Marking the Trump-Xi heavyweight fight in Beijing

A week after the high-profile events of May 14 and 15 summit in Beijingthe verdict in Tokyo is divided: did US President Donald Trump hold his ground or did Chinese leader Xi Jinping gain the upper hand?

Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara struck a cautious note, emphasizing that “the stability of the U.S.-China relationship is of utmost importance” and urging China to act responsibly while maintaining strong ties with Washington.

However, much of the Japanese media is more skeptical. Headlines portrayed Xi as dominant and Trump as erratic, warning of a potential “historic deal” that could destabilize Japan and Taiwan. Some comments even ridiculed both Trump’s diplomacy and the Takaichi administration’s emphasis on close coordination with the United States.

Such hasty judgments fail to take into account the bigger picture. Assessing the long-term competition between the United States and China through the lens of a single summit – or its domestic political lens – risks obscuring the strategic realities at play.

The rivalry between the United States and China increasingly resembles a third iteration of the “Great Game” – after the Anglo-Russian competition of the 19th century and the Cold War between Washington and Moscow. This last phase is expected to take place over the next ten to twenty years.

A better analogy is a heavyweight title fight. The United States are the defending champions; China, main competitor. Neither will be knocked out in one hit. This is a 15-round fight, and the Beijing summit was, at most, the third round.

If this is the case, the outcome will only be clear in later rounds. Debating the judges’ scorecards after the third round may not say much about the ultimate winner.

Iran’s influence

Some analysts expected Washington to pressure Beijing to use its influence over Iran in the ongoing conflict. This expectation has always been unrealistic.

China has no formal allies and avoids military engagements in regions like the Gulf. Its non-interventionist posture limits its influence. Even if Beijing urged Tehran to agree to a ceasefire, its influence would be limited.

Iran, meanwhile, is struggling with the survival of its Islamic Republic at stake. China’s priority, on the other hand, is managing its relationship with the United States. Under these conditions, Tehran is unlikely to exchange a crucial bargaining chip – a ceasefire – simply at Beijing’s request.

Even if Iran may show some deference to a long-standing partner, the chances of a Chinese-brokered breakthrough remain slim.

Fears that Trump might make concessions because of his personal affinity with Xi are also exaggerated. The idea of ​​a real “friendship” between the two leaders is doubtful.

Xi’s political journey suggests a leader driven by power and control, not personal connections. Trump’s references to friendship are best understood as diplomatic rhetoric aimed at facilitating deals, not as evidence of meaningful trust.

Substantively, the summit produced no progress on the key economic, trade or security disputes that have defined the U.S.-China relationship for decades.

Washington remains deeply frustrated by what it sees as China’s mercantilist practices. Beijing, in turn, has exploited tools such as rare earth exports. Neither side shows any real willingness to compromise.

Past dialogue mechanisms—from the post-1979 Joint Economic Committee to later iterations such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and its successors—have yielded few lasting results beyond China’s episodic purchases of U.S. goods.

The same impasse persists when it comes to security. China’s military buildup in the Indo-Pacific region continues to shift the regional balance, raising a fundamental question: Would Washington make concessions on Taiwan under these conditions? This seems highly unlikely.

A warning and a risk

One point from the summit deserves attention: Beijing’s warning that mismanagement of Taiwan could lead to confrontation or even conflict.

This raises a deeper concern: China’s growing confidence could lead to excesses and miscalculations. This risk was identified decades ago by former Japanese diplomat Hisahiko Okazaki, who argued that parity between rival powers could provoke war.

As a rising power approaches military equality with a dominant power, it may begin to believe that it can win. At the same time, those in power may feel obliged to act before the balance shifts further. Such dynamics can make conflict more likely, not less likely.

Experts would do well to understand that Okazaki’s vision remains relevant today.

Strategic competition between the United States and China has only fully taken shape over the past decade. The Beijing summit is not a definitive moment but the first chapter of a prolonged struggle.

Rather than focusing on personalities or short-term perspectives, policymakers should focus on the changing balance of power. This is a long-shot clash between two seasoned heavyweights – one that will not be decided in a first round at a single summit, but over many rounds to come.