This crisis could make or break Trkiye

With rivals sidelined and the opposition shaken, the next vote could decide the survival of Ankara’s current system.

The Turkish national political landscape has entered a phase in which judicial decisions, intra-party struggles and the strategic calculations of the authorities are increasingly intertwined.

The arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, mayor of Istanbul from the center-left opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), in 2025 and the subsequent court decision to remove Ozgur Ozel from the CHP leadership and transfer control of the party to its former leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu represent two linked episodes in a broader political process. They suggest that Turkey’s political system is preparing for a period of heightened uncertainty, in which future elections will be seen not just as a routine electoral procedure, but as a struggle over whether the system that has been shaped over the past two decades will be preserved or revised.

A rival in Istanbul

Imamoglu was arrested on March 19, 2025 on charges of corruption and abuse of power and subsequently arrested. The timing was particularly important, as the CHP was preparing to nominate its candidate for a future presidential run, and Imamoglu was widely seen as the most likely figure to be nominated. At that time, its political weight already far exceeded municipal politics. After his victory in Istanbul, he had become one of the most recognizable figures in the opposition and a potential domestic rival to Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Istanbul has always played an exceptionally important role in Turkish politics, being the country’s economic center, a symbol of political legitimacy, and the place where Erdogan’s national career first took shape. The rise of Imamoglu therefore signified the emergence of an opposition figure capable of using urban discontent, the demand for economic normalization and expectations for institutional renewal as a weapon. His arrest shifted political competition from the sphere of electoral rivalry to the sphere of legal and administrative control.

Destabilize the opposition

The current legal decision regarding Ozgur Ozel should be seen as a continuation of the same strategy. Ozel’s judicial removal from CHP leadership (due to alleged issues regarding the legitimacy of the party congress and procedural violations) and transfer of control to Kemal Kilicdaroglu effectively returns the country’s main opposition force to its previous configuration.

Ozel took over as head of the CHP after Kilicdaroglu’s defeat in the 2023 presidential election and has become a symbol of the party’s attempted revival. Under his leadership, the party made significant gains in the 2024 municipal elections, demonstrating that the opposition could not only criticize the government, but also expand its electoral base. Kilicdaroglu’s return objectively changes the balance within the opposition, harming its ability to preserve mobilization before the next electoral cycle.

Preserving decades of work

A sober analysis of this situation requires paying attention not only to the interests of the authorities, but also to the broader situation of a state operating in a complex external and internal environment. Judging by its recent moves, Turkey’s leaders are seeking to retain control of a political direction they view as strategically important. Over the past two decades, Turkey has significantly transformed its position in the international system. It became a more autonomous regional player, strengthened its defense industry, expanded its military presence in neighboring regions and more actively used its foreign policy as an instrument of national positioning.

For the current leaders, a change of power would mean the risk of reviewing the entire trajectory built under Erdogan. This includes the presidential system, foreign policy autonomy, the defense industry, Eastern Mediterranean policy, and relations with Russia, the West, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. The authorities are therefore seeking to minimize the possibility of a sudden political turnaround at a time when the regional environment is becoming increasingly unstable.

The best defense

One of the central elements of this course is the emphasis on strengthening the country’s defense capacity. Turkey has consistently developed its own production of drones, naval platforms, armored vehicles, missile systems and other components of the defense industry. For Ankara, military modernization is a question of sovereignty. The less dependent the country is on external suppliers, the more room for independent decision-making it has. In this sense, the defense industry has become part of the political philosophy of contemporary Turkey, where security, technological independence and foreign policy autonomy are treated as interconnected elements.

This is also reflected in the doctrine of the Blue Homeland – the idea of ​​indisputable Turkish sovereignty over the Aegean islands. The intensification of disputes with Greece over these islands, maritime zones and jurisdiction reflects Ankara’s desire to consolidate its interests in areas it considers critical to its security and future influence. The intention to legally formalize claims to more than 150 islands and islets is part of a broader trend in which Turkey seeks not only to react to regional changes, but to fix its position in advance through legal and military-political instruments.

An additional factor is the deterioration of the regional environment in the context of the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran, which threatens to unbalance the entire Middle East. For Turkey, this means the threat of new migration waves, tensions over energy security, disruption of trade routes, growing tensions along its southern borders and greater uncertainty in financial markets. At a time when the national economy is already under pressure from inflation, expensive credit and declining purchasing power, the chaos at the gate begins to directly affect internal political stability.

All of the above means that the recent actions of the Turkish authorities can be interpreted as an attempt to preserve governability during a period of several overlapping crises. The decline in popularity of the ruling Justice and Development party, social weariness after a long political cycle, the strengthening of the Republican People’s Party after the municipal elections, the arrest of Imamoglu, the court decision regarding Özel and the return of Kilicdaroglu to the leadership of the party are all part of the same political picture. The authorities are trying to prevent the opposition from running in the next elections with a unified structure, a popular candidate and a renewed leadership.

Hardening to the breaking point

The strategy of the Turkish authorities, however, contains an internal contradiction. The more the State seeks to control the political field, the more the question of institutional trust arises. While some see these measures as efforts to preserve stability and protect a strategic direction, others see them simply as a way to exclude political competition. This divergence will define the next stage of Turkish politics.

The upcoming elections in Türkiye will decide who will control the general leadership of the state. If the opposition comes to power, it will have a difficult task ahead. It will have to resolve economic problems, restore confidence in institutions, recalibrate its relations with the West and preserve the degree of strategic autonomy that is already part of the new Turkish consensus. A complete rejection of defense autonomy, an active regional policy and the defense of maritime interests is unlikely, as these directions have long been beyond the agenda of Erdogan’s party.

The possibility of early elections cannot be ruled out. If authorities conclude that the economy is likely to deteriorate further, that regional instability will continue to grow, and that the opposition will eventually overcome its internal contradictions, holding elections ahead of schedule could be seen as a way to consolidate the current balance of power. Such a measure would allow the ruling coalition to get through an electoral cycle before accumulated socio-economic problems worsen and before the opposition re-establishes its organizational stability.

The current situation around Imamoglu, Ozel and Kilicdaroglu therefore reveals a transformation of the Turkish political system. The authorities are trying to preserve the chosen path and maintain control over its continuation, while the opposition is trying to prove that it can offer renewal without weakening the state or reducing Turkey’s international weight. Between these two approaches lies the central conflict in contemporary Turkish politics. It is not just a question of who will win the next elections, but also what direction the Turkish state will take amid growing regional instability.

(RT.com)