Do turkey decrease democracy a model to prevail over America?

Last week, the Turkish authorities arrested Ekrem Imamolu, the mayor of Istanbul and the main challenger expected to receive Tayyip Erdoan in the country to the next presidential election, scheduled for 2028. Imamolu, who is a member of republican terrorism; He denied the accusations and described them as politically motivation. In response to the detention of Imamolus, the demonstrations at the national level broke out on an unclear scale in at least a decade. Erdoan has managed Turkey since 2003, and he has maintained his grip on power, in part, repressing political opponents and the media. Some of these opponents come from persistent Kurdish minority turkey; Last month, Abdullah Calan, the imprisoned chief of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), called for a cease-fire in the longtime insurrection of the PKKS against the Turkish government, as part of a process that could potentially lead to the disarmament of the group and his prison release.

I recently talked by phone with Jenny White, Professor Emerita at the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies and expert in modern Türkiye. During our conversation, which was published for duration and clarity, we explained why Erdoan struck his opponent now, the way in which his rule has changed in the last two decades and the similarities and the differences between his authoritarian style and that of Donald Trump.

With the arrest of Imamolu, do you think it entered a new period of Erdoans rule, or does it look like a continuation of the same thing?

I think it's absolutely a new page. And if this page will be turned or not is very important. The result is not yet clear. But if the page is turned, if Erdoan manages to get away with this Türkiye, it is no longer what is called a competitive authoritarian regime. It is a regime with real elections, but the elections are not completely fair because the government controls a giant media part, or the media belong to pro-government companies. In Türkiye, the opposition never gets real time on television, and they cannot send their message via the media. The elections are therefore not correct. But there are elections and they still have a chance to work.

There is real competition, despite everything. But if Erdoan manages to get rid essentially of the opposition candidate and he speaks not only to do so, but also to restructure the main opposition party, the Chpthen that there is no real opposition, there is no competition and you will not have real elections. And then you have a complete autocracy. This is what happens if you turn the page.

Why is Imamolu in particular so threatening from Erdoan?

Well, there are quite concrete things, like that, he continues to win elections. Surveys preselected in 2022 even won the Imamolu election against Erdoan. So why didn't he win? Because the head of the CHP then, Kemal Kldaolu, said mainly, I want to be the candidate. Even if it was this kind of gray and not charismatic person. And they made other mistakes, such as tinkering together a coalition of six parties, including very small parties, to pool the votes. Who diluted the identity of each party. They called themselves the table of six. Instead of a party, you had a six table that was still arguing. But Erdoan has still only won fifty-two percent.

In addition, Imamolu beat the AKP party, Erdoans, during the election of the 2019 Istanbul town hall. And the AKP did not like the result. They therefore canceled the elections and made them redo, how much Imamolu won with an even greater margin. And he won again in 2024. So he is able to win elections. He has a national reputation and not only Istanbul. And, despite all the obstacles that the regime is constantly put on his way, he managed to do things for the city. For example, he obtained money for the public transport system by going throughout Europe, speaking to mayors and contracting loans from European banks. There are reports claiming that when the CHP wins a municipality, the outgoing administration AKP empties the chests and sells all the buildings. So when the CHP comes into play, they have nothing. Imamolu was very creative. He is a good speaker. It is very modern and is relatively young.

He also opened a lot of days of day. To give you an idea of ​​some of the absurd things that happen now, there were reports that the government was going to investigate it for having opened these day concerns. Another absurd thing that has just happened is that the university where he obtained his university diploma canceled his diploma. You need a university degree to be president.

There are many opposition parties in Türkiye. Democratic scholars often refuse to need the opposition to be united. It doesn't always work. It didn't work in Hungary, and it didn't work in Turkey in 2023. Why not?

There was just a dilution of identity. If it is a powerful party and a bunch of small parts, what do the small parts represent?

Imamolu can still stand for the presidency of the prison, right?

Except now, he has no university degree. In general, I think of what happened after the Gezi demonstrations in 2013. Gezi's demonstrations concerned land, a park, one of the last green areas of Istanbul that the government wanted to make a shopping center. There was a violent response from the police, and you had demonstrations nationwide, but they were in a way diffuse and there were no leaders. In fact, many demonstrators were very proud of this, saying that they were not associated with parties or groups. It was just people there. And so they were. The government's rhetoric at the time was exactly the same as rhetoric now. Erdoan has just been released and said, oh, these people are vandals. They destroy our inheritance. They cause economic problems to people. And it worked.

But this time, it is a question of voting and your ability to vote significantly. The Turks are very proud to have elections. And the ability to vote means something. It's not just a park. It is something much more existential.

There have been many events in the past five or six years in Turkey, which had to injure the popularity of Erdoans, such as its erratic economic management, or governments to protect people from the after -effects of a horrible earthquake in 2023. And yet we are there. Is your feeling more vulnerable now? Or did he in a way have been able to maintain his popularity?

I am not sure I can call it real popularity. He has a base, but there are all these polls that show that young people are really sick and tired. The proliferation of Islamic schools and programs is part of the Erdoans try to shape Islamic children with Islamic ethics. But young people see on social media and television how people live elsewhere. Over fifty percent of young Turks want to leave the country. The demonstrations you see now are led by young people who have just had it.

Another problem is that the AKP has finished most of the economy in its own network, and it is difficult to get a job without knowing someone in the party. Who counts. The fact that he has co -opted so much the economy means that people are afraid that if they do not vote for Erdoan, they will lose their jobs. They are afraid that the CHP will come and dismiss everyone and put their own people. And the economy is now in such a terrible form. It is a very, very disastrous situation for many people. And they dare not make a change because the little they have disappeared. I think that is part of what keeps Erdoan in power.

Do you think that Erdoan would win a completely free election in Türkiye in 2025?

Almost positive, it would not.

Is your feeling that the anti-democratic movements it makes is to keep a step ahead of political failure, but that the movements themselves also stimulate its unpopularity? It looks almost like a feedback loop: you must continue to separate because the things you do make you more unpopular. Or isn't it true?