Tarique Rahman’s visit to China shows Beijing’s charm offensive

The has just been elected prhyme mMinister of Bangladesh, Tariqhad Rahman, concluded his long-awaited first foreign tour since he entered in February 2026. His two-country tour, first to Malaysia and then to China, is seen as a major overhaul of Bangladesh’s foreign and security policy roadmap. This reflects a shift in Dhaka’s regional commitments away from India. Rahman could have made a simple trip to China, but he made Kuala Lumpur, not Beijing, his first stop. Many would say it was simply to avoid headlines in Delhi.

But why avoid Delhi and break with traditional diplomatic practice, especially when Rahman was pushing to restore ties with India, strained following the “July Movement” in 2024 that ousted the country from Delhi. ancient Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina? Was it the reported delay in issuing visas by India to Bangladeshis Or Hasina’s extradition issue? Does Rahman respond to domestic political sentiment by signfill intention towards India but take the last step towards China? While the response that could be everything of the aboveit would be a mistake to assume that India had not anticipated such a move.

Key oresults

Bangladeshi Prime Minister The three-day China tour was comprehensive, with key outcomes including security commitments, development cooperation, connectivity, investments, maritime affairs, medical cases and multilateralism. In total, 13 memorandums of understanding were would have signed, and among Rahman’s key meetings with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership was one with President Xi Jinping in the Great Hall in Beijing.

THE Chinese state media called THE visit an “upgrade” in the links, quoting Rahman’s remarks on Beijing as “the most valued and trusted partner”.

However, the initial rise and language shift in bilateral relations occurred all the way back during Xi’s visit to Bangladesh in October 2016, when relations were upgraded to a “strategic partnership”. Iit was the same year that Bangladesh joins China’s ambitious multi-billion dollar project Belt and Road Initiative.

The two key developments in Bangladesh-China relations occurred during Hasina’s second term, considered close to India. If Hasina could move towards China more strategically despite sharing closer ties with India, it may be unrealistic to expect an “India first” approach a regime that was elected after its ouster (especially when Delhi continues to host Hasina as a “guest”).

Also read: Tarique Rahman’s visit to Malaysia indicates geopolitical shift

Deepening ties with parties

In addition to the exchange of diplomatic courtesies, one of the first developments during Rahman’s visit to China was the signature of A Memorandum of Understanding between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the CCP. This development deserves some attention, because over the past decade the CCP has advocated stronger party-level ties in countries across the Indian subcontinent.—alongside state-level ties—to increase its political influence.

Notably, amid the current political upheaval in the region, Bangladesh and Nepal have seen an increase in the number of new leaders and political parties.. For China, this represents an opportunity to forge early alliances. This political shift reflects a move away from Indian centrality and hypernationalism.. The aspires to youth leadership in Bangladesh and Nepal seems to prefer not to be burdened by history-who understands links shared with the nearest neighbor.

China understand that exchanges at party level become crucial during elections as well as periods of political instability in these countries. Besides Bangladesh, China has recently made a similar thrust with Nepal during fstranger businessthe visit of Minister Shishir Kahanal, advocating a “political party + channel” to “consolidate and develop friendly ties” with the ruling Rashtriya Swatantra party.

Maritime cooperationconnectivity, defense, trade

Besides the emphasis on party-level ties, security and maritime cooperation between China and Bangladesh require further inspection. In the joint statementthe subtle mention that the the two sides “agreed to strengthen cooperation in maritime affairs”, without much explanation, must read with caution. Beijing is expanding its strategic watermarks in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) through the development of maritime infrastructure in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand and other BoB coastal states. such as Sri Lanka.

