How Turkey can help defend Europe

The gap between Europe and Turkey to establish a closer long -term security relationship has reduced considerably.

Given the evolution of American security priorities, European nations are considering means of improve their own defense capacities. However, in the short term, it may not be possible. First, this would require substantial financial resources, which certain members of NATO still have difficulty attributing. Seven European members of NATO have not even reached The threshold of 2%. Second, the current level of industrial capacities of Europe can hinder the production of military equipment on a necessary scale.

Given these challenges, the potential role of turkey in European security is gain Please note, especially after the last meeting between the leaders of Ukraine and Turkey in February. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed his interest in Deploy Turkish forces In Ukraine to improve the defensive credibility of a potential peace agreement with Russia.

The involvement of turkeys in European security is not new. Turkey is a longtime NATO member and defense cooperation with Europe has developed in recent years. For example, in 2023, the United Kingdom sign A closer military cooperation agreement with Turkey. In addition, France is in sell New generation meteor missiles in Türkiye despite the worries of Greece. In addition, in addition to the recent London summitTurkey should be part of the next EU summit guest by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

As the second largest NATO army, with around 402,000 soldiers staffTurkey has a lot to offer in terms of security. First, the deterrent of potential future Russian against Ukraine could be carried out. As a member of NATO, the deployment of troop turns near the borders of the Ukraines could act as a means of deterrence, because any attack on them could risk triggering a broader NATO response.

Second, Turkey has a well-developed and expanding defense industry that could help rebuild not only the Ukral soldiers but also the armed forces of other underdeveloped European nations. In 2024 only, Turkish defense and aerospace exports exceeds 7 billion dollars, with a large part of sales directed towards Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Given the urgency of the current threat, strengthening cooperation with Turkey could help accelerate the military preparation of Europe, an effort that could otherwise take years.

However, more in -depth security cooperation with Turkey is accompanied by challenges. Internal turkey problems are a concern. Another major concern is Ankaras' close ties with Moscow, a relationship that brings both strategic opportunities and risks. On the positive side, the diplomatic channels of turkeys with Russia could serve as a bridge for crisis management between NATO and Moscow.

This was obvious during the war in Ukraine, when the Biden administration frequently reached the mediation efforts of the turkeys. At the same time, the proximity of turkeys with Russia raises questions about its reliability. If Europe is becoming more and more dependent on Turkey, what happens if Moscow offers Ankara a more favorable affair? In addition, the ability of turkeys to balance the relationships between the West and Russia gives it a lever effect, which he has often used to advance his own interests.

While the world order is shaking, the lack of confidence between Turkey and Europe is linked to having adopted. Turkey also has skepticism towards Europe. Ankara has long expressed her frustration in the face of the failure of the EUS to keep her promises concerning Turkish membership. Another source of distrust was the perception of the West turkeys as a supporter of the PKK and YPG groups, which he considers the most serious national security threats.

In addition, the turkey defense industry faces a certain structure challenge. Its monopolized nature and a shortage of qualified human capital could create long -term vulnerabilities. A well -structured security partnership must take these factors into account, balancing potential advantages with risks while ensuring that mutual interests remain aligned.

Europe can approach this problem in two ways: a short -term transactional partnership or long -term integration of Turkey in its security architecture.

The first approach involves a pragmatic exchange provides support for economic development and, in return, Turkey provides security support until Europe no longer requires external assistance. This arrangement is achievable and relatively simple, because it requires a minimum long -term commitment on both sides.

However, given the current security challenges of Europe and the uncertain trajectory of the transatlantic relationship beyond the Trump administration, a long-term partnership is the wiser choice. The integration of Turkey more fundamentally in the European security framework would provide strategic stability and higher resilience in the face of future uncertainties.

The long -term stability and predictability are only achievable if the two parties see mutual gains. Although a potential agreement requires concessions on both sides, Europe can compromise in several areas. Currently, Turkey has several urgent needs, with economic concerns at the top of the list.

Europe could remedy it by increasing investments in Türkiye or, at the very least, by offering trade privileges. Europe and Turkey, both of which are home to a large number of refugees from Syria and neighboring regions, could also collaborate in the facilitation of a safer return of refugees, which could be coordinated with the relatively pro-Western and Pro-Turkish Syrian government.

Another potential area of ​​compromise concerns groups such as the defense units of Syrian Kurdish peoples (YPG or SDF) and the Kurdish workers' parties (PKK), which Turkey considers major threats to national security. Historically, Western policies towards these organizations have diverged from the position of turkeys. However, the change in geopolitical dynamics offers Europe the opportunity to reconsider its approach.

The collapse of the Assad regime, the emergence of a pro-Türkiye government in Syria, a possible American withdrawal from the region, the recent agreement Between the YPG and the Syrian government, and the potential release of the PKK chief, followed by a progressive rapprochement, will most likely decrease the regional influence of these groups. This changing landscape can allow Europe to adopt a more flexible position that aligns better with turkey safety problems.

If a mutually beneficial framework can be established, both parties can promote a more stable and more predictable long -term partnership. After all, despite its close ties with Russia, Turkey finally sees Moscow as a geopolitical competitor and would not favor a weakened Europe in the face of a potential Russian expansion.

Ali Mammadov is a doctorate. Political science researcher at the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, specializing in international relations and comparative policy. He is a scholarship holder and editor of the Center for Security Policy Studies. He has a master's degree in international relations by Johns Hopkins SAVE and a BS in economics and finance from George Washington University.

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