Xi Jinping's Axis of Losers

The United States faces the most difficult international environment it has faced since at least the Cold War and perhaps since World War II. One of the most disconcerting features of this environment is the emerging cooperation between China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. Some policymakers and commentators see this cooperation as the beginnings of a 21st century axis which, like the German-Italian-Japanese axis of the 20th century, will plunge the world into world war. Others do not foresee a Third World War but a series of distinct conflicts scattered across the globe. Either way, the result is a world at war – the situation is that serious.

What to do with this cooperation is another matter. Some strategists argue for ruthless prioritization, focusing on axis members who pose the greatest threats. Others believe that only a comprehensive effort will succeed. But the best strategy would borrow elements from both approaches, recognizing that China is the primary long-term concern of U.S. national security strategy, the threat that drives development, in the U.S. Department of Defense's definition, but also a different type of global actor than its rogue state partners. As a result, Washington's goal should be to make Chinese President Xi Jinping understand how counterproductive and costly these new relations will prove to Beijing's interests. That means fighting Iran, North Korea, and Russia effectively in their own regions, demonstrating to China that clinging to a group of losers is hardly a path to global influence.

BROTHERS IN ARMS

Cooperation between members of this 21st century axis has been heavily focused on military, industrial and economic support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, which could not be sustained without such assistance. The resulting defense industrial cooperation and emerging integration will likely go far beyond what existed between 20th-century axis partners. North Korea supplies Russia with artillery shells, other munitions, military personnel and industrial workers and obtains oil, missiles and space technology in exchange. Iran supplies missiles and drones produced in its defense factories, also helps build such factories in Russia itself and gets help for its own missile, drone and space programs and perhaps also for the civil nuclear energy. So far, China is providing everything but actual weapons: greatly increased trade and purchases of oil, gas and other natural resources; dual-use technology that is integrated into Russian air defense, electronic warfare, drones and other weapons and communications systems; and recently, real components for Russian weapons. There is even talk of producing drones and weapons systems for Russia in Chinese factories. What China will get in return is not entirely clear at this stage, other than discounted energy and potentially unrivaled influence over Russia. Beyond the war in Ukraine, China, Russia and their axis partners have increased training and joint operations, notably with bombers, ships and even land forces.

The axis partners have also accelerated their diplomatic coordination, with Beijing and Moscow using their veto power in the United Nations Security Council to protect each other as well as Tehran and Pyongyang from unfavorable resolutions. The high-level reciprocal visits of leaders and senior officials resulted in a series of cooperation agreements in economic, technological and other fields.

This 21st century axis may not be a formal alliance, but it nonetheless represents an increasingly close, highly functional, and flexible alignment of interests that need not become an alliance to advance goals. of its members or undermine the interests of the United States. States and its allies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Even without any real ideological affinity, there is a common anti-Westernism, opposition to democracy and support for authoritarian alternatives. What truly binds the axis is not ideology but a common opposition to American power and the international system it supports, fueled by the conviction that this power represents a mortal threat to American interests, aspirations and even the survival of their regime.

The link between China and Russia is particularly important. It builds on the strong personal relationship between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, forged during more than 60 meetings during their tenure. There are of course both historical and contemporary sources of tension between China and Russia: a long common border with many empty spaces on the Russian side and a large population on the Chinese side; Beijing's suspicions of Moscow have revived relations with North Korea, and Moscow's suspicions of Beijing's growing economic influence in Central Asia; and considerable xenophobia in both countries. But these tensions, although real, are unlikely to disrupt relations between the two governments as long as Putin and Xi are in charge.

THE CHINA MAP

Although some commentators have recommended trying to separate the axis members, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice leans in the opposite direction, proposing that policymakers seek to bring them together and make them face the consequences of the fact that they don't actually have much in common. There is much to be said in favor of this approach. Any effort to move Putin away from the axis will almost certainly fail; it is too dependent on these partners for its support in Ukraine. Attempting to separate North Korea or Iran from the axis would require concessions that no U.S. administration would likely be willing to make.

But China may be another matter. Unlike its axis partners, China is integrated into the global economy. The prospect of broad, limited and so far targeted secondary sanctions, in the event that China crosses Western red lines by supplying weapons to Russia, could threaten to result in real economic costs. Meanwhile, the war against Israel led by Iran and its proxies threatens to disrupt critical oil supplies to China and other trade with the Middle East. And North Korea's increasingly bellicose attitude toward its neighbors has strained China's diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea and Japan.

More fundamentally, China has made its prestige hostage to the success of its axis partners. If they were to fail in their respective efforts to impose their will on their neighbors by force, it would become clear to the world that Beijing has chosen the losers. This would not only harm China's efforts to project itself as the global leader of a new type of international order; it would also damage Xi's personal reputation, at home and abroad.

Washington should demonstrate to China that clinging to a group of losers is not a path to global influence.

How could this objective be achieved? As far as Russia is concerned, this amounts to preventing Putin from achieving his strategic goals in Ukraine. This will require sufficiently sustained Western diplomatic, economic and military support to enable Ukrainian forces to halt the current Russian advance and, if not reconquer the occupied territories, at least to establish a stable line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian forces. Such an outcome would allow kyiv to focus on building a sovereign, prosperous, non-corrupt and democratic state, increasingly integrated into European economic and security institutions.

As far as Iran is concerned, this means ending Tehran's hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. This can be done in part by helping Israel strike heavy blows against Iran and its proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and many others, in order to restore deterrence and pave the way for a Middle East. -East more stable. Stability will enable continued reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the start of a more promising future for the Palestinians, and the opportunity for the Lebanese people to liberate their country from Hezbollah domination.

And when it comes to North Korea, that means demonstrating that Pyongyang's fixation on nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will not bring security to the country or influence over its neighbors. This will require strengthening the diplomatic, economic and military capabilities of Australia, Japan, South Korea and other regional allies and partners to work with the United States to deter North Korea and defend against any military action it might take, all with the aim of continuing the fight against North Korea. progress towards a free, open and peaceful Indo-Pacific.

EXISTENTIAL RECONSIDERATIONS

Each of these steps would advance the interests of the United States and its friends and allies, leaving aside the message they would send to China. But if pursued successfully, they could lead Beijing to limit, or even reduce, its commitment to the failing adventurism of its renegade partners.

There is good reason to believe that such a review is possible, since Xi has already adjusted his course under pressure. In the face of street protests and other clear expressions of public discontent, he abruptly abandoned his zero COVID policy. In response to the China strategy forged during the Trump and Biden administrations, he has shifted his approach toward the United States. Early in his term, Xi seemed to have concluded that the United States and the West more generally were in terminal decline, thus presenting China with an opportunity to assert itself on the world stage; A strong US response, supported by a clear bipartisan consensus, real strategic investments and a united front with friends and allies, prompted Xi to reconsider his decision. The result was a decision to reconnect with the United States, including meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco last November, to try to halt the decline in U.S.-China relations.

By decisively curbing the adventurism of its axis partners, Washington could lead Xi to change course once again. It would surely be in his interest to do so. For if the recklessness of his partners leads to lasting global instability and conflict, Xi himself would bear much of the responsibility for preventing the Communist Party from fulfilling its promises to make China a moderately developed economy of here 2035 and a strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious economy. and a modern socialist country by 2049. The right US strategy could make Xi realize that he can better serve his own interests by breaking away from the losers' axis.

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