Great Britain is likely to fall off with Trump on China

AS Donald Trump re-enterers the Oval Office This MONTH AND PROMISES A RESUPTION OF HIS SIGNURE TRADE WARS, Officials in Britain, LONG ONE OF THE USS CLOSEST ALLIES, Are Heading to Beijing to PUSH FOR A RESET OF THE UK-CHINA relations and the Resumption of financial and investment talks.

While Trump seeks to tighten the Policy of China of the Americas and that a new European Commission in Brussels focuses squarely on economic security, the question is whether the United Kingdom could pay a high price for a Chinese strategy that seems Disabled with its closest partners.

Economic growth at all costs has been the word of surveillance of the Keir Starmers Labor government since its entry into office last July. The logic works that outside the EU, the United Kingdom can become a higher destination for Chinese investment, which could in turn stimulate economic growth and help the government Clean energy superpower.

This is not a new idea. The so-called the golden era of relations from 2008 to 2019 saw several British governments prioritize the guarantee of investments in China compared to the concerns of national security and human rights. Rather than respecting the media threshing of the increase in foreign direct investment in China stimulating significant economic growth (China was placed 22^ND For IED in the United Kingdom in 2018 At a highest point in the relationship), the ministers have left Chinese investments dissected in the sensitive sectors of the United Kingdom at a high cost for the taxpayer, including in telecommunications And nuclear energy.

The difference this time is that China is faced with an economic slowdown, a decrease in the populationand the rigid authoritarian control of Xi Jinping which has seen repression in all aspects of the Chinese economy of technology,, higher educationhas financial services.

On the left: the British Foreign Minister David Lammy, meets Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, October 18, 2024. On the right: Chancellor Rachel Reeves meets the Chinese Minister of Finance Lan Fo'an in Beijing, 10 January 2025. Credit: British government,, Treasury HM

In opposition, the Labor Party was expressed in his criticism of the former conservative governments who do not defend human rights in China in particular, calling for sanctions against Hong Kong officials and vote To label the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang as a genocide. However, within the government, work has adopted a more pragmatic strategy of cooperation, stimulating and competition with China.

This policy, alongside a audit of the British-Chinese relationship, is not too different from the last governments approach. It is not surprising that some members of the British government are drawn to a Chinese policy that imitates the cake of Germany or France, which seeks to benefit from the deepening of trade links with Beijing while taking advantage of Continuous support from the United States for Defense and National Security. Some also suggested that the United Kingdom was following the example of the Australia administration or the outgoing Biden administration, which increased bilateral engagement with China.

It is often missing that Australia and the United States have also strengthened their respective national security in recent years thanks to the adoption of registers of foreign agents and effective regimes of screening for foreign investments. This allowed them to engage from a position of strength.

… There are still important questions about the logic of the United Kingdom seeking to deepen relations with Beijing at a time of probable deterioration in American-Chinese relations and a slowed Chinese economy.

The United Kingdom has much less to offer in terms of trade than the two countries. Additional reality is in Beijing, the United Kingdom is neither considered an important partner nor of confidence. Beyond higher education and the city of London, there are few sectors of the British economy that China wishes to invest in which national or economic security do not affect.

This did not prevent political decision-makers from slowly pushing the policy of Uks from the United States and the EU orbit. The divergence zones include: the United Kingdom refusing to join Washington, Ottawa and Brussels in the introduction price on Chinese electric vehicles; not to be introduce a reasonable diligence detection regime of forced labor; And, after heavy pressure groups of pro-Chinese companies, postponing the introduction of a Recording of foreign agents and the classification of China at the highest level.

At a time when the British government seeks to repair relations with the European Union and to avoid the prices of the prevail, it is not known how long the China Policy with UKS synchronization can go unnoticed.

Far from changing its visits planned in Beijing, Trumps' re -election led the British government to extend efforts to deepen trade relations with China. This coverage strategy has been partially fed by speculation that the United States will be an unpredictable and unreliable ally over the next four years.

The decision to appoint former Minister Peter Mandelson as an ambassador to the United States is additional proof of the Government Plan to double his strategy in China.

Alongside former Prime Minister David Cameron and the Minister of Finance George Osborne, Mandelson is considered a architect Uks supposedly the golden era of relations with China. He has also already put pressure on the government on behalf of Chinese customers, including the clothing manufacturer Shein Who is looking for IPO in London.

Mandelson promised to successfully convince Trump not to put prices on British goods. But given its history and its assessment on China, we do not know how much traction of hell obtains with a Trump administration which includes many prominent Chinese hawks.

It is sure, the United Kingdom could play on a Trump trade war with China that never occurs, the presence of a number of former managers of Wall Street and figures like Elon Musk in administration , as well as Trumps' preference for great good deals.

Such a strategy is a hostage to fortune. Even if Trump is looking for a big deal with XI, there is no guarantee that his administration would support partners deepening commercial partnerships with China at the expense of USS.

And whatever it is prevailing on intentions, it does not seem wise for the British government to paint a target on the back by such a manifestation of resetting relations with China. Given the vulnerability of British economies outside the European Union, UKS trade surplus With the United States and its significant dependence on American foreign investment, it would be considered by many in the world of Trump as an easy target of economic coercion.

Regardless of the question of whether the Uks China strategy puts it in the reticulus of an incoming Trump administration, there are important questions about the logic of the United Kingdom seeking to deepen relations with Beijing at a time of probable deterioration of American-American relations and a slowdown Chinese economy.

At the very least, he will weaken British governments to deal with American counterparts and will be cited as proof that London is without alignment with the priorities of the United States foreign policy and not seriously about national security. In the worst case, he will be considered by Trump's world as a disloyalty worthy of being appointed for punishment.

Sam Goodman is director of main policies at China Strategic Risks Institute and co-founder of the new diplomacy project, a group of reflection that informs the Labor Party in British foreign policy. Previously, he was the director of politicians and plea at Hong Kong Watch, and worked as a political advisor to the Labor Party and Parliamentary Researcher.