Xi Jinping wants Taiwan to be free

When President Donald Trump lands in Beijing today, for his first state visit to China since 2017, he hopes the conversation on cable news will be about soybeans, Boeings and the extension of his trade “truce.” However, in Beijing’s mind, this meeting concerns only Taiwan. Every trade item on the agenda aims to create leverage on the Taiwan issue.

Beijing has a clear theory for the summit victory: It wants the international press to report that Trump is betraying Taiwan. Chinese leader Xi Jinping told his US interlocutors directly that Taiwan was the “most important issue” in US-China relations. His goal for this summit, and for the next one in Washington later this year, will be to persuade Trump to move toward a broader compromise on the Taiwan issue. But even if Trump refuses to budge, Xi wants to create a narrative that his American counterpart is giving in on Taiwan. If this narrative gains momentum, even if it is not true, it could push Taiwan to the negotiating table out of desperation.

Xi’s first request would be small and inconsequential. He wants Trump to say that America “opposes” Taiwan independence, not just that it “does not support” it. it’s a line the United States has taken since the Clinton administration. In practice, there is no difference between these two positions. The essence of the long-standing US position is that Beijing and Taipei must be deterred from unilaterally changing the status quo. The United States has never had any interest in declaring support for Taiwanese independence. But if Trump appears to have changed his communication on the One-China policy under duress – even slightly – Xi hopes to make it appear that more substantial concessions are coming.

Xi has his eyes on Taiwan’s January 2028 presidential election, where he hopes a candidate more interested in dialogue with Beijing will come to power. Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is hoping for a fourth consecutive term. Xi, however, seeks to organize a restoration of the Kuomintang (KMT), which recognizes in principle (with its own interpretation) that Taiwan is part of “one China”. Xi can do business with the KMT. He will not negotiate with the DPP. Its goal: to erode Taiwanese voters’ confidence in the United States, so that they turn away from the DPP.

The broader point is that Xi’s main vector of coercion at present is political, not military. The West has long envisioned a crisis in Taiwan as an amphibious invasion in 2027. This risk remains real, as China acquires new military capabilities. But an invasion would be difficult and fraught with danger, especially given the unrest within the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Xi would rather take Taiwan for free, if he can get it.

“Xi would rather take Taiwan for free, if he can get it.”

In case Trump refuses to give Xi what he wants, China is preparing options other than war to assert its control over Taiwan. The most worrying scenario is that of “quarantine”, or indirect control option. It would not be a blockade. He would not seek to force Taiwan’s immediate surrender, nor would he seek to stop the flow of goods into and out of the island. Instead, Xi would argue that, under the law, customs authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should be able to control who and what enters and leaves “Taiwan Province.” It could move toward this outcome gradually, for example by requiring airlines entering and leaving Taiwan to submit passenger manifests for approval, or cargo ships entering and leaving Taiwan to submit to spot inspections. The goal would be to undermine Taiwan’s economic autonomy while persuading private companies and the United States to accept this as a new normal. Ultimately, if Taiwan still refuses to negotiate, it could use these new tools to exert targeted economic pressure. If Taiwan capitulated, Xi would then gain effective control of the island’s semiconductor manufacturing base. The United States could in principle destroy these facilities, of course – but not without paying a huge economic price itself.

Trump’s public communications do not suggest he understands why a quarantine would be dangerous. He is also concerned about other issues. He is negotiating against the backdrop of the war in Iran. Thanks in part to quiet support from Beijing, Iran chose to drag out negotiations rather than reach a deal. Its game of coercion in the Strait of Hormuz is working: the US Navy was unable to prevent Iran from closing the Strait; the insurance market has not recovered; oil futures still carry a war premium; Strategic oil reserves are running out. Trump needs a deal to reopen the strait and prevent the energy crisis from crushing the U.S. economy. He may also think he needs Xi’s help to resolve the Iran problem.

It is certain that Trump will go to Beijing strongly and meaningfully. The artificial intelligence boom continues, with American laboratories decisively leading the way. Beijing was surely impressed by many aspects of the US military campaign against Iran: the special forces operations, the impeccable aerial refueling campaign, the use of AI for intelligence gathering and targeting. Chinese leaders are keenly aware that the United States maintains structural and qualitative advantages in the military domain that their country has not yet matched. They also recognize that the core US state, including many of Trump’s top advisers, views the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as its main adversary. And they expect that U.S. opposition to China’s rise will be structural and that Washington will adopt increasingly extreme tactics as China continues to grow. Xi does not want a confrontation with America now; if he had, he wouldn’t have invited Trump to Beijing in the first place.

Xi doesn’t seem to be in a hurry. The Party’s National Congress is approaching next fall, when he will need to reshuffle key leadership positions and ensure a smooth transition to a fourth term. A stable relationship with the United States suits him, at least for now. But that could change in early 2028, when Taiwan holds its elections. Then, if Xi senses weakness in Washington, he might feel empowered to apply pressure – with a quarantine, if necessary.

It’s not too late for Trump to save the summit. Xi is deterrent, and a well-planned summit could signal that the United States is resolute and ready to resist him without provoking him. But this will require exceptional discipline on the part of the American president. Quarantine is avoidable, but it cannot be deterred by military equipment alone, nor by speeches on democracy. The United States must demonstrate that it has an integrated counter-strategy combining military preparedness, economic leverage, and allied coordination.