Garvan Walshe: does not negotiate by making the eyes of the domestic repression of Toerdogans for cooperation against Russia

Garvan Walshe is a former adviser in national and international security policy of the Conservative Party. He directs the political technology company Article7 – Intelligence for Democrats

Turkey must cooperate against Russia in its own interests.

With Trump in the White House and in Europe in search of all the military support he can obtain, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is spending the moment. Since the opposition has decisively won the local elections in 2024, it was obvious that he and his ruling party AK were heading for defeat in the next presidential ballots. Although there are still three years until the elections are held, Twenty years in power, dissatisfaction with its authoritarian and anti-laic policy, an absolutely terrible economy has wreaked havoc. Winning the next elections called for something radical: to imprison the head of the opposition.

The main opposition CHP, at the origin of the Ataturks party, had put aside the quarrels and the deference at the age which made them lose the presidential vote in 2023, to choose a leader, Ekrem Imamoglu. If unified, they had become that the primaries of the parties had only one recorded candidate, Imamoglu himself.

No Soviet style masquerade, it reflects the consensus that Erdogan would only be beaten if they were united.

The judgment of the Imamoglus, on dubious corruption and accusations of frankly absurd terrorism, followed the order to cancel the diploma he obtained from the University of Istanbul. (In Türkiye, the presidents must have a university degree). Disqualification is an element of a three -part plan.

Immediately before Erdogan consolidated his power by reaching a peace agreement with Kurdish separatist terrorists from the PKK. He hopes that this will help him, will help him win back part of the Kurdish vote, which the regime had lost against the Kurdish parties on the left, more recently known as Dem. The previous incarnations of the party had been prohibited and their previous leader, Selhattin Demritas, has been borrowed since 2016.

As growing support among Kurds A, Erdogan hopes Erdogan, a second effect. The CHP has a rescue candidate in the form of the mayor of Ankara Mansour Yavas. Yavas are however less friendly with the Kurds. This difference in support could be decisive and allow Erdogan to keep power with its ultra-nationalist allies (and strongly anti-Kurdish of the MHP).

The final element is time: opposition movements must support the momentum, ideally causing clashes in which the regime is poorly calculated, but it will be difficult to do it for three years. Erdogan also hopes that he will be able to survive dissatisfaction.

However, this plan is not without defects.

Wags immediately stressed that a previous mayor of Istanbul had only been arrested to win the presidency. His name was Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Imamoglu already turns a martyr into a little. 13 million non-members of the CHP also voted in the primaries (they were authorized to vote for solidarity). The party will establish contacts with these 13 million people and seek to mobilize them in future confrontations. The police tried to repress the demonstrations, but were unable to apply the prohibitions. They used the arrest of photographers and journalists as well as opposition leaders.

The split with the Kurds did not materialize. The DEM party threw its weight behind the CHP campaign for the release of their leaders. Finally, time is not necessarily on the Erdogan side. If he can lead the opposition to shoot, it also allows the economy to continue to worsen. Imamoglus stops alarmed investors and sent the Turkish Lura even further. Interest rates were increased to 44%.

Erodgan feels relatively immune due to the international situation. This American administration will hardly do more than light concerns expressed. European countries, including the United Kingdom, began to involve Turkey in defense discussions against Russian aggression. He is right to see the European reaction: there is no call for economic sanctions against the Turkish economy, for example, in response to this expansion of repression.

But he would make a mistake if he thinks he can present assistance against Russia in favor of European democracies. This underestimates the Turkish fear of Russian expansionism and exaggerates the relevance of any possible Turkish contribution.

The biggest interest of turkeys is to prevent Russia from taking control of the northern coast of the Black Sea, which requires a strong Ukraine. In this regard, the apparent agreement linked to a sea cease-fire which has just been forced to Ukraine is also a setback for Turkish interests.

Ukraine had beaten the Crimean Black Sea fleet in Port in Novorosssk.

The second aspect has to do with the Turkey forces available. A Turkish contribution to the security of Europe would be welcome, in particular because Ankara has solid land forces at its disposal, but would not be decisive or would not be able to mitigate the most important gaps left by a possible American withdrawal, which is mainly linked to command and control, the abolition of enemy air defense and tactical nuclear weapons.

There are therefore good reasons for the United Kingdom, France and Europe from other leading powers to resist any attempt by Turkey to condition cooperation on the Erdogan leash to storm its grip on power. Such cooperation is already in the own interests of turkeys and it would be self-de-free for Erdogan to withdraw it so that he can continue to cling to power in a country which thinks more and more that he had exceeded his welcome.

On the contrary, Europeans should start making emergency plans for a power transition, which could even involve the first elections, or a return to a more parliamentary political system, in order to prevent the deepening of civil conflicts in Turkey.

The most important interest that the United Kingdom and the EU now share with Turkey is to cooperate to limit Russian expansionism. This is better served by stable cooperation between diplomatic, military and intelligence institutions of the countries involved, rather than being a question of the occupier of the Turkish presidential office.

Even if it seems to have been a good time for Erdogan to play with increased repression, it is always a bet whose success is far from certain. A continuous campaign to neutralize the risks of opposition causing interior conflicts. Rather, we have to help find a way for him to go back.