Cheng Li-wun’s Chinese Illusion – Taiwan Insight

Written by Günter Schubert.

Image credit: Zheng Liwen/Facebook.

I’ve been following the KMT closely since the election of its new president, Cheng Li-wun, trying to understand two crucial questions about the party’s prospects in the upcoming election – and perhaps its future relevance in Taiwanese politics more generally. First, what exactly does the party stand for in terms of cross-Strait policy? Second, how convincing is his approach likely to be with Taiwanese voters, especially middle-of-the-road voters who tend to decide elections?

In conversations with KMT supporters and officials in recent weeks, I have found little consensus beyond the familiar standard statements: “We need to talk to China.” “The DPP provokes war. » “Leaning too heavily towards the United States is dangerous. » None of this constitutes coherent policy. So what exactly does the KMT want and where is the party headed under the leadership of Cheng Li-wun?

To answer these questions, it is helpful to start with Cheng’s own public statements. One of the most revealing interviews she gave appeared in the South China Morning Post, May 11shortly after her six-day visit to mainland China, during which she also met Xi Jinping.

The cornerstone of Cheng Li-wun’s approach remains the “1992 Consensus.” Traditionally, this meant “one China with respective interpretations”, a formula long central to the KMT’s China policy. Yet during his recent visit to the mainland, Cheng did not use this formulation at all. Instead, it has repeatedly adopted the phrase “1992 Consensus Opposing Taiwan Independence” (九二共識、反對台獨), language that closely mirrors Xi Jinping’s own formulation.

Cheng describes his trip to China as an effort to “resolve misunderstandings”, “stabilize the relationship” and thus “maintain the status quo”. Any change to this status quo, she insists, must occur peacefully, serve the well-being of people on both sides of the Strait and respect the will of the Taiwanese people.

But at this stage, we expect a discussion on how these principles could be translated into concrete policies. Instead, Cheng offers little substance. She simply advises proceeding “one step at a time,” echoing Xi Jinping’s call to move forward “steadily and pragmatically.” Rather than presenting a detailed policy program, she turns to criticism of the DPP government, accusing it of “de-Inization” and provoking hostility from Beijing.

Most notably, Cheng asserts that a majority of Taiwanese do not want war, prefer peaceful exchanges, and do not identify with the DPP’s cross-strait policies. Cheng therefore promises that the KMT will provide “a clearer and stronger cross-Strait vision” capable of restoring public trust and proving that peace is achievable. This already appears to foreshadow what could become the KMT’s central message for the 2028 presidential election: supporting the KMT’s cross-strait route is the only way to ensure peace. Again, Cheng does not define exactly what this “road” would mean in practical political terms.

It turns instead to questions of identity and civilization. Cheng emphasizes a shared Chinese cultural identity, asserting that people on both sides of the strait are “the heirs of Chinese civilization.” According to her, Taiwanese and Chinese identities are not mutually exclusive: “I am Taiwanese, I am Chinese – these identities coexist. » She further argues that China’s modernization and growing national power are producing an increasingly influential Chinese culture. Ordinary Taiwanese, she argues, can already see how modern China has become and, if they remove the “tinted glasses” of politics, they will recognize that Taiwan and mainland China are custodians of the same larger civilization.

Discussing her meeting with Xi Jinping, Cheng said she felt “pure sincerity” and patience in Beijing’s approach to resolving cross-Strait disputes, provided that Taiwan honors the “1992 Consensus” and opposes Taiwan independence. She also insisted that Xi made no remarks about cooperation between the KMT and the CCP on unification, even though official Chinese statements after the meeting suggested exactly that.

On defense policy, Cheng sharply criticizes the DPP government, accusing it of turning Taiwan’s defense budget into a “black box” vulnerable to corruption and waste. According to her, stricter legislative control is necessary.

Cheng also discussed Taiwan’s position within a broader great-power rivalry. Ahead of the expected Xi-Trump summit, she argued that Taiwan “must not become a bargaining chip” between major powers and must maintain its own voice and action. At the same time, she stressed that the question of Taiwan was, for Beijing, “a question of principle”.

The interview ends with Cheng describing the 2028 elections as a stark choice between war and peace. According to her, the KMT road map “aims to ensure peace and avoid conflict,” while the DPP implicitly represents the opposite.

I do not dispute Cheng Li-wun’s self-identification as Chinese or her embrace of Chinese culture. I also do not object to the KMT’s long-standing support for the “1992 Consensus.” What strikes me instead is the lack of concrete policy and Cheng’s apparent willingness to ignore Xi Jinping’s own interpretation of this consensus.

From Xi’s 2019 New Year speechit is clear that Beijing no longer accepts “different interpretations” of the “1992 Consensus”. In Xi’s formulation at the time, and in the PRC White Paper 2022, The Taiwan Issue and China’s Reunification in the New Era (“The Taiwan Question and the Cause of China’s Unification in the New Era”), the “1992 Consensus” was unequivocally linked to the “one country, two systems” framework applied to Hong Kong and Macau, leaving little or no room for the Republic of China as an enduring political entity.

I guess Cheng Li-wun understands this as well as anyone else in the KMT. She nevertheless appears to believe that by endorsing the “1992 Consensus” and opposing Taiwan’s independence, a KMT-led government could restore the more cooperative atmosphere of the Ma Ying-jeou years. But today’s geopolitical circumstances are fundamentally different. The strategic rivalry between China and the United States has intensified significantly, and the political space that once existed for rapprochement through trade, investment and tourism deals has largely disappeared. As a result, a future KMT government would likely face increasing pressure from Beijing to move toward deeper economic and political integration. In Chinese political culture, belonging to “one family” also comes with obligations.

At the same time, Cheng Li-wun’s criticism of the DPP government blurred the KMT’s position on national defense. This reinforces the impression that the party favors a risky form of appeasement towards China. Legislative control of defense spending is normal in democracies. What is unusual, however, is insisting on item-by-item approval after purchase agreements have already been negotiated with foreign governments, as the KMT has done for U.S. arms sales. This effectively turns long-term defense procurement into an ongoing political negotiation process and reflects what Cheng herself described in the SCMP interview as “zero trust” in the DPP government.

There may also be a deeper problem at work. The KMT’s behavior gives the impression that Taiwan cannot simultaneously strengthen its own defense and gain Beijing’s trust. Yet this contradicts a long-standing and proven principle of international politics: if you want peace, prepare for war — if you want peace, prepare for war.

For many Taiwan sympathizers, the KMT’s position is increasingly difficult to understand, unless one assumes that the party is resigning itself to the logic expressed in Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” » It is difficult to imagine that such thinking could convince a majority of Taiwanese voters in 2028.

Ultimately, the KMT’s China policy, as outlined by President Cheng, appears largely devoid of concrete policy content. Instead, it is strongly ideological, shaped by a deep distrust of the ruling party and a risky confidence in China’s goodwill once Taiwan accepts Beijing’s interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” and the “One China Principle.” Cheng Li-wun nevertheless seems determined to continue on this path – and to take the KMT with her.

Gunter Schubert is Full Professor of Greater China Studies and Director of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at the University of Tübingen. This text is a revised and expanded version of an opinion article published by The Commonwealth Magazine of May 21^st.

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