Beijing and stability in the Middle East

China expects Iranian retaliation against Israel (related to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran). Aware of the risks that such retaliation could engender, Beijing is opting for an ambiguous and apparently inert line. In fact, China is trying to position itself on a third, apparently distant, path. And even if the profound risk of Iranian retaliation could lead to chaos, with a potential war between Israel and Iran that would not suit China, the commitment of the People's Republic to avoid such chaos is not as explicit, as public, as direct as it could be (or should?) be.

Beijing has a long-term strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East: protecting its energy routes, ensuring the success of Belt and Road Initiativeexpand its economic and diplomatic influence and prevent potential threats to internal security. Launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), initially defined as One Belt and One Road (OBOR), can be described as an ambitious project aimed at strengthening trade and stimulating economic growth. It is a long-term initiative and an important development strategy aimed at promoting land and maritime connectivity between Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, aiming to establish and strengthen economic partnerships and collaboration between these regions. The initiative was included in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China in October 2017 to underline the long-term commitments of the Chinese government.

Moreover, China fears, for example, that instability in the Middle East could have repercussions on the current situation in the Xinjiang region, where local Muslim minorities are being re-educated to avoid radicalism. A conflict in the Middle East would actually be detrimental to China's energy security, given that the goal of becoming an “electro-state” is still in development and that the region's fossil fuel imports are still huge. Regional stability is essential to the success of the BRICS, as the land and sea trade routes that pass through the Middle East must remain secure to ensure the continued flow of goods and investment.

It is therefore clear that, in a balanced context, China can benefit from developing harmonious collaborations with Middle Eastern countries (especially with the rich Gulf countries). This is also due to China's new commitments in the region. Beijing is present, but avoids deep involvement. In recent days, for example, the Chinese Party/State's top diplomat, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, had a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart. China supports Iran in defending its sovereignty, security and national dignity in accordance with law, as well as in its efforts to maintain regional peace and stability, and is ready to maintain close communication with Iran, the statement released after the phone call said.

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This initiative seems to be a way of sending a double message. First, Wang is talking about that part of the world that is looking at what is happening without the Western prism and understands the Iranian position; this is important because the elimination of Haniyeh in Tehran is tantamount to an act of war and for this reason, Israel has not taken responsibility for the killing of Haniyeh. So, speaking of the Islamic Republic, Beijing is saying something similar: we understand you, because you have every reason to react radically, but try to handle the situation with self-control.

Andrea Ghiselli, a professor at Fudan University and head of research for the ChinaMed project, recently gave this meaning to the Chinese attitude: “Certainly, as in the series of Israeli-Iranian attacks and counterattacks some time ago, China would probably prefer that there be no response from Tehran, so that a regional escalation, which no one wants, can be avoided and, at the same time, to preserve the narrative that Iran is a responsible actor, while Israel, and therefore the United States, are the real sources of regional instability. This element is very important because it clarifies Chinese thinking in strategic and general terms. But what would happen in the event of Iranian retaliation? The substance would not change much. Of course, China has already defined its narrative about what is happening. At most, Iranian actions would be described as limited and, in any case, as a response to Israeli provocations. Everything was hushed up, if possible.

China, in a gesture of diplomatic opportunism, led the Iranians and Saudis to sign an agreement to normalize relations last year. The Beijing table has taken advantage of a negotiation process that has been ongoing for some time (mainly between Omanis and Iraqis) to reap its successes: this should have weight in the assessment of the situation conceived in Beijing. The real problem could arise if Iranian retaliation is not limited and if it becomes extremely difficult to manage the evolution of the regional situation.

Professor Ghiselli also reiterated: It is therefore not surprising that the foreign ministers of China and Iran already spoke by phone a few days ago, with Wang Yi probing the intentions of the Iranian government. At the same time, as the researchers of the ChinaMed project explain, the Chinese are keeping their eyes open to the Iranian internal situation, aware that the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing a dramatic situation from an economic point of view and a crisis with Israel. This could make things even more difficult.

Edoardo Pacelli journalist, former research director at CNR (Italy), editor-in-chief of the magazine Italianamiga and vice president of Ideus.