This expansion is also reflected in the project of China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC), a key strategic corridor close to eastern and northeastern India. THE CMBEC was discussed and announced during Rahman’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart. While THE development captured securities in Delhi due to its strategic importance, a further action plan would clarify its critical impact on India, given that the country shares long borders with Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Furthermore, the two sides agreed to “jointly advance the project of modernization and expansion of the Mongla port facilities and the development of the Chattogram China Economic and Industrial Zone.”. Iinterim leader Muhammad Yunus proposed this decision during his visit to China in March 2025. Recent development reflects Beijing’s intention to pursue the projectbecause it has strategic value. Both Bangladeshi ports are close to India and have a Chinese presence, raising concerns for New Delhi.

On the foreign and security policy front, China and Bangladesh agreed to “establish a strategic dialogue mechanism among foreign ministers” and also explore “2+2 dialogue mechanism” on diplomacy and defense. Although these mechanisms help maintain regular exchanges on diplomatic and defense issues, they primarily serve as key initiatives to strengthen China’s defense exports. World Time Has reported Dhaka’s intention to purchase 24 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets, the plane used by Pakistan against India in May 2025.

China is one of Bangladesh’s major trading partners, with annual bilateral trade estimated at 18 billion dollars. AIn 2024, China would have recorded a trade surplus of $21.7 billion with Bangladesh, while exports reached $22.8 billion and imports totaled $1.16 billionindicating Chinese dominance.

TTrade deficit remains a major challenge for Bangladeshfor which some efforts seem to have been made during this visit, starting with the prices.

“Bangladesh appreciates China for treating zero tariffs on 100 percent tariff lines and will foster a favorable environment for Chinese companies to invest in Bangladesh,” the joint statement said.

Also read: Why Modi is visiting Seychelles for only the second time in 50 years of diplomatic relations

No hiding in Taiwan

If we look closely at the structure of China’s joint communiqués with other country, the first paragraphs often bear the weight of Beijing’s security concerns, while the following lines clarify the objective.

THE recent joint statement said that Bangladesh has reaffirmed its “firm commitment” to the one-China principle.

“Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legal government representing all of China. Bangladesh resolutely opposes any form of “Taiwan independence” and firmly supports the Chinese government’s efforts to achieve national reunification.“, we read in the press release.

While other countries’ diplomatic reiterations on these issues are important to Beijing’s strategic calculus and positioning on global platforms, they also serve as a way to warn countries in the region and beyond not to engage with Taiwan and isolate Taipei. It is interesting to note that the first mention of Taiwan in official documents China-Bangladesh Communiqués occurred during former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s state visit to Bangladesh in April 2005. The wording may have changed over the past two decades, but the message remains the same.

There is no doubt that Taiwan has become a standard request for China, in addition to the other commitments it expects from Bangladesh in trade, connectivity and defense. It also reveals how Beijing uses its power to advance its strategic interests, particularly against geographically smaller and less powerful countries, and then presents this pressure in the subtle language of diplomacy, partnership and mutual respect.

China’s modus operandi in India’s neighboring countries in recent years has clearly been to exploit resources, events and political dynamics that seek to move away from engagement with India. Whether it is the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal or Bangladesh, Beijing is clearly not left out. The fact remains that for the countries of the subcontinent, concessions to China come at the expense of their own peace and stability.

Path ftowards gold

The recent political upheavals in the countries of the Indian subcontinent have not only changed their domestic orders but also their foreign and security policies. With India traditionally being an ironclad friend, the new forces want to distance themselves from Delhi in search of short-term political gains. These countries are confident that China will prove to be a reliable partner. For Bangladesh, the path forward should not be defined as a choice between India and China, but rather as a careful balance between developmental needs and long-term strategic autonomy.

At the same time, New Delhi must also be clear that geography, shared history and the legacy of the 1971 war alone cannot guarantee influence and friendship. It is worth noting that the youth-led and development-oriented polity in Dhaka will judge India on its proactive performance in development, connectivity and water cooperation, among other areas. At the same time, issues such as visas need to be handled delicately, as they affect the strongest pillar of the India-Bangladesh bilateral partnership: the people.

Rishi Gupta is a commentator on global strategic affairs. Opinions are personal.

(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)