How MBS and Xi Jinping have become spirits

In recent years, the Nike advertising campaigns have represented a series of previously unthinkable scenes: the students of students, driving and even playing Sportsalone, not accompanied by male guards. While Nike could be selling sneakers, his partner in Riyadh sold something much more consecutive: Mohammed Bin Salman, the prince-engineer of the social transformation of the Saudi Arabs. Since he assumed the role of Crown Prince in 2017, MBS presented himself as the avant-garde of a modernizing monarchyone wishing to reinvent himself with cloisted petostate in a dynamic center of innovation and cultural rebirth. At the heart of this transformation is found Vision 2030Its scanning plan to diversify the economy dependent on the oil of the kingdoms and redesign its global image.

Through the Asian continent, another leader commands the Jinping Côtagexi, the president of Chinas and the primordial leader who is often considered to be the antithesis of a reformer. Where MBS is described as modernizer, XI is considered a revivalist: to retreat the liberalizations, to tighten the grip of the Chinese Communist Party and resuscitate a political style recalling Mao Zedong. However, for all their differences in the surface, the Saudi prince and the Chinese president share something deeper and more sustainable: an instinct for consolidation and a desire to reinge the architecture of the state around them.

The MBSS reformist veneer masks a more radical restructuring of the political foundations of the Saudi Arabs. The traditional angular stones of powerful oil income, the legitimacy of the Wahhabi clerics and the consensus of the royal family have all been methodically weakened. In their place is centralized authority with MBS at its top. The religious elites that have once influenced have been sterilized or sidelined; The high -ranking Royals were imprisoned or politically neutralized. The monarchy, formerly a sprawling network of family deliberation, now works more as a human regime.

MBS considers traditional advisory structures not as active but obstacles involving the rapid execution of its ambitious program. He takes a skeptical eye to the past and turns to his neighbors in the Gulf, Qatar and the water, where concentrated authority has allowed faster modernization. In the new order of the kingdoms, a power of ministers does not result from the line or the religious sanction but from personal loyalty to the crown prince. This change not only upsets existing hierarchies, but redirects the entire state apparatus to serve a vision of a man.

In China, Xi Jinping made a similar, but more discreet coup, against the institutional heritage of its predecessors. After the excesses of Maos, Deng Xiaoping instituted reforms designed to prevent the rise of another all-powerful figure. Term limits have been introduced. Collective leadership has become the rule. The Chinese Communist Party, although never democratic, was at least designed to be more predictable. XI methodically canceled this framework. His inner circle is stacked with loyalists, his detractors have been silenced and his face is omnipresented return to the cult of personality which once defined the Maoist rule.

The irony is bitter: XIS 'own family was the victim of the cultural revolution, but it adopted the very tools of power which once ravaged its lineage. His leadership model emphasizes personal authority on parties' consensus. Consequently, the institutional railings built over the decades have been weakened or dismantled, creating a system in which the leader stands alone, without control and surrounded by deference.

In Riyadh and Beijing, power mechanisms have been redesigned to prioritize obedience on deliberation. When institutions have once balanced authority, sycophance now reigns. The two men replaced tradition with a personal ambition. The Saudi clerics and the ancient royals, the Chinese Politburo and the center of the reformist were reduced. In their place are loyal devices that echo rather than question the visions of their respective leaders.

This transformation goes beyond governance on narrative control. MBS and Xi built powerful mythologies to justify their domination. MBS sells Vision 2030 as a national renaissance, while XI markets the China's dream as a return to imperial greatness. In both cases, the nation becomes an extension of the leaders will do so. The line between the state and the blurred ponadades. It is therefore not surprising that the links between Saudi Arabia and China have warmed up. Despite Riyadh's long -standing alignment with Washington, the kingdom has found a kinship in Beijing: another autocracy, governed by a man who considers himself the embodied state.

But with personalization comes from the danger. The systems that depend on the instincts of a man are intrinsically fragile. When advisers become echo chambers and dissent is criminalized, governance is deteriorating. The missteps are not corrected. Autocracies often fall not because they are overturned but because they collapse under the weight of their own pride.

MBS and XIs each face these risks. In Saudi Arabia, centralized power coupled with economic volatility can cause troubles if reforms disappoint. In China, XIS assistance on Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Southern China Sea is likely to alienate the global partners and outdo the national ambition. The two leaders stand on high pedees, but the higher the perch, the more dangerous the fall.

The parallels between MBS and Xi speak to a broader truth about authoritarian modernity. It is attractive to believe that a single man can make a nation a nation through stickers. However, the very institutions that these men dismantle are the same people who provide resilience, comments and continuity. In the short term, the leader wins. But over time, the state can be dangerously dug in appearance, but fragile at the base.