The controlled “demolition” of Turkish democracy

The court order to replace Turkey’s main opposition party indicates that President Erdogan is setting the cards for early elections.

Last Thursday’s court order dismissing Ozgur Ozel from his post as elected leader of the CHP (Republican People’s Party), Turkey’s secular opposition, and replacing him with the party’s former leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is characteristic of the repression of the opposition defended by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan since his AKP (the Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002.

A disciple of Necmettin Erbakan, the father of political Islam in Turkey, Erdogan continued in his footsteps as mayor of Istanbul in 1994 and made no secret that democracy was not his goal but the vehicle of his movement. When Erbakan’s Welfare Party was dissolved in 1998 for his challenge to secularism, and Erdogan having been sentenced to a short prison sentence, he changed course.

The AKP, founded in 2001, introduced himself as a Westerner, reformist, moderate and neoliberal, and an ally of Turkey in Europe and the United States bought in the story. The start of European Union accession negotiations in 2005 provided Erdogan with the alibi he needed to send the army back to the barracks and stifle secular opposition.

Two major elements of Erdogan’s regime have been the confrontation with the Kemalist (secular) opposition, which has been the main stumbling block in his attempt to impose Islamist rule on Turkey. The other is the standoff with his former ally, the Turkish imam Fethullah Gülen, whose movement initially provided the educated cadres Erdogan needed.

In the first case,a fictional monster was created, the “Ergenekon terrorist organization”, and inthe Sledgehammer affair (“Balyoz”)a fictional army plot to overthrow the government. Before the July 2016 coup attempt, the Gülen movement was declared Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) in May. This served as the basis for the mass arrests and persecution of the movement that followed.

THE cogeneration was founded by the founding father of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), alongside the Turkish Republic in 1923. The party’s main offense is its overall majority achieved in the Turkish local elections in March 2024, which poses a clear threat to Erdogan’s power.

In October last year, the CHP published a complete account on how the AKP government undermined the party, titled “The Judiciary vs. the Ballot Box: The Anatomy of a Coup.” However, Studyo Recap has published a detailed analysis of how the government has undermined local government since the 2024 elections.

Many CHP mayors have been removed from office, accused of corruption and embezzlement, particularly in Istanbul. Last year, on March 19, Ekrem Imamoglu was arrested and confronted a variety of feeswhich represents a total of 2,352 years of imprisonment. that of Istanbul Attorney General, Akin Gurlekhas since been promoted to Minister of Justice. In several municipalities, pro-Kurdish CHP and DEM (People’s Democracy and Equality Party) mayors were replaced by government administrators, some of the former mayors accused of terrorism-related charges.

Kilicdaroglu was a lackluster leader of the CHP. In the 13 years he led the party, it did not win a single national election. A conviction in December 2022 for a remark he made to the press, Imamoglu blocked Imamoglu from running in the 2023 presidential election, and Erdogan won. Thus, Ozgur Ozel was elected leader during the ordinary congress of the CHP in November 2023, and in April last yearhe was re-elected without opposition during an extraordinary congress.

However, a call to cancel this congress was rejected by the Supreme Electoral Council of Türkiye (YSK). It should be noted that under Article 79 of the Turkish Constitution, the final decision on the conduct of elections rests with the YSK. In a second extraordinary congress held in September, Ozel was also re-elected unopposed.

The following month, an Ankara criminal court dismissed the case challenging the legitimacy of Ozel’s election, saying it had no legal basis. In June, the AKP representative on the Supreme Electoral Council also declared that the decision of the YSK cannot be overturned by the criminal court of first instance or by the high criminal court. “If that’s the case, it will be very, very bad.”

Therefore, last Thursday’s decision to remove Ozel and his board and reinstate Kilicdaroglu comes as a bombshell. This decision took place shortly before the Eid al-Adha holidays, which had been extended to nine days, to cushion a response.

On Sunday, Kilicdaroglu’s lawyer asked police to help him evacuate the CHP headquarters. they forcibly expelled Ozel and his deputies with tear gas and rubber bullets. The day before the court’s decision, Kilicdaroglu had called for “purification“, and now he reports a purge.

The numbers tell the story. The AKP, with its ally the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), commands 322 places out of the 600 in the Turkish parliament. To call early elections, which could give Erdogan another term as president, or to put constitutional reform to a referendum, they need 360 seats. More than 400 seats would pave the way for unfettered constitutional reform. An agreement with the pro-Kurdish DEM and nine other MPs, which have 56 seats, could pave the way, but the DEM has just shown it. his support for Özel.

As Turkish editor and journalist Yavuz Baydar concluded in an incisive analysis“It is no longer a crisis of democracy, it is its demolition.”

This decision comes at an uncertain time for the country’s markets and economy. In March last year, after the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, the Turkish central bank cost $50 billion to support the lira, and 6 billion euros Thursday, following the court’s decision. The war in Iran cost about 30 billion dollars to keep the lira stable, and Turkey started to burn its gold reserves And sell its US Treasury holdings.

Turkey is still grappling with inflationand the mood is depressed. The question is how much longer the Turkish people will be prepared to endure a return to authoritarian power that will have tangible effects on their standard of living.

About the author: Robert Ellis

Robert Ellis is a Turkish analyst and commentator. He is also an international advisor at RIEAS (Research Institute for European and American Studies) in Athens. He regularly comments on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press. Previously, he was an advisor to the Turkey Review Group in the European Parliament and a senior researcher at the Gatestone Institute in New York.