G7 Leaders Hiroshima Vision for Nuclear Disarmament

We, the leaders of the G7, met at a landmark in Hiroshima, which together with Nagasaki offers a reminder of the unprecedented destruction and immense human suffering that the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki experienced as a result of the atomic bombings of 1945. moment solemn and reflective, we reaffirm, in this first G7 leaders’ document with a particular focus on nuclear disarmament, our commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons with reduced security for all.

We emphasize the importance of the 77-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, undermining of arms control regimes, and stated intention to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus are dangerous and unacceptable. We recall the Bali declaration of all G20 leaders, including Russia. In this context, we reiterate our position that Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons, let alone Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, in the context of its aggression against Ukraine are unacceptable. We recall the joint statement of the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states issued on January 3, 2022, on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Avoidance of an Arms Race, and affirm that a nuclear war cannot and must never be won. We call on Russia to recommit – in word and deed – to the principles embodied in that declaration. Our security policies are based on the understanding that nuclear weapons, so long as they exist, must serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war and coercion.

The overall decline in global nuclear arsenals achieved since the end of the Cold War must continue and not be reversed. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be maintained as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with reduced security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic and responsible approach. In this regard, Japan’s Hiroshima Action Plan is a welcome contribution. We deeply regret Russia’s decision to undermine the New START Treaty and call on Russia to enable a return to full implementation of the Treaty. At the same time, China’s acceleration in building up its nuclear arsenal without transparency or meaningful dialogue poses a concern for global and regional stability.

We emphasize the importance of transparency regarding nuclear weapons and welcome the actions already taken by the United States, France and the United Kingdom to promote effective and accountable transparency measures by providing data on their nuclear forces and target arsenal size their nuclear. We call on nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so to follow suit. To promote transparency, we also call on nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so to engage with non-nuclear-weapon states in a meaningful dialogue on transparency about their nuclear arsenals and limiting nuclear competition, including an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society participants at future NPT-related meetings. In this regard, we emphasize the benefit of prior notification of relevant strategic activities, as an essential contribution to risk reduction. The G7 recognizes the need for concrete steps by nuclear-weapon states to reduce strategic risks. We call on China and Russia to engage substantively in relevant multilateral and bilateral fora, consistent with their obligations under the NPT, including Article VI.

We call for the immediate start of long-delayed negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 2023 will mark the 30th^th year since the consensual adoption of a United Nations General Assembly (UN) resolution calling for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), and we call on all countries to refocus political attention on the FMCT- as a priority action to prevent a recurrence of the nuclear arms race, including any and all independent or complementary efforts. In this regard, we call on all States that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

We are firm in our view that no nation should conduct any nuclear weapons test explosions or other nuclear explosions, condemn any threat to do so, and emphasize that bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another pressing matter. . We remain committed to maintaining the global norm against nuclear explosive testing until it is legally binding, and we call on all states to declare new moratoriums or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapons test detonations or any other nuclear detonation. We express our concern about Russia’s announcement of its readiness to conduct a nuclear test and call on Russia to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests. We further emphasize the essential role of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in detecting and reporting suspected nuclear explosions around the world. The G7, collectively, has supported CTBTO activities to the tune of more than US$100 million in 2023. We reaffirm the G7’s commitment to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and long-term sustainability of all verification elements of the CTBT system and I urge others to do the same.

A world without nuclear weapons cannot be achieved without nuclear non-proliferation. We reiterate our unwavering commitment to the goal of North Korea’s complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and any other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in accordance with Resolutions relevant of the UN Security Council (RKSKB). We demand that North Korea refrain from any further destabilizing or provocative actions, including any further nuclear tests or launches using ballistic missile technology. North Korea cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. It is essential that sanctions are fully and scrupulously implemented by all states and remain in place for as long as North Korea’s war weapons and ballistic missile programs exist. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s continued escalation of its nuclear program, which has no credible civilian justification and brings it dangerously close to current weapons-related activities. We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon and call on all countries to support the implementation of UNSCR 2231. We call on Iran to stop nuclear escalation. We call on Iran to fulfill its legal obligations and political commitments regarding nuclear non-proliferation without further delay. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. In this context, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action continues to provide a useful reference. We call on Iran to uphold its defense obligations and stated commitments with swift and concrete action. We applaud and continue to fully support the mandates and efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iran.

In these times of uncertainty and tension, preserving, resourcing and strengthening existing regimes and other global efforts is of utmost importance. We call on all states to take seriously their responsibilities to meet the highest standards of protection, safety and security in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, science and technology, including those related to the deployment of nuclear technologies of the next generation. We further express our deep concern about Russia’s attempt to control Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, which pose serious risks to nuclear security and are in total disregard of Ukrainians’ right under the NPT to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We reaffirm the importance of implementing the highest standards of IAEA safeguards and the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol (AP) as fundamental components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We will promote a reliable and accountable nuclear supply chain, consistent with the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation, including the implementation of the AP. We support further discussions within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) towards establishing PA as a condition of supply in the Groups guidelines. Those G7 countries that choose nuclear energy or related peaceful nuclear applications recognize that the use of nuclear energy, science and technology contributes to the provision of affordable, low-carbon energy. The G7 notes the contribution of nuclear technology applications, in areas such as medicine or isotope hydrology, to promoting prosperity and addressing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. We reiterate our utmost commitment to the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which for more than 20 years has delivered concrete and impactful programs to advance nuclear non-proliferation in every part of the world.

We emphasize that the transparency of civil plutonium management must be maintained. We oppose any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programs under the guise of civilian programs, which undermines the objectives of the NPT, including the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, we underline the importance of implementing the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC 549). We call on all states that pledged to report annually their holdings of all plutonium in peaceful nuclear activities to the IAEA to fulfill these commitments. We recognize the need to manage civilian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium with the same sense of responsibility as the plutonium covered by these guidelines. We also commit to prioritizing efforts to reduce the production and stockpiling of weapons-usable nuclear material for civilian purposes worldwide.

Achieving the world we hope to see requires a global effort to lead us from the harsh reality to the ideal, however narrow the path. In this regard, we underline the importance of education and outreach for disarmament and non-proliferation. We encourage other leaders, youth and people from around the world to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to raise and support awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons that can be witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To this end, we welcome initiatives such as the Youth Leader Fund for a World without Nuclear Weapons from Japan, the P5 Young Professionals Network, the German-funded Youth Champions for Disarmament and the Next Generation Youth Initiative from created by the EU no. – The Consortium for Proliferation and Disarmament, as well as other initiatives that support the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, in addition to the engagement of civil society in the processes of disarmament and non-proliferation.

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