The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing asks the question: stability for whom?

The photographs were striking: US President Donald Trump and People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping strolling from the Temple of Heaven, two men whose rivalry between the countries is defining the geopolitical moment.

The Star-Spangled Banner played, children cheered and a 21-gun salute rang out across Tiananmen Square as the two walked the red carpet in the Great Hall of the People Square. Xi then quietly warned that if Taiwan was “mismanaged,” the two countries could end up in conflict – “an extremely dangerous situation.”

Critical response

The Beijing summit was both a picture of controlled calm and a window onto a perilous drift. Fareed Zakaria, who is not a supporter of Trump’s foreign policy, allowed on CNN, Trump may have exploited “the right instincts” in handling the US-China relationship – recognizing that China’s economic, technological and military clout makes a full-scale confrontation a formula for tearing the global economy apart. Elizabeth Economy, writing in the Financial Times, took a clearer view: the summit was “little more than a collection of low-risk photo ops,” with each side telling the story it wanted to tell. Nicholas Burns, former US ambassador to China, threaded needle, crediting the meeting’s modest business results while sounding a clear alarm about Taiwan.

These three perspectives, taken together, point to a single, sobering conclusion: the summit delivered a fragile stabilization of the bilateral relationship that structurally benefits China and leaves the United States with unresolved vulnerabilities – particularly in Taiwan.

“Equity and reciprocity”

The finding at the top of the White House fact sheet – that the United States and China agreed to “build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity” – seems reassuring. This framework is a policy evolution Xi has long sought.new type of relationship between great powers“, a concept that previous US administrations have consistently refused to endorse.

The Trump team added the qualifier “fairness and reciprocity” – except that the underlying architecture is one that Beijing has wanted for years: a framework that normalizes Chinese power and creates obligations of mutual restraint.

A strategic stability initiative of the type that China is considering could become a “poison pill,” according to Ambassador Burns, potentially limiting the United States’ ability to publicly criticize China or defend Taiwan without violating a framework agreed upon by both parties.

Beijing, for its part, has no illusions. China’s own analysts describe the dynamic not as a reset but as a “calculated stalling tactic” — buying time for China to continue reducing risks from U.S. technological dependence while taking advantage of the period of superficial stability to fend off U.S. efforts to contain it.

Ambiguity over Taiwan

Perhaps the most dangerous legacy of the summit is not what was agreed, but what was left unresolved. Trump’s post-summit comments on Fox News amounted to a continuing equivocation on Taiwan — not a reversal of U.S. policy officially — but something arguably more damaging: an ambiguity.

Trump called the $24 billion arms package “a very good bargaining chip” and said he was “not seeking” independence for Taiwan. It has refused to engage in arms sales which the Taiwan Relations Act strongly supports.

Yet Xi’s initial strategy and his stern warning about Taiwan at the summit appear to have been reflected, at least in Trump’s subsequent attitude. The People’s Republic has now inserted Taiwan into the calculus of US domestic negotiations in an unprecedented manner.

This week brought further confirmation of the instability that lies beneath the smiling surface. Trump declared his intention to speak with Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, prompting Beijing to demand that Washington respect the “common understanding” reached at the summit. Following Trump’s comments on Fox News, it was announcement that the United States was suspending arms sales due to the Trump administration’s war against Iran.

Global trade relations

Meanwhile, the 17 business executives who traveled to Beijing returned with mixed results. Boeing announced a commitment for 200 planes. Sales of Nvidia’s H200 chips have been authorized to some Chinese buyers. Citi has obtained national banking approval. But Tesla’s hopes for fully autonomous driving were not confirmed and much of the wider delegation – Apple, BlackRock, Goldman, Blackstone – returned home with strengthened relationships but no major new access assured.

Jamie Dimon’s observation at the JP Morgan conference in Shanghai – that China has become “more cohesive” in its relations with other countries – reflects a real shift in the perception of global businesses. As the credibility of the United States crumbles and its traditional allies recalibrate, China is positioning itself as the stable pole of the international order. This positioning is partly marketing, partly real.

China has not taken steps to fill the leadership vacuum it claims the United States created. Its foreign aid remains minimal, its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, and its maritime assurance remains intact. The world, according to economics, faces two superpowers that want the privileges of global leadership without the responsibilities – and most countries conclude that the answer is “none of the above.”

What the summit did not change was the deep institutional architecture of competition between the United States and China. Tariffs, export controls, semiconductor restrictions and industrial policy enjoy strong bipartisan support. Washington’s goal in the sectors that define long-term power – artificial intelligence, quantum computing, critical minerals, biotechnology – is not accommodation but domination.

The risk is not that the United States will soften its competitive position at the structural level. This is because a transactional president, acting on instinct rather than doctrine, forgoes the clarity of signals on which his allies and adversaries – particularly in Taiwan – depend.

A “constructive strategic stability relationship” that leaves Taiwan’s security status as a bargaining chip is stability for China. For the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners, this is a fragile détente with a dangerous asterisk. The smiles at the Temple of Heaven were real. Just like the warning that followed.

Marsha Vande Berg is Vice Chair of the OMFIF Advisory Board and Managing Director of MVandeBerg Advisory. She writes “Context at Geostrategics” coming soon to Substack.

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