Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and the illusion of a reset

DONALD TRUMP’S second state visit to China was intended to mark a reset of one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships. Instead, it revealed the deeper structural realities shaping the contemporary international order: a rising China increasingly confident in its influence and an America struggling to reconcile the impulses of economic nationalism with the demands of strategic competition. Although wrapped in the language of “historic deals” and “great chemistry,” the visit underscored how far the balance in engagement between the United States and China has evolved since Trump’s first trip to Beijing in 2017.

The symbolism surrounding the visit was unmistakable. Beijing orchestrated the event with characteristic precision military honors, lavish banquets, carefully curated cultural settings and repeated invocations of “mutual respect” between the great powers. Xi Jinping has sought to project continuity and calm at a time when the global system remains deeply unstable. For China, optics matters because they shape narratives, and narratives shape perceptions of power. In welcoming Trump with imperial grandeur, Beijing was not simply welcoming a foreign leader; this demonstrated that China remains at the heart of global economic and geopolitical stability despite growing tensions with the West.

The context leading up to the visit was tense. Trump’s return to the White House has reignited the muscular “America First” agenda that defined his previous presidency. Tariffs were once again used as instruments of economic coercion, and Washington stepped up pressure on Beijing by imposing restrictions on trade and technology. China has responded not with mere rhetoric, but with targeted export controls on rare earth minerals and other materials critical to advanced manufacturing and defense production. This reminds us that the days when China could be considered simply a “factory of the world” are over. Beijing now occupies dominant positions in strategic supply chains, giving it leverage that previous administrations in Washington underestimated.

By the end of 2025, the two parties had reached a fragile détente. Some customs duties have been suspended, some export restrictions have been eased and dialogue channels have been reopened. But this truce was tactical rather than transformative. Trump entered Beijing seeking headline-grabbing commitments that could be sold domestically as victories for American workers and farmers: massive agricultural purchases, orders for Boeing planes, energy exports and greater market access. Xi, meanwhile, aimed for strategic stability, reducing pressure on Chinese technology companies and, above all, strengthening Beijing’s red lines towards Taiwan.

Substantively, China appears to have gained greater value from this visit. Trump claimed success, touting billions of dollars in deals covering soybeans, beef imports, energy cooperation and aircraft purchases. Yet many of these announcements lacked specificity, timelines for implementation, or independent confirmation from Chinese authorities. The credibility problem facing Washington stems not only from China’s reluctance to act, but also from the broader reality that structural economic tensions cannot be resolved through transactional negotiations alone.

Perhaps the most important dimension of the visit concerned Taiwan. Xi Jinping reportedly stated in explicit terms that Taiwan remained the “most important” issue in bilateral relations and warned that mishandling the issue could lead to “collision or conflict.” Trump’s response thereafter was carefully ambiguous, even at times deferential. His references to Taiwan as a “small island” and his refusal to offer unequivocal assurances reinforced the impression that Beijing had succeeded in imposing its narrative on the issue.

This is important because Taiwan is no longer just a bilateral dispute; it is the central flashpoint in the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

For America’s allies and partners, Washington’s ambiguity raises troubling questions about the credibility of U.S. commitments. Beijing understands this dynamic well. It does not necessarily seek immediate reunification by force, but a gradual psychological and diplomatic normalization of its demands. Every time the United States appears hesitant, China’s strategic position gradually strengthens.

Trump entered Beijing hoping to demonstrate the enduring power of transactional diplomacy and economic pressure. Xi used the opportunity to demonstrate that China can absorb pressure while gradually defining the terms of engagement. The contrast was revealing

The timing of certain American concessions further amplified the perception of a Chinese advantage. Earlier easing of restrictions on advanced technology exports, including approval of sales of AI-related semiconductors, as well as reports of delayed or suspended arms transfers to Taiwan, created the impression that Washington had softened key positions before achieving concrete reciprocal gains. Beijing, meanwhile, has retained its influence over rare earth supply chains without making major structural concessions.

For Xi Jinping, the visit therefore achieved several objectives simultaneously. It stabilized relations at a time of economic uncertainty, reduced immediate risks of escalation, and strengthened China’s image as a patient, disciplined power capable of managing competition on its own terms. More importantly, it saved time in Beijing. Time remains one of China’s greatest strategic assets. Each year that a major conflict is avoided allows China to deepen its technological capabilities, strengthen its industrial self-sufficiency, modernize its military and expand its influence in the Global South.

However, Trump faces a much more complex political and strategic landscape after his visit. Domestically, he must demonstrate that his approach to China produces tangible results rather than symbolic showmanship. Critics in both political parties have accused him of prioritizing optics over results, while China hawks in Washington argue that concessions on technology and Taiwan weaken America’s long-term position.

The challenge for Trump is that the old assumptions underlying American debt are no longer entirely true. During the early phases of globalization, Washington believed that China’s dependence on export markets gave America overwhelming economic influence. But China’s resilience during successive rounds of sanctions, tariffs and technological restrictions demonstrated a more complex reality. Beijing has adapted, diversified its trade partnerships, expanded its domestic innovation capabilities, and weaponized interdependence where it was advantageous.

This does not mean that China has overtaken the United States overall. America retains immense assets in finance, innovation, military projection and alliance networks. But the relationship has moved from one of asymmetrical dependence to one of mutual vulnerability. This distinction fundamentally changes the nature of negotiations between the two powers.

Furthermore, unresolved geopolitical disputes continue to weigh heavily on any temporary stabilization. Little significant progress has been made on fentanyl flows, Chinese support networks linked to Iran, or broader concerns about the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific security architecture. The structural rivalry remains intact. Trade truces may delay confrontation, but they do not eliminate underlying strategic competition.

The broader significance of Trump’s visit lies in what it reveals about the evolving international order. Trump entered Beijing hoping to demonstrate the enduring power of transactional diplomacy and economic pressure. Xi used the opportunity to demonstrate that China can absorb pressure while gradually defining the terms of engagement. The contrast was revealing. One side sought immediate results and political messages; the other pursues a long-term positioning.

The visit produced what both leaders needed in the short term, but neither could translate into a lasting strategic settlement. Trump made headlines about deals and jobs. Xi ensured stability, symbolic parity with the United States and the strengthening of China’s strategic red lines. Yet behind the ceremony and rhetoric, the deeper trajectory of US-China relations remains unchanged: an escalating struggle between two powers locked in economic, technological, geopolitical and ideological competition.

The real test will not be the announcements made in Beijing, but the implementation that follows – and history offers plenty of reasons to be skeptical. As in 2017, grand declarations may ultimately give way to familiar frustrations. The difference today is that China enters this phase of rivalry more capable and better prepared for prolonged competition than at any time in its recent history.

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This comment was originally published in OPEN.

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