The China-India rapprochement is tactical and not strategic

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A thaw in Sino-Indian relations has been underway since October 2024, when the two governments announced a border agreement. This followed clashes in 2020, which marked the worst period of hostilities in more than four decades. Both sides have taken numerous steps to normalize people-to-people interactions, including resumption of direct flights, relaxation of visa restrictions And reboot of a Hindu pilgrimage to Tibet. But these developments demonstrate a pragmatic stabilization and not a substantial reset of the bilateral relationship.

Interactions between senior leaders resumed with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. sideline meeting of the BRICS summit in October 2024 in Kazan, Russia. Modi then visited Tianjin in August 2025 to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit – the first visit by an Indian leader to China in seven years. This will likely have reciprocity with Xi’s visit to India when New Delhi hosts the BRICS summit in September 2026.

Many efforts have been made to address sources of friction in bilateral relations. On the border conflict, both countries have resumed the framework of Special Representatives in December 2024 after a five-year hiatus. Significant progress has been made during the August 2025 meetingwhen the read aloud noted the creation of an expert group to explore an “early harvest” solution, which hints at a phased approach toward border demarcation.

A key catalyst for the normalization of bilateral relations was New Delhi’s recognition that his ambitions To emerge as a global manufacturing hub, India would need to maintain cordial relations with Beijing. China remains a key trading partner of India and plays a central role within its supply chains – a point made clearly in the report. Report 2023-2024 from the Economic Survey of India, published by the Indian Ministry of Finance.

Beijing restrictions lifted on exports of rare earth magnets, fertilizers and tunnel boring machines to India in August 2025 – although this remains a work in progress. In March 2026, New Delhi eased investment restrictions with amendments to press note 3a 2020 regulation requiring government approval for investments from countries sharing land borders with India, but primarily targeting China.

A more unstable geopolitical environment, fueled by Trump’s return to the White House, has reinforced the strategic importance of the thaw in bilateral relations. Shared exposure to the disruptive policies of Trump 2.0 reaffirmed the need for Beijing and New Delhi to stabilize their relations. Both countries initially faced some of the highest levels of tariffs under Trump’s reciprocal tariff policies. And the US-Israeli attack on Iran in February 2026 inflicted further shocks, with Beijing and New Delhi both maintaining historically close relations with Iran and remaining heavily dependent on energy imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. US attacks on Venezuela, Iran (and perhaps Cuba) are also an affront to Beijing and New Delhi’s claims to be the leaders or “voices” of the Global South.

But despite the positive rhetoric of a new “dragon-elephant tango“, mutual trust and understanding remain low and none of the grievances underlying the bilateral relationship have been resolved. There remains no mutual consensus on the Line of Actual Control that demarcates the disputed territory. Limited de-escalation efforts have not yet translated into a more permanent demilitarization or deinduction of forces along the border.

Efforts to build confidence in other military areas have been limited. The maritime affairs dialogue, which held its first meeting in 2016, has stalled despite its necessity in the face of China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The two countries also lack strategic nuclear dialogue despite their growing nuclear arsenals and evolving doctrines. Third parties further complicate bilateral relations as Beijing maintains its “all weather” policy relationship with Pakistan and deepens its relations with other South Asian countries, while New Delhi strengthens its cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam And Taiwan.

The trade imbalance in favor of China remains a source of tension. Even though bilateral trade has exceeded 150 billion dollars in 2025, more than US$100 billion would consist of Chinese exports to India. New Delhi attributed this to Beijing’s persistent use of non-tariff barriers. Even under the relaxed investment restrictions, only non-controlling minority investments of up to 10 percent are allowed without government approval. Meanwhile, Beijing has sought to undermine New Delhi’s ambition to position itself as a global manufacturing hub by restrict movement of Chinese nationals in India.

Several other hot spots remain in bilateral relations. China is building the world’s largest project hydroelectric project across the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo river, which passes through the two countries, is a source of growing concern in New Delhi. Although some interim steps have been taken to share hydrological data, there is still no formal water sharing agreement between the two countries.

And the issue of Tibet – a long-standing source of tension since the 14th Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 – threatens to resurface. As the Dalai Lama turns 90 in 2025, there are growing fears that bilateral tensions could escalate if his successor reincarnated among Tibetans living in exile in India.

The changing geopolitical context is exacerbating these fault lines. The United States has long viewed India as a bulwark against China’s rising power. But that narrative has lost some traction under the Trump administration’s value-neutral, transactional foreign policy, particularly as New Delhi and Washington independently pursue bilateral engagements with Beijing.

As the world’s most populous country and the second and soon to be third largest economy, China-India relations have significant implications for the future of the Indo-Pacific and the region. world order — a fact often overlooked amid concerns over conflicts in the Middle East and Europe.

Beijing and New Delhi have chosen to set aside points of disagreement for the moment as they navigate more turbulent geopolitical waters. But without resolving their fundamental grievances, this remains a tactical accommodation rather than a strategic reset of the bilateral relationship. Limited reengagement has not yet translated into lasting reconciliation.

Chietigj Bajpaee is a Senior Fellow for South Asia in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House.