments, the private sector, academia, and civil society. As mentioned earlier, they must be prepared to accommodate a changing set of participants with their own agendas and capabilities. This approach effectively uses the strength of the social section among countries supporting FOIP. Their vibrant governments, businesses, universities and civil societies demonstrate how the FOIP concept strengthens nations both abroad and at home. It is important that when developing solutions to problems related to, for example, financing LNG terminals, countries supporting FOIP use their industry and technological strengths. Ultimately, this will strengthen intraregional economic cooperation, build diplomatic trust, and convince nations most threatened by a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific to support FOIP.

Achieving broader consensus for FOIP in the Indo-Pacific region is unlikely to be easy or straightforward; he will likely face political, economic and security setbacks along the way. Yet the principles that underpin FOIP, the rule of law and the free movement of capital, goods and people, have been responsible for the region's rapid economic growth and success over several generations. The FOIP concept is a compelling message and a project worth working for; The United States and its allies should continue to make every effort to work together to support a winning idea.

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