Michael Mazza on Taiwan: a tale of two tests

Five weeks after US President Donald Trump met with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Beijing, his administration now faces two important tests in the Indo-Pacific region.

The first test is that of the president himself. After meeting with Xi, Trump described arms sales to Taiwan as “a very good negotiating tool” and announced that a previously approved sale was now “on hold.” The Financial Times later reported that Beijing was awaiting approval for a visit by Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy, pending the president’s decision on the sale.

During Trump’s first term, he regularized the arms sales process. Rather than grouping sales into infrequent large lots, which were then timed to avoid coinciding with the U.S.-China diplomatic calendar, the president moved toward a process in which sales were granted on demand, regardless of timing.

This was a good thing for Washington, Taipei and even Beijing. This created greater predictability for all three parties. And by decoupling U.S.-China diplomacy from the arms sales process, it theoretically facilitated negotiations on other issues where compromise was actually possible.

But during his second term, the president abandoned this approach. He preemptively delayed final approval of a sale in exchange for a meeting with Xi in which the Chinese leader gave him little in return. Beijing is now looking to see if it can repeat that feat with a sub-cabinet official. Hence the test.

Maintaining Taiwan as a de facto independent state is in the interests of the United States, as Trump’s national security strategy makes clear.

If Trump is willing to negotiate the removal of Taiwan’s self-defense capability so that Colby can go to Beijing, Xi will have learned that the integrity of the first island chain, which the national security strategy has prioritized, is not as important to the president as a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” with China.

The second test also involves the first island chain, which stretches from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines. Last week, the Philippines confirmed that China had installed a new floating structure inside Scarborough Shoal, a disputed maritime area in the South China Sea off the western coast of Luzon.

Chinese actions at Scarborough Shoal have caused some of the highest tensions in the South China Sea in the past two decades.

During a standoff in 2012, the United States negotiated a reciprocal withdrawal.

Beijing reneged on the deal after Manila withdrew its ships, leaving China in effective control of the atoll.

Two years later, Beijing launched its island-building campaign in the South China Sea, through which it exercised greater control over the contested waterway and established a series of military bases – also in violation of a pledge made to then-US President Barack Obama at the White House not to “militarize” the sea.

Today, Beijing is once again pushing the boundaries. Make no mistake: China is directly challenging the United States. If Washington fails to respond effectively to Beijing’s installation of a floating structure, a permanent structure will eventually follow.

Mischief Reef, another controversial property that China essentially stole from the Philippines 31 years ago, is now home to a military base with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, room for 24 fighter jets and surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. Manila is rightly concerned that the future of Scarborough Shoal will resemble that of Mischief Reef. This would place Chinese intelligence facilities and power projection capabilities just 150 miles away [240km] from Luzon and only 220 miles [354km] from Manila.

An outpost at Scarborough Shoal would put Chinese forces in a better position to constrain the Philippines, disrupt future combined “Squad” operations (an emerging security partnership between Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States), and complicate allied intervention in a Taiwan Strait eventuality. Does Trump care?

The diplomatic, economic and military tools he needs to meet this challenge are at his disposal if he chooses to use them. Therein lies the second test.

To pass the first test, Trump will have to stop kowtowing to China in Taiwan. This means informing Congress of new arms sales without further hesitation. To pass the second test, the president will have to draw a line in the sand – or rather, in the water – and make Xi understand that Chinese actions at Scarborough Shoal are contrary to the strategic stability that Xi so ardently desires.

Michael Mazza is a senior director of research at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (formerly the Project 2049 Institute) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.