The rise of subnational power: why mayors and regional leaders will rule the world

It is no coincidence that the man most likely to replace Keir Starmer as Britain’s prime minister is Andy Burnham, the directly elected mayor of Greater Manchester. His myth and reputation, built over a decade of improving local government and public services, is such that he is now known, at least in Labor circles, as the “King in the North”. We live in a time where, more than ever, the political classes are discredited due to their broken promises and the increasing prevalence of parliamentarians without real professional experience beyond politics itself. So leaders who have demonstrated that they can do something – anything – in practice, even at the head of some kind of subnational authority, tend to have an advantage with voters who are exasperated by ordinary politicians who believe in nothing and can only come up with empty words and slogans.

Boris Johnson followed a similar path: his tenure as mayor of London (2008-2016) raised his national profile and gave him a power base that ultimately propelled him to Downing Street. But of course, none of this is new. Jacques Chirac used his 18 years as mayor of Paris (1977-1995) as a springboard to the French presidency. José María Aznar was president of the province before becoming Prime Minister of Spain. Germany has a strong tradition of state prime ministers or big city mayors – from Adenauer and Brandt to Kohl and Scholz – moving to the Chancellery. On the other side of Europe, the last three Romanian presidents were previously mayors; and the runner-up in last year’s Polish presidential election was the mayor of Warsaw. Even Vladimir Putin’s early power base was rooted in the networks of St. Petersburg, where he served as deputy mayor.

The path from local government – ​​or, for broader applicability, “subnational” power – to the top of a country’s political system is therefore well mapped. But we tend to downplay the extent to which it becomes the main route to supreme power, nor the way in which it competes with national power. The fact is that in the 21st century, lower levels of government are gaining influence, legitimacy and resources while central administrations are increasingly failing.

This is one of the most important structural tensions that modern states – regardless of how they view the democratic-authoritarian spectrum – must soon resolve. It is also a topic that receives relatively little attention as such. Certain types of pundits may obsess over supranational schemes and projects – like the ever-closer union of the EU or ideas like CANZUK – in the hope of bringing together entire states into new consortia, on the assumption that large “blocs” are needed to compete effectively in a world dominated by the US and China.

But the real – and perhaps more desirable – shift in political power is in the opposite direction: from state-level authority to subnational leaders in charge of provincial governments or large municipalities. The dream of recreating imperial-sized entities may persist on paper, but the harsh reality is that larger polities today only compound the problems of managing large-scale, complex modern systems. Dysfunctions at the national level are spreading and, in this landscape of growing failures and frustrations, some of the only good news in terms of governance and public service performance comes from subnational authorities.

Budgets tell their own story. Once again, it’s the trend that counts. Subnational governments (regions, states, provinces, cities and combined authorities) NOW account for approximately 40 percent of total public spending and 55 percent of public investment in OECD countries. This share has increased steadily over the past decades. In many unitary states the increase was even greater thanks to deliberate decentralization. Over the past 30 years, for example, California state spending has increased 2.5 times, from about $51.4 billion (44 billion euros) in fiscal year 1990-91 (approximately $131 billion or 113 billion euros in today’s money, adjusted for inflation) has more than 300 billion dollars (258 euro bars) in 2025-26.

In Britain, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) emerged in 2011 with a budget of just over £200 million (€231 million) and responsibility for only a few key functions, including transport elements. Now, 15 years later, its finances have increased significantly 10-fold, with its remit now extending to transport, skills, housing, policing duties and more.

The same dynamics are at work in non-democratic countries like China, where the province of Guangdong alone generates A GDP equivalent to that of a mid-sized G7 economy (more than $2,000 billion according to recent figures, or €1,700 billion), while provincial Party secretaries in Shanghai, Jiangsu or Zhejiang have budgets and patronage networks that dwarf many central Chinese national ministries.

To understand why this trend toward decentralization of power – or rather empowerment of subnational structures – will only increase in the future, it is worth examining some of the key forces fueling its momentum. The first is urbanization and economic concentration, with the world now predominantly urban. Large metropolises and their surrounding regions – London, Paris, New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, São Paulo – function as Actually city-states. Each is more like urban powers with a country, or at least a large part of a country, attached to itself, than the other way around. National economies are increasingly dependent on the innovation, investment and tax bases of these centers. At the same time, central governments are finding it increasingly difficult to manage this complexity and are increasingly failing in this task.

The second driving force of subnational power is deliberate decentralization and democratization, which continues and remains a current political issue. Since the 1980s, about two-thirds of countries have increase the scope and power of regional authority. In democracies this has taken the form of elected mayors, decentralization agreements (Britain) or stronger Länder (Germany). In authoritarian systems, this is a pragmatic process, as in the case of “federalism with Chinese characteristics” after 1978, which gave provinces the means to stimulate growth. Even in Putin’s Russia, some regional governors (e.g. Kadyrov in Chechnya, Minnikhanov in Tatarstan) and mayors (e.g. Sobyanin in Moscow) remain influential regional governors despite the Kremlin’s strong centralizing tendency.

Third, there is governance overload which increasingly harms central governments. Modern issues – from housing, transport, skills and climate adaptation to migration integration or economic development – ​​have hyper-local effects but are national in scope. Central bureaucracies find them too complex to ensure uniform coordination from the top. Subnational leaders can experiment, compete and adapt solutions more quickly.

Again, this has nothing to do with diet types. In the United States, governors of California, Texas or Florida often rely more on key policy issues than many senators. In France and Germany, certain regional presidents and mayors of large cities are national heavyweights – like Edouard Philippe in Le Havre, possible next president of France; or Markus Söder from the CSU in Bavaria. Meanwhile, as we mentioned, in Russia and China, control of places like Moscow, St. Petersburg, or Guangdong offers enormous political leverage.

The future of politics may well be increasingly linked to the dynamics of large cities and regions. If “follow the money” is a good rule in this and other areas, it seems that further delegation of power to subnational levels is likely. Breaking larger problems into smaller pieces that lend themselves to more localized and targeted solutions – not least through the increased competition that would result – is perhaps one of the best ways to address some of the most pressing public concerns of modern societies. Capital flows will reward well-managed countries, and local power bases will more often form the basis of national influence.

The struggle between central control and decentralization will not be determined by ideological “debates” but by concrete demonstrations of what works. The so-called “saviors” of nations should concentrate their efforts at the local and regional levels and build solidly for the future; this is where the political battle will be won.