Deciphering Turkey’s African Policy – ​​Analysis – Eurasia Review

By Pierre Fabricius

President Recep Tayyip Erdoans Trkiye may not quite be an enigma shrouded in a mystery within an enigma, as Winston Churchill described the Soviet Union in 1939 after its incongruous pact with Nazi Germany . But his foreign policy can sometimes be enigmatic.

Last week, Trkiye was reportedly invited to become a member of BRICS member. How, many ask, can a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) join an association dominated by two identified enemies of NATO, Russia and China?

In Africa, Erdoan also surprised friends and foes in 2019 when Trkiye intervened in Libya's civil war to prevent Khalifa Haftar from seizing Tripoli. Recently he tried to reconcile two of its closest African allies, Somalia and Ethiopia, have fallen out over Ethiopia's recognition of the independence of the Somalilands in exchange for access to the sea.

This mediation dilemma dates back to 2011. When countries were deserting Somalia because Al-Shabaab terrorism made it too dangerous, Erdoan visited the country to show his support. He returned in 2016 to open an embassy. Conversely, he endeared himself to Ethiopia by supply with drones in 2021, which helped prevent Tigrayan rebel forces from capturing Addis Ababa.

In a sense, this makes Trkiye a neutral intermediary, but the country is also seen as closer to Somalia, especially after signing a new agreement. defense pact with Mogadishu in February. Erdogan is the master of surprise, of seizing opportunities.

Erdoan surprised friends and foes when Trkiye intervened in Libya to prevent Khalifa Haftar from seizing Tripoli

On the surface, his African policy seems rather orthodox. As a member of the G20, Trkiye obviously believes it is necessary to engage with the continent, as many other G20 powers have done, for example, to strengthen their support for the United Nations. This weekend, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan will chair a meeting of the Trkiye-Africa Ministerial Review Conference with his counterparts from 14 African countries ahead of the fourth Trkiye-Africa Summit in 2026.

This is part of a vast campaign of opening towards Africa, which Erdoan has greatly encouraged. Writing in 2023, former Turkish Ambassador Numan Hazar note that since 1998, the number of embassies on the continent has increased from 12 to 44, while African embassies in Ankara have increased from 10 in 2008 to 38 today. Since becoming prime minister in 2003 and president in 2014, Erdoan has visited 31 African countries.

Total trade with Africa increased from US$5.4 billion in 2003 to US$40.7 billion in 2022. Trkiyes' overall investment stock in Africa, focused on infrastructure, education and health care, amounts to 6 billion US dollars. Turkish contractors have built 1,296 projects worth $82.6 billion.

Hazar points out that the late former South African ambassador to Ankara, Tom Wheeler, said Trkiye used its soft power to expand its influence in Africa, without drawing the backlash that other countries have faced. This could partly be because Trkiye carried no colonial baggage. This lack of threat perception would be remarkable, given that Trkiye has significantly expanded its military presence in Africa.

As stated by Ali Bilgic, professor of international relations and Middle East politics at Britain's Loughborough University. The ISS todayTurkey has made notable progress in realizing its ambition to become a key economic, humanitarian and military power in sub-Saharan Africa. The creation of military bases, such as that in Somalia, and the training of local forces have solidified its geopolitical presence.

He notes that as Islamist terrorists increasingly target West African states such as Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso and Mali, Trkiye sells drones to these countries.

Ankara seeks dialogue with all parties, which is why Trkiye has neither eternal friends nor enemies, only partners

Turkey's defense industry has grown significantly, with numerous contracts signed across Africa. For example, Turkey has supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ethiopia and Libya… Additionally, Turkey has entered into agreements to provide military training and equipment to countries like Somalia, strengthening its influence in the region.

Bilgic views Ankara's efforts to mediate the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict as a diplomatic balancing act driven by Ankara's strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Horn of Africa.

However, striking a balance is becoming difficult as Ethiopia has expressed concerns over Trkiyes' deepening relations with Somalia, particularly its military support, which it perceives as a potential threat to its own security . This postponed Ankara's mediation efforts.

Bilgic says Trkiyes' more assertive foreign policy has also strained relations with NATO allies and the European Union.

He does not find Trkiyes' potential inclusion in BRICS, despite its NATO membership, incongruous. Rather, it reflects Erdo's multifaceted approach to foreign policy. This decision is not seen as an alternative to NATO or the West, but as part of a realistic policy in which Ankara seeks to engage with all parties. This approach means that Turkey has neither eternal friends nor enemies, but only partners.

Erdo's ambiguous approach is also evident in the way he governs his own country. It is apparently a democracy that holds regular elections. But Freedom House evaluate Trkiye is not free, saying Erdoan and his Justice and Development Party had become increasingly authoritarian in recent years, consolidating significant power through constitutional changes and imprisoning opponents and critics.

Africa has become the terrain of Erdoan's struggle against the moderate Islamic movement Glen or Hizmet.

The recent death in exile of Fethullah Glen, spiritual leader of the moderate Islamic movement Glen or Hizmet, raises another aspect of Erdoans Trkiye's ambiguities. He and Glen were once allies, but they fell out in 2011 when Erdoan accused the Glenists of trying to overthrow the government. The Erdoan government also accused them of plotting the abortive 2016 coup and labeled them a terrorist organization.

Africa has also become a ground for Erdoan's struggle against Hizmet, as the movement runs schools in South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Ghana and in Egypt, Hizmet sources say. Trkiye has pressured African countries to close Hizmet schools or detain its members, they say, and several have done so.

This pressure has caused tensions with certain governments, including South Africa. Hezmet believes that one of the motivations for Erdoan's efforts in favor of Africa, including aid and investment, has been to gain leverage to put pressure on countries to stifle Hizmet.

Erdoan also managed to counter his Middle Eastern regional rivals on African soil, such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which supported Hafter in Libya. And its growing military support for Somalia is helping to block the United Arab Emirates, which supports Somaliland.

Erdo's apparent reasons for expanding Trkiyes' African footprint are undoubtedly genuine trade, investment, humanitarian aid, and national and regional stability. But it seems that Africa is also a step to enable him to pursue his ambition of making Trkiye a global player.