NATO | Towards a more European alliance

For more than seven decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the cornerstone of Western security architecture. Founded in 1949 as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into capitalist Europe, the 32-member military alliance has outlived its original purpose by transforming itself into a vehicle for projecting American power not only in Europe but across the world.

In the post-Cold War period, challenges to NATO have come from within and without. The most obvious external threat has been Russia, which has sought to curb its continued eastward expansion by invading Ukraine. Today, the war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its fifth year, remains NATO’s top priority under its core European security mandate. The domestic threat, however, is more insidious. It can be summed up in three words: the Trump presidency.

Both during his first term and his current term, President Donald Trump has questioned NATO’s usefulness to the United States and even threatened to withdraw from the alliance. He believes that even though NATO’s capabilities, funds, leadership and infrastructure were overwhelmingly American, the United States gets out of the alliance far less than it puts in, unlike its European allies, who have been able to reap the benefits while paying a fraction of the costs. In his deal-centric thinking, NATO seemed like a bad deal for the United States.

Mr. Trump’s simmering resentment appeared to reach a boiling point in April, when his NATO allies ignored his call to join the United States in its war of choice against Iran. Notably, Spain and the United Kingdom (initially) denied US fighter jets access to their military bases, while France refused overflight rights. Mr. Trump lashed out, calling NATO a “paper tiger” without the United States. He saw it as NATO’s betrayal of the United States, saying: “We were there automatically, including Ukraine. Ukraine was not our problem. It was a test, and we were there for them, and we always would have been there for them. They weren’t there for us.”

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio went further: “If NATO just allows us to defend Europe in the event of an attack, but then denies us the right to establish bases when we need them, that’s not a very good arrangement. It’s hard to stay committed to this and say it’s good for the United States. So we’re going to have to re-examine all of that.”

American withdrawal

This was followed, in June, by a New York Times story based on a communications leak, which exposed plans for a significant withdrawal of US commitments to NATO operations in Europe. According to the report, the Trump administration planned to “withdraw a third of the combat aircraft it supplies to NATO for Europe,” as well as “repurpose a missile submarine and an aircraft carrier, as well as several warships.” These developments have raised alarm bells across Europe’s strategic corridors as they appear to be eroding the pillar of their collective security – the mutual defense commitment under Article 5. Could they still count on the United States to rescue them in the face of attack?

The United States also cut aid to the war effort in Ukraine, making European allies the main donor. At the same time, Mr. Trump pushed European NATO members to spend 5% of their GDP on defense (3.5% on basic military needs plus 1.5% on critical infrastructure). But only five of NATO’s 32 members are on track to achieve this goal in 2026.

Other sources of tension within NATO include Mr. Trump’s obsession with annexing Greenland, the sovereign territory of fellow NATO member Denmark. Mr. Trump also feels frustrated that European security considerations are preventing him from developing a friendlier relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Tensions on this front came to the fore in early 2025 when he attempted to end the war in Ukraine by speaking directly to Mr. Putin.

For their part, the European members of NATO have tried to play a balancing role. It is now clearly accepted that the United States can no longer continue to be the sole pillar of NATO. The constitutive principle of NATO is the unconditional guarantee of security. But Mr. Trump’s repeated attempts to make it conditional – tying it to members’ “payment” or their “loyalty” – have cast a pall of uncertainty over that guarantee, prompting European nations to consider autonomy and self-sufficiency. But these are expensive propositions that require time and vast investments to bear fruit. In the meantime, European allies cannot do without the United States’ continued engagement in NATO operations, which they say requires a strategy to selectively appease Mr. Trump and indiscriminately flatter him.

Interim strategy

This strategy, which was on full display at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7-8, appears to have worked quite well. European leaders, led by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, a savvy Dutch politician, outlined plans to increase spending on military hardware and investment in expanding their defense industrial base. While maintaining their decision not to get involved in the Strait of Hormuz, they ensured that the summit declaration reiterated Mr. Trump’s stated goals in the Iran war: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons and freedom of navigation must be restored in the Strait of Hormuz.

For good measure, they also promised $50 billion in new defense purchases – a boon for the US military-industrial complex – and €70 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. In exchange, they got Mr. Trump to sign a “firm commitment” to Article 5. Despite his usual litany of complaints, which he revived again in Ankara, Mr. Trump, at the end of the summit, said he was satisfied with the “tremendous love” he received from his European allies.

But tensions, although hidden in Ankara, have not eased. The reluctance of European allies to join US military operations against Iran reflects a fundamental divergence in how the two countries view NATO. While Europeans view NATO as a region-specific (transatlantic) “defensive” force, Mr. Trump views it more broadly as an extension of U.S. military capabilities that should be globally deployable. Hence its expectation of unconditional “loyalty” from its European allies in exchange for the unconditional security guarantee that the United States provides them through NATO.

To be fair, NATO has never been a one-way street as Mr. Trump seems to believe. For nearly eight decades, the United States enjoyed unfettered access to air bases, military networks, infrastructure, and logistical support across Europe, without which its various campaigns in West Asia and elsewhere during this period would have been impossible. It has also enjoyed the support of its European allies on most foreign policy issues, including controversial ones, as well as the military support of most countries on the continent. But as the United States increasingly prioritized the Pacific theater, a greater European role within NATO was inevitable.

In the medium term, in the words of the Ankara Declaration, “a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO” is the stated objective, in which European allies and Canada would “assume greater responsibility for the defense of the Alliance.” But in the long term, Europe would like to develop its military capabilities to a level where, on the one hand, it can provide credible deterrence against Russia, even in a scenario of strategic ambiguity on the question of American intervention in the face of a credible threat, and, on the other hand, guarantee the autonomy necessary to safeguard its own political interests when they come up against American coercion.

Published – July 12, 2026 at 02:00 IST