A Marriage of ConvenienceThe Limits of a Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement | Opinion

On September 4, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Ankara, Sisi's first visit to Turkey since coming to power in 2014. Despite the appearance of reconciliation, the meeting is best understood as a calculated move by both leaders to advance specific economic and geopolitical interests.

Relations between the two nations have been glacial since 2013, when Erdogan condemned Sisi's ouster of Mohammed Morsi, then leader of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan's denunciation of Sisi as a “tyrant” And “brutal killer“as well as his 2019 wish that he “never talk to someone like that“Sissi seems to have cemented an irreparable rift.

This dynamic began to change in 2020, when Erdogan launched a broader campaign charm offensive across the Middle East. Yet the rapprochement with Egypt came with demands that Erdogan could not easily meet, such as an end to the Turkish occupation. military activities in Libya, ending support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which he provided seriously, from 2014, and the resolution of maritime borders and energy disputes with Cyprus and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean.

A turning point has occurred at the 2022 FIFA World Cup World Cupwhere Erdogan shook hands with Sisi on the sidelines of the match. In July 2023, the two countries exchanged ambassadors For the first time since 2013, relations between the two countries have eased. Despite this, the motivations for their rapprochement are rooted in divergent national and regional needs.

What exactly does Egypt need from Turkey, and what does Turkey need from Egypt?

For Egypt, the Eastern Mediterranean represents untapped potential in energy exploration. Ankara's assertiveness in the region, often at odds with its Egyptian allies Greece and Cyprus, poses a challenge to Cairo's ambitions. LibyaThe Turkish military supports factions opposed to Egyptian interests, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

By improving his relations with Erdogan, Sisi hopes to neutralize these threats and turn them into opportunities.

The Economy of Egypt situation adds urgency to Sisi’s diplomatic efforts. Plagued by record inflation, soaring unemployment and a crippling debt crisis, Cairo is in dire need of foreign investment. Reestablishing ties with Ankara could open up new opportunities for foreign investment and trade, allowing Sisi to reduce his tax burden. dependence on traditional Gulf allies.

Erdogan's calculations, however, are more aimed at reasserting Turkey's role in the region. Over the past decade, Erdogan has spared no effort to ruin Ankara maintains ties with virtually every power in the Middle East and North Africa, and not for strategic reasons. In the case of Egypt, Erdogan's staunch support for the Muslim Brotherhood has driven a wedge between the two nations. A similar story can be seen in Erdogan's relations with Israel, which he damaged for political gains among ideologically Islamist voters.

The restoration of ties with Cairo offers Erdogan the opportunity to reverse his failed isolationist strategy. Beyond regional rivalries, the rapprochement with Cairo also allows Ankara to gain influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with neighboring countries. Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a platform from which Turkey has been excluded.

More urgently, Erdogan seeks to exploit Egypt's position as an Arab power to gain a foothold in Gaza. Without Egypt, Erdogan has no voice because of his relentlessly and unreserved support for Hamas. By strategically engaging with Cairo, Ankara is positioning itself as a central player in regional politics, thereby strengthening its position against these competing forces.

These strategic interests Energy issues were at the heart of the discussions at the September 4 meeting. The discussions reportedly focused on the situation in Libya, energy conflicts, economic collaborations, and joint venture projects in the energy and infrastructure sectors. While Sisi seems willing to listen to Erdogan, he is not naive.

Erdogan's decade-long rhetorical insults against Sisi are one thing, but Erdogan's efforts to provide sanctuary to Muslim Brotherhood agents in Türkiye. Support for the Muslim Brotherhood was multifaceted, including the opening of a TV channelto the external political support offered by Erdogan and his government. Sisi will be interested to know what measures Ankara will implement to end the existence of the Muslim Brotherhood within its borders.

However, there are significant limits and risks to this “marriage of convenience.”

Deeply rooted ideology differences—especially on Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood—remain unresolved and could rekindle tensions. Erdogan's tactical support for Islamist groups, even if tonic If this situation is mishandled by Ankara, it risks destabilizing Sisi.

Moreover, the partnership in its current form is primarily driven by immediate economic and geopolitical needs, making it susceptible to change. Egypt’s economic crisis and Erdogan’s desire for influence are not going away anytime soon, but any change in their respective situations could unravel the relationship.

While Sisi is often seen as a pragmatic leader, Egypt’s growing internal difficulties are beginning to reveal the cracks in his rule. Erdogan, known for his unpredictable foreign policy, often reacts to domestic and regional pressures. This volatility means that the current détente could quickly unravel, underscoring the precariousness of their rapprochement and the ever-present risk that today’s cooperation could become tomorrow’s conflict.

Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an associate professor of national security studies at Marine Corps University. Follow him on X @SinanCiddi.

Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at FDD. Follow her on X @themariamwahba.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors.