Government Officials Consider Increasing Surveillance of Dangerous Virus Research: Shot

This image shows purified particles of the mpox virus, formerly called monkeypox. Such viruses can be genetically engineered in the lab in more dangerous ways.

NIAID

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NIAID

This image shows purified particles of the mpox virus, formerly called monkeypox. Such viruses can be genetically engineered in the lab in more dangerous ways.

NIAID

Over 150 virologists Commentary In other words, all the evidence so far indicates that the coronavirus pandemic started naturally, and was not the result of some sort of laboratory accident or malicious attack.

They say the continued speculation of a lab in China has fueled calls for tighter regulations on testing with pathogens, which could stifle the basic research needed to prepare for future pandemics. I am afraid that

Virologist issued a statement just before the key meeting Friday was held by external advisors to the federal government. The group will put together a recent review of existing surveillance systems for experiments that have been controversial because they could create new potential threats.

Advisor recommendations phone For expanding a special decision-making process that currently weighs the risks and benefits of experiments that could make “potential pandemic agents” more dangerous.

“Governments know when researchers want to make a virus more deadly or more contagious, how it’s done, why it’s done, and the benefits are worth it,” it said. I’m here. Tom InglesbyDirector of the Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

He believes the draft recommendations “would be a huge step forward” if adopted by the government.

Pandemic origin

All of this comes as a Chinese lab known as the Wuhan Institute of Virology makes headlines once again. Criticize The National Institutes of Health said it failed to properly monitor grants given to nonprofits that worked with scientists at the Wuhan lab.

Felicia GoodrumVirologists at the University of Arizona say unbiased experts have investigated the origins of the pandemic. The available evidence supports the idea that the virus, like other viruses such as HIV and Ebola, originated naturally by jumping from animal to person in contact with an animal.

“The evidence we have so far suggests that SARS-CoV-2 entered humans that way,” said Goodrum. “There is no evidence to the contrary, no evidence to support the lab leak. Nothing is credible.”

Basic research on viruses has led to the rapid development of vaccines and drugs to combat the pandemic, she says.

Yet virologists are disappointed that misinformation and conspiracy theories hold science accountable.

Say, “There is this complete disconnect between reality and what happened.” Michael Imperialea virologist at the University of Michigan.

After years of debate about the wisdom of conducting experiments that could make a bad virus even worse, he feels differently now.

“The pandemic really heightens the urgency that these issues need to be addressed, and that’s because of all the controversy out there as to whether or not this was a lab leak,” he says. .

Avian Flu Study Issues Warning

For example, unlike the study of nuclear physics, biology has traditionally had an open culture. But after the 2001 anthrax attack, biologists began to grapple with the possibility that the published research could serve as a recipe for bad actors wanting to create bioweapons.

And in 2011, protests erupted after government-funded researchers modified a potentially lethal bird flu virus. Their laboratory work has made the virus more contagious in laboratory animals, a human stand-in.

critic Said They created the super flu. Proponents said the virus may need to be manipulated in the lab to see what it can do. After all, mutations always occur in nature, and that’s how pandemic strains emerge.

The episode marked the beginning of a long and heated battle. discussion, plus a research moratorium, and eventually the development of new regulations. In 2017, a review system was put in place to weigh the risks and benefits of research that could further exacerbate potential pandemic agents. three The series of studies proposed is an influenza virus that is considered dangerous enough to deserve special scrutiny of its kind.

“We’re talking about a really small amount of research proposals,” he says. Lyric JorgensonActing Associate Director for Science Policy, and Acting Director of the Office of Science Policy at NIH.

She says just before the pandemic began, officials asked advisers to the National Scientific Advisory Board for Biosecurity to consider whether the government needs to do more. transparent We shared with the public how we were making decisions about this type of research. Before that work was completed, the pandemic hit and put everything on hold. Last year, the agency asked the group to expand its work and assess regulations more comprehensively.

Proposed changes developed by this advisory group, if ultimately adopted by governments, are “reasonably expected” to enhance transmission or virulence of pathogens in ways that could pose a public health threat An additional layer of oversight is applied to research. This means that more experiments with more viruses will allow us to look more closely.

“What this new recommendation says is that even if you start with a virus that can’t cause an epidemic or a pandemic, if you’re doing research that modifies that virus in ways that could cause uncontrolled disease. , or a widespread disease that must be reconsidered by this new paradigm,” says Inglesby.

Furthermore, the advisory group said, “In order to create public trust in the review and oversight process, there is a need to increase the transparency of the review process.”

What is “reasonably expected”

The American Society for Microbiology responded He said he enthusiastically endorsed the draft recommendations and “urges the federal agencies involved in this work to implement the recommended changes expeditiously.”

But some virologists believe that if these recommendations translate into policy, the devil is in the details.

“They keep using the phrase ‘reasonably expected,'” says Imperiale. “How would that be interpreted? Is there any clear guidance on what that means?”

Researchers often don’t know what’s going to happen when they start an experiment, says Goodrum. Especially when the science is cutting edge.

“That’s where great scientific progress comes from. So to tie our hands behind our backs to say we can only do science that is predictable really limits innovative science.” she says.

Ron FusierA virologist at the Netherlands’ Erasmus University Medical Center, who conducted bird flu experiments more than a decade ago, said in an email that he hopes his experience with the pandemic will simulate more research. . limit. ”

He said many infectious disease researchers in the United States “will face significant delays in critical research efforts if they are allowed to continue their research.”

The U.S. is unusual in that it has a system that seeks to manage risks by engaging in a lot of public debate on these issues, Inglesby said.

He believes surveillance can be enhanced without getting in the way of science.

“I am passionately and fully an advocate of science and research, especially infectious disease research,” says Inglesby.

But he said a small part of that research was “where there could be a very high risk if something went wrong, either by chance or on purpose. So the risk that could unfold and potential benefits.”