A historic summit between China and North Korea – The Cipher Brief

Chinese and North Korean media have been busy covering Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea for meetings with Chairman Kim Jong Un. Mr. Xi’s last visit was in 2019, and what a difference seven years makes when it comes to North Korea.

Xi received royal treatment during his two-day visit in June 2026. Chinese and North Korean media coverage talked about expanding cooperation in trade, agriculture, construction and technology and strengthening exchanges in diplomatic, police and military fields. Interestingly, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun and his North Korean counterpart No Kwang-Chol also participated in some of the meetings.

During the visit to the North Korea-China Friendship Tower in honor of the fallen soldiers of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, Messrs. Xi and Kim stressed the importance of perpetuating their traditional friendship, with the “spirit of resistance against the United States.”

Regardless of the symbolism, what has China accomplished from this visit, the first overseas trip in 2026 for Mr. Xi?

1. Reaffirmation that North Korea is China’s only ally, in accordance with the 1961 Treaty of Amity, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. After Xi’s visit, North Korea is likely to receive an impressive gift from China.

2. North Korea’s recommitment to a one-China policy on the Taiwan issue.

3. A message to Russia’s Vladimir Putin that China will ensure that North Korea remains economically and strategically linked to China. North Korea keeps China informed of its military support for Russia in its war in Ukraine.

4. A message to President Donald Trump that China retains considerable influence over North Korea and that any U.S. effort to seek rapprochement with North Korea will be transparent to Beijing and dependent on Chinese support.

What has North Korea accomplished with Xi’s visit?

1. De facto recognition that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state.

2. The prestige gained by Mr. Kim thanks to Mr. Xi’s visit.

3. A likely increase in trade and agricultural aid, in line with commitments made by Mr. Xi during his visit. It is also likely that closer collaboration between the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will be considered.

Clearly, what Mr Kim took away from his visit was the prestige of seeing two great powers – China and Russia – competing for North Korea’s attention. The Victory Day celebration in September 2025 in Beijing, with Mr. Kim alongside MM. Xi and Putin, preceded by Mr. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang and now Mr. Xi’s visit to Pyongyang, are all helping to raise the profile of a North Korean leader who is building more nuclear weapons that can be coupled with ballistic missiles that can target South Korea, Japan and the United States.

It is likely that the question of the United States came up in private discussions between these two leaders. Mr. Kim likely advocated for North Korea’s nuclear program and advised China against again openly calling for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In fact, Mr. Kim probably made it clear to Mr. Xi that building the new uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon was a message he was sending to the United States: North Korea’s nuclear program will make it clear (to the United States) that the Yongbyon nuclear complex now has a new facility that spins sophisticated centrifuges to produce more highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Yongbyon facility is the facility that Mr. Kim offered to dismantle in February 2019 during the Hanoi summit with Mr. Trump, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed in 2016. Message from Mr. Kim to the United States: You missed an opportunity and we will now use this new facility at HEU to build more nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, Mr Xi’s last visit to North Korea was in June 2019, a few months after Mr Trump’s summit with Mr Kim in Hanoi. It is clear that China was expecting a briefing on the summit and the state of US relations with North Korea.

Having a friendly North Korea as a buffer state with a US-aligned South Korea is important to Beijing. Expecting China to facilitate contacts between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim is unrealistic and not in China’s interests. The ball is in the American court.

The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. Any statements of fact, opinions, or analyzes expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the content should be construed as asserting or implying authentication of the information by the U.S. Government or endorsement of the views of the author